The Ship of Theseus - mind, body and identity

Does that apply to a human, whose body is continually changing structure and having its constituent parts replaced?

Yes, but the whole was still considered that particular person. If Bill had a nose job, he's still Bob (Sorry, I mean bill) and in the case of the Ship of Theseus, the whole ship was basically replaced. Identity is incased within a whole.

So, my question is, what do people here think about this?

I don't know if Swartz and you are speaking about the same thing. Personality/Memory and Person must be distinguished here. I believe Swartz was referring to the former when he uses "personal identity", and so what he says does seem true.

We would still call a dead person the same person they were when they were alive, but we would not say this to mean they still had personality.

And it seems to me that if my father lost all of his memories, we would still call him the same person, but when we said, "He's not the same person", we would be using the phrase to mean, "He doesn't have the same personality, memories or qualities which corresponded with his previous personal identity".

We of course would not be speaking from a legal standpoint at all.

This is regarding something stated by Norman Swartz :

[INDENT][INDENT]Without veridical memory, there cannot be personal identity.[/INDENT][/INDENT]

at section 12.7 of:
Chapter 12 - Persons

If a man loses his memory, is he now a different person? If your father was struck on the head, such that he lost all of his memories, but was otherwise okay, would he still be your father, or would he be a different person then?


My opinion is that the person would be the same person without the memory, so that Swartz is wrong. The person I was privately discussing this with was not so sure about this. However, I am inclined to believe that most people are on my side on this, and that the law in every country, or practically every country, is on my side on this. (As, for example, the person would not have to get a new birth certificate and name, and would own the same property, have the same debts, etc.)

So, my question is, what do people here think about this?

Over time, the cells in a human body are replaced. I do not know what the current scientific estimate is for all the cells in a body to be replaced, but do you think it right or wrong to say that the person is the same person regardless of whether or not all of their cells are replaced over time?

Of course, in practice, people do say that it is the same person, no matter how often or how many times all of the cells are replaced. Do you think this should be our way of speaking, or should the "new" person be required to get a new birth certificate, new driver's license, go to school again (as the earlier person is the one who got the education), etc.?

---------- Post added 02-18-2010 at 11:22 AM ----------

I don't know if I should start a new thread, or simply add on to this one. If the moderators of this forum think that it should be a new thread, please detach this post and start a new thread, with whatever title you regard as appropriate.

I was having a discussion with someone (not on a message board) about the following:

This is regarding something stated by Norman Swartz :

[INDENT][INDENT]Without veridical memory, there cannot be personal identity.[/INDENT][/INDENT]

at section 12.7 of:
Chapter 12 - Persons

If a man loses his memory, is he now a different person? If your father was struck on the head, such that he lost all of his memories, but was otherwise okay, would he still be your father, or would he be a different person then?


My opinion is that the person would be the same person without the memory, so that Swartz is wrong. The person I was privately discussing this with was not so sure about this. However, I am inclined to believe that most people are on my side on this, and that the law in every country, or practically every country, is on my side on this. (As, for example, the person would not have to get a new birth certificate and name, and would own the same property, have the same debts, etc.)

So, my question is, what do people here think about this?

Except that forgetting everything may not alter the personality. And this is only an extreme example of what is constantly occurring with people all of the time, as people are forgetting things all the time.

It seems to me that we should either say that a person does not continue through time, because the person is somewhat different from one moment to the next, or we should reject the idea that a person who has amnesia is not the same person as before. I prefer the latter of these, as the absolute identity that the former suggests is impractical and goes very much against common usage (for the reason of being very impractical).

You may be right about the laws on countries, but I don't see why that would be relevant. I don't have any evidence that the concept that the law uses of personhood is the same as the one I am using. Indeed, the concept that I am using is quite vague but the the law (in my country at least) is using is not vague. A law with such a vague terminology could not work very well, so it has to use a different, simplified concept. Swartz also made this point somewhere in that book.

I don't think so. He seems to be using "personal identity" to indicate particular persons. You might want to take a look at section 12.5, where he discusses theories of personhood. One of the theories mentioned is:

Except that forgetting everything may not alter the personality. And this is only an extreme example of what is constantly occurring with people all of the time, as people are forgetting things all the time.

True enough, but that does not mean that the law is based on nothing.

It seems to me that we should either say that a person does not continue through time, because the person is somewhat different from one moment to the next, or we should reject the idea that a person who has amnesia is not the same person as before. I prefer the latter of these, as the absolute identity that the former suggests is impractical and goes very much against common usage (for the reason of being very impractical).

Did Swartz really say that? I am surprised. If he did, then he is obviously wrong. Amnesiacs don't become different persons just because they have amnesia. X and Y are the same persons iff X and Y are spatially and temporally continuous with each other.

Every person I have ever known has been a human being. By "human being" I do not mean, as this ter m is sometimes used, " a decent, upright person ", but rather I mean a living animal of the species Homo sapiens: a flesh-and-blood mammalian creature having a head, a torso, and typically two ar ms, two legs, etc., standing upright, breathing air, eating a variety of organic produce, etc.

While every person I have met, and expect to meet, is a human
being, it is not at all clear that persons must be human beings or that
all human beings are persons. At least for the moment we want to leave it as an open question whether a person could have a nonhuman body (an animal body or an electromechanical body perhaps). Then, too, anacephalic infants (human beings bor n with no brain) who may be able to carry on some basic life processes are not conscious and have no prospects of consciousness. They are human beings, in that they have human (albeit defective) bodies, but it is arguable whether such grievously deficient, nonconscious human beings can be reasonably regarded as being persons. [359-360]

But S. is clearly wrong, anyway. That the notion of "same person" in the law is more precise than in ordinary use is no good reason not to consider the law's use of "same person". That we do not think that an amnesiac needs a new passport or a new birth certificate seems to me to support the view that an amnesiac is not a different person. Doesn't it you?

