@deepthot,
ImnotRussian:
I don't think that the classical monotheistic conception of God--as an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly morally good being--is compatible with a world in which
gratuitous evils exist.
By
gratuitous evils I mean those events which are not caused by the deliberate actions of moral agents (e.g., natural disasters) and which cannot be countervailed by some greater compensatory good. In others words, natural evils are justified if and only if God has some
morally sufficient reason for allowing natural evils, and "a morally sufficient reason" would be a case in which a natural evil resulted in some
greater compensatory good. Conversely, a natural evil which was not countervailed by some greater compensatory good would lack a morally sufficient reason and be
gratuitous. And if an evil is gratuitous, serving no good whatsoever, it is inconsistent with God's allegedly perfect moral goodness.
So, is every occurence of natural evil in the world (events not caused by the deliberate actions of moral agents) sufficiently countervailed by some greater compensatory good? Remember that in order for God's perfect moral goodness to be compatible with the existence of natural evils, each natural evil must necessarily be accompanied by some morally sufficient reason the motivation for which is the promotion of some greater compensatory good. For if just one natural evil cannot be assessed as such, it is
gratuitous, and therefore inconsistent with God's perfect moral goodness.
So let's say a drought causes a famine in some region of the world, leaving a large population to starve from a lack of drinking water. The theist might argue that this event induces others to feel compassion for the drought victims, who then organize a humanitarian program to relieve their suffering. So, the theist defending God's perfect moral goodness could argue that the evils wrought by the drought are countervailed by the greater compensatory good that resulted: organized compassion and humanitarianism. But are organized compassion and humanitarian aid
morally sufficient reasons when attempting to reconcile God's perfect moral goodness with the existence of famine-inducing droughts?
Maybe, and maybe not. But it gets worse,
because it is a fact that not every occurence of natural evil is countervailed by some greater compensatory good. Indeed, some natural evils result in no goods, greater or lesser, whatsoever. Consider:
a man is walking in the woods at night when it begins to storm. He runs towards his cabin to seek shelter when a lightning bolt strikes a tree and sends it crashing down on the man. The man survives the impact, but he is stuck because the tree is too heavy for him to lift. No one is around for miles, and over the course of several days the man experiences unbearable suffering before finally expiring from starvation. I am not recounting a 'true story,' of course, but
such events do happen. Now, can we reconcile such an event with God's perfect moral goodness? In other words, can we come up with some morally sufficient reason that would justify this occurence? Personally, it is hard to imagine how this event could be countervailed by some greater compensatory good, since no human was around to be induced into compassion and provide aid. Therefore, this man's suffering was
gratuitous, and inconsistent with the claim that God is perfectly morally good.
So, to sum up:
P1: God is perfectly morally good (assumed).
P2: Natural evils (events which are not caused by the deliberate actions of moral agents) exist in abundance.
P3: Natural evils are justified if and only if it can be determined that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing them, the motivation for which is the promotion of some greater compensatory goods.
P4: Natural evils are gratuitous and unjust if and only if it can be determined that they lack morally sufficient reasons by their not promoting some greater compensatory goods.
P5: Cases of gratuitous evils exist.
P6: Gratuitous evils are incompatible with God's perfect moral goodness.
C: Therefore, God is not perfectly morally good.