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The Ship of Theseus - mind, body and identity

 
 
kennethamy
 
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Reply Thu 18 Feb, 2010 05:21 pm
@Emil,
Emil;129736 wrote:
Ok, good. Then, do you still disagree with Swartz about what is essential for a person? If I had a complete memory loss and knew nothing of philosophy or science or anything that is central to my personality, would you really agree that I was the same person? If my mother lost all memories I would probably not think she was the same person as before. Even though she would still be the same human being.

Yes, you were comparing them. Read your own posts if you don't remember.


What I was doing was saying that I don't have to read Eddy to know that what she said is false, and I don't need to read S. to know that what he says (if he said what was reported) is false. I wrote that in response to your remark that I should not have judged what S. said was false unless I had read what he wrote. I don't think that is comparing him with Eddy. Do you?

About your first point, I think it is a good one. It assumes, though, that DNA is simply a bodily category, and not something more. And that is not clear to me.
Emil
 
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Reply Thu 18 Feb, 2010 05:35 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;129748 wrote:
What I was doing was saying that I don't have to read Eddy to know that what she said is false, and I don't need to read S. to know that what he says (if he said what was reported) is false. I wrote that in response to your remark that I should not have judged what S. said was false unless I had read what he wrote. I don't think that is comparing him with Eddy. Do you?


In a way you were, by analogy. My point was that you should grant him some more respect, if not because he is a retired philosophy professor, but then because I say so and I assume you have some respect for my intellectual capabilities. I'm quite familiar with Swartz work and I think his views about modal logic, foreknowledge, free will are closer to being correct. His views are quite similar to yours too, and mine. So us three have rather similar views on these matters.

Quote:
About your first point, I think it is a good one. It assumes, though, that DNA is simply a bodily category, and not something more. And that is not clear to me.


I don't understand what you mean.
0 Replies
 
Pyrrho
 
  1  
Reply Thu 18 Feb, 2010 09:58 pm
@Emil,
Emil;129736 wrote:
Ok, good. Then, do you still disagree with Swartz about what is essential for a person? If I had a complete memory loss and knew nothing of philosophy or science or anything that is central to my personality, would you really agree that I was the same person? [emphasis added] If my mother lost all memories I would probably not think she was the same person as before. Even though she would still be the same human being.

Yes, you were comparing them. Read your own posts if you don't remember.



Whether kennethamy agrees with you or not, I do not accept your claim that your memories are essential to your personality. Presumably, if you had such a memory loss, without anything else being changed about you, and were again exposed to philosophy, you would be interested in it again. How would that make your personality any different?

Also, if it were essential for your personality, then it would surely be redundent for Swartz to say:

[INDENT][INDENT]I remain convinced that memory and personality are the essential {page 390} core of the concept of personal identity.[/INDENT][/INDENT]

Chapter 12 - Persons
(It is the first sentence of the second to last paragraph in section 12.7, which can easily be found simply by using the search function of one's browser for words in the quote. As kennethamy has expressed some doubt about my reports regarding what Swartz has stated, I suggest he particularly does so with the quotes I have given thus far.)

If memory is essential for personality, then he could have said:

I remain convinced that personality is the essential core of the concept of personal identity.

But be that as it may, I remain convinced that memory is not essential for the concept of personal identity. If, for example, my wife lost her memory, I would still regard her as my wife, and would want her to get to know me again. Presumably, she would again come to feel about me similarly to the way she does now, just as I would expect you, Emil, to be interested in philosophy when exposed to it if you lost your memory without any other change in you.

---------- Post added 02-18-2010 at 11:13 PM ----------

Emil;129693 wrote:
...
I'm not very convinced by your "clearly wrong"'s, as you consider Graham Priest clearly wrong though you haven't studied his works at all. Same goes for Pyrrho. I have studied some of his works and he is not clearly wrong, though he may be wrong. I don't know. You would have to meet him by the arguments, not just sweep him away as "clearly wrong".
...



But I have read the relevant chapter of his book. Swartz gives no good reason to suppose that having amnesia makes one a different person.
0 Replies
 
 

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