One of the most difficult problems some persons have when they
first approach these questions is to sort out the difference between the
legal criteria for personhood and the conceptual criteria. The Law is a poor touchstone for deciding conceptual issues. The Law, in some jurisdictions, may rule, for example, that a fetus is a person. But although the Law may so rule, one can always ask, "Does this law comport with what our concept of personhood is? Do we have good philosophical grounds for accepting that law, or should we want to argue that it rests on a conceptual mistake and ought to be changed?" We are not logically, legally, or morally bound to accept the decisions of Law in constructing our own best concept of personhood. Ideally, the order of precedence ought to be the other way round: Law ought to try to capture the best thinking of the society; it ought to follow the best thinkers, not lead them.

Thus, even if 'the Law' (and of course ' the Law ' is hardly monolithic, but varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, society to society) were to say "anyone is ( legally) a person who satisfies the conditions a, b, and c", that would certainly not answer for us the question how we ought best to conceive of personhood. Even if in the eyes of the Law every human being were to be considered a person, that would not tell us whether from a considered philosophical point of view that was a warranted conclusion or not. We may be legally obliged to act in accord with the Law, but we surely do not have to believe or think in accord with the Law.

Then, too, the Law is nearly always reactive. It responds to needs and disputes as they arise and become issues in the community. The Law seldom anticipates changing beliefs and thus does not plan in advance for them. But metaphysics, and philosophy in general, is different. Metaphysicians are free to speculate, and indeed considerably enjoy speculating, on situations which have not arisen - and indeed may never arise - in their attempts to refine our concepts. For metaphysicians, the Law may be a storehouse of case studies, a repository of much of traditional thought, but it can hardly serve as the arbiter of the cogency of a conceptual reconstruction. [360-361]

No, it does not, as it seems to me that the law is using another concept of personhood that we normally do.

Yes, and doesn't Swartz acknowledge that earlier in the work? He says something along the lines of that people, in a legal sense, are beings which have rights. But I wasn't clear if he went on to distinguish this from his discussions on "personal identity".

Can you shed some light?

Maybe you should read what he wrote. The book is freely available online. When Swartz talks about person, he is talking about personality, not the body. "person" is sometimes used to refer to the body. The body is still the same even though the mind/brain has a complete memory loss.



---------- Post added 02-18-2010 at 07:05 PM ----------



I'm not very convinced by your "clearly wrong"'s, as you consider Graham Priest clearly wrong though you haven't studied his works at all. Same goes for Pyrrho. I have studied some of his works and he is not clearly wrong, though he may be wrong. I don't know. You would have to meet him by the arguments, not just sweep him away as "clearly wrong".

No, it does not, as it seems to me that the law is using another concept of personhood that we normally do.

I don't have to study the works of Mary Baker Eddy (the Christian Scientist) to think she is clearly wrong when she says there is no disease, and no death. But I was relying on the report of Pyrrho. If what S. believes implies that an amnesiac is a different person (and I don't know that is what he believes) then he is clearly wrong, for amnesiacs are not different persons from what they before. But, if he means by "person" personality (for some weird reason) then, of course, I am not talking about that.

I don't have to study the works of Mary Baker Eddy (the Christian Scientist) to think she is clearly wrong when she says there is no disease, and no death. But I was relying on the report of Pyrrho. If what S. believes implies that an amnesiac is a different person (and I don't know that is what he believes) then he is clearly wrong, for amnesiacs are not different persons from what they before. But, if he means by "person" personality (for some weird reason) then, of course, I am not talking about that.

Well, personality and memory are the two essentials for being a person, according to Swartz. Not all humans are persons (anacephalic infants), and it's theorized that not all persons must be human (Wookies, for instance).

Why do you think it is a weird to consider a person to be one who has memory and personality? May I ask what you mean when you say "person"? Are you speaking strictly from a legal sense?

Christian science is disreputable and metaphysics is not (though some claim that it is, they are wrong).

Well, personality and memory are the two essentials for being a person, according to Swartz. Not all humans are persons (anacephalic infants), and it's theorized that not all persons must be human (Wookies, for instance).

Why do you think it is a weird to consider a person to be one who has memory and personality? May I ask what you mean when you say "person"? Are you speaking strictly from a legal sense?

Just to be clear, do you mean "unfalsifiable" by "disreputable"? Or did you actually mean lacking respect?

He means personality by "person". I quoted him above making a distinction between personalities and bodies. Of course the body does not become a different a different body just because the mind has complete amnesia.

There is a difference between Swartz and whatever 'christian scientist' you name. Christian science is disreputable and metaphysics is not (though some claim that it is, they are wrong).

---------- Post added 02-18-2010 at 07:25 PM ----------



I'm guessing Ken means human being by "person" and not personality as Swartz does.

No, I don't mean being human by person. Some persons are not human beings. A Martian may be a person, but not a human being. And a human being may not be a person. For instance, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a fetus is a human being, but is not a person. X is a human being iff X has human DNA. Being human is a biological category. Being a person is not. It is, as Locke said, a forensic category, i.e. social and legal.

Yu don't think I was comparing S. with a Christian Scientist, do you? Or saying he was one?