@pagan,
Oh I should make clear that this original post wasn't necessarily about Skepticism (as skeptics eventually give up such justifications like this). But it is an interesting "problem" about debates that came to being from an ancient skeptic, then further analyzed by Markus Lammenranta.
pagan;97421 wrote:hi absolution and welcome to the forum,
i find this original post a bit confusing. I read your article on skepticism and found it interesting though there were two things that didn't quite feel right. One was the reliance upon logic at times and the other the criticism of relativism. This thread gives me an opportunity to perhaps clarify what you and skepticism mean.
Yes, Markus Lammenranta is an epistemologist, so his arguments end up very logic orientated. I wouldn't take his argument though as the stance of skepticism in general. It is a specific interpretation of an ancient greek academic skeptic. For a more general introduction on skepticism, I can send over an article that explains it better.
pagan;97421 wrote:
The proposition is that p and ~p are the only two possible beliefs in response to a particular question. (This immediately makes me feel that the question is a logically biased question.)
eg "does god exist?" Would this be considered such a question? Because if so then to insist that there are only two possible beliefs, corresponding uniquely to one of the two answers, seems premature. The reason is that on the face of it there are only two beliefs that can arise from it. Yes and No. (Don't know is presumably not counted as a belief or valid response to the proposed type questions). However, there is a massive assumption written in here. Namely that the question is unambiguous in interpretation.
It could be such that there could be more than one belief. But this interpretation focuses on two people with two opposing beliefs. You could imagine adding more, then having each belief go against each other in separate debates, and this interpretation would hold in each case. You are right though, it assumes that the question or the idea in the first place is well understood in the same way by both parties. Otherwise this interpretation doesn't really work.
pagan;97421 wrote:
It could be that (through logic or otherwise) two people could figure out that although they initially disagreed, that they subsequently found out through discussion that they had interpreted the question differently. Once they agreed upon an interpretation it is possible that they subsequently agree without changing their minds about the original belief that inspired their first responses. (something that does happen, and even if it doesn't, debates about interpretation are very common)
But what i find really odd is why the whole logical 5 steps above would be formulated in the first place. "(5) We should suspend judgment about p."
So if they each had a different understanding of the question and then agree, or just agree at all, then there will be no debate, and thus this interpretation would be invalid. But what is assumed here is that there is a debate, and each person understands the question and has opposing beliefs. Or it might just suffice, that one is playing "devil's advocate" and chooses to debate an opposite viewpoint. And what Lammenranta is saying here, this debate thus becomes irresolvable if faced against a devil's advocate. In a way you have to imagine someone who doesn't agree to any of your evidence. In this way the debate goes to infinite regression (goes on forever), or one of the debatees would have to assume what they are trying to prove to be justification in itself (called circular reasoning). And for the most part people don't accept circular reasoning as a justification unless relativism is allowed. So Lammenranta goes to explain how the debate is still irresolvable if relativism is allowed. Because one person could say that there is no relativism and relativistically they would be true. But then anything and everything could be true, and that may be the cause, but it is hard to have a definition of true without false, and this area I admit doesn't seem to be well understood.
pagan;97421 wrote:
Surely the suspension of judgement is implicit in skepticism full stop? I don't mean to imply that skeptics therefore do not act, but as i understood it they act out of the belief that they could be wrong. Like a fallibilist?
So if you are 3rd person in this debate, a spectator you could say, without a good reason to choose either side, since either side will end up in infinite regress or circularity, you must suspend your judgment on which one is correct. For the most part, the great majority of philosophers assume that the suspension of judgment is the first step of skepticism. Although I argue it is the self admission of unknowing is the first step, but this leads to the suspension of judgment anyway.
Fallibilism and Skepticism can be quite similar, in fact it is hard to distinguish the two at times. It seems to be more of a lack of understanding between academic and pyrrhonic skepticism that led to fallibilism. So for the most part the fallibilists act on appearances, knowing they could be wrong, (in the exact same fashion as the pyrrhonic skeptics), and criticize the academic skeptics for asserting that there is no knowledge (just as the pyrrhonic skeptics did). The only major difference I see between pyrrhonic skeptics and fallibilists is that the fallibilists are in alive in the time where the scientific method as invented so they have a method to advocate. But in general skepticism does not make any assumptions on the validity of appearances, so how to "act" is up to the individual. And skeptics admit the possible fallibility of skepticism so in that way skepticism becomes a continual search, but the way to go about that is up to the skeptic.
pagan;97421 wrote:
With regards to the relativism.
why does this follow? Again it seems like an almost pathological logical bias (lol) Is it inconcievable that there is an interpretation of relativism that cannot be dissected in this way?
I mean even by the biased language of binary opposition ....... If it is inconcievable to you, then logic rules and you are not a skeptic about logic. If it is concievable to you, then it shows that skepticism towards binary logic is philosophically healthy?
You have came across a good point that is raised in modern skepticism. To accept this argument is correct you must have faith that the logic of the argument is correct. In this way skeptics may take this argument to become a skeptic, but once they reach skepticism they realize they must give up their faith in this argument. As a pyrrhonic skeptic by the name of Sextus Empiricus said, these arguments to become skeptics are like bridges that burn themselves down after use. In general skeptical arguments start with some sort of definitions that show some sort of certainty then they logically show how they are inconsistent. So one could debate whether if the definitions have problems or logic in general has problems. And being a skeptic myself, I don't know which is the problem so I suspend judgment on the issue, and in general I don't accept Lammenranta's interpretation as being "correct", I just find it interesting since I don't have a good way to refute it except his methods of logic in themselves could be flawed.
