Evidential Argument from Evil

William Rowe's (paraphrased) Evidential Argument from Evil:

1. God is perfectly morally good (assumed).
2. Natural evils (events not caused by the deliberate actions of moral agents) exist in abundance (e.g., natural disasters, birth defects, chronic diseases, etc.).
3. Natural evils are justified if and only if God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing them.
4. Reasons are morally sufficient if and only if natural evils result in greater compensatory goods.
5. Therefore, a natural evil is gratuitous if and only if it lacks a morally sufficient reason (i.e., didn't result in a greater compensatory good).
6. Given the objective evidence, not all natural evils appear to result in greater compensatory goods.
7. Gratuitous evils are inconsistent with God's perfect moral goodness.
8. Therefore, the appearance of gratuitous natural evils significantly lowers the probability that a perfectly good God exists.

***If you don't believe in the traditional monotheistic conception of God, and if you don't ascribe the omni-attributes to your deity, then the evidential argument from evil doesn't apply.***

Notice that this argument doesn't deduce, hands-down, that the objective evidence refutes the existence of an all-good God. Instead, as an evidential argument, it merely infers from such evidence that the appearance of gratuitous natural evils significantly lowers the probability that an all-good God exists. Indeed, it is an epistemic possibility that God has some morally sufficient reason for, say, permitting congenital birth defects (i.e., they result in greater compensatory goods). However, based on the objective evidence, it is really plausible to assume that this is true? Do we really have any independent reason, aside from retaining our cherished religious convictions about God's goodness, to hold that the appearance of gratuitous natural evils is just an illusion?

Some people are prepared to suggest just that. They'll tell you that just because it appears to be the objective case that some natural evils are gratuitous, it's quite possible that they do have some unseen moral purpose. Spooky! This strategy is called inductive skepticism. When we engage in inductive reasoning, we draw evidential support from particular cases and extrapolate to reach a general conclusion. In fact, we all do this, and we do it all the time, both in science and in our daily lives. For example, do you willingly jump off a cliff? Of course not. Why not? Because you've never seen anyone survive such a feat, so you rightly infer that you'll share a similiar fate should you also take the leap. Have you ever said to yourself "Well, anthrax has killed everyone its ever come into contact with, but maybe I'm the exception. After all, one can never be 100% certain about these things. Down the hatch!" It is true that one can never be 100% certain when reasoning inductively. But assuming you are mentally competent, I doubt you'd leap off cliffs, or ingest anthrax, for all that. Inductive reasoning is a survival mechanism--it keeps us alive. Conversely, inductive skepticism would make your stay on this earth very short indeed. However, in the case of natural evils, some people are quite prepared to deny that we can use this same inductive reasoning to infer that such events not only appear, but probably are, gratuitous; thus, the evidential argument