@vectorcube,
I was looking for quotes and found a little interpretation of Wittgenstein on causality. I thought it might add to the discussion.
Silliman's Papers
Where the traditional philosophical approach has assumed causation and, from there, made a problem, Wittgenstein dissolution would proceed by showing that the language of causation was confused and this confusion gave rise to the problem. There are two confusions concerning causality: first, that causality was a form of necessity distinct from logical necessity; second, that causality could be stated.
Given Wittgenstein's language, it is impossible to imagine any sort of causality that is beyond the causality of the logic of language. "The only kind of necessity," he writes, "is logical necessity." Since logic is the mirror of the world, and the world is the case, there could be no sort of causation not shown in logic. There is no causality apart from that which is found in logic, that is, nothing is necessitated unless it is necessitated by logic. If states of affairs are caused by will or by prior states of affairs, then that must be shown in the mirror of logic.
We cannot speak of causality, either the illusionary causality that gave rise to the problem, or the logic reflected causality of Wittgenstein's. In the first case, if causality is above the world, above the assemblage of facts, then it would be like the ancient's superstitions of gods and of fates. Causality, if it were this sort of thing, would be beyond the facts of the world and we couldn't speak about it. In the second place, in Wittgenstein's language, we cannot speak about the logic of language because we would need another logic to speak in, and so on ad infinitum. We cannot, Wittgenstein holds, speak that logic, The logic shows itself, but it cannot be spoken of. Thus causation is either in the world, unspeakable and showing itself through the structure, or outside the world, and unspeakable and indescribable. Either way, to think that we could speak of causality would be confused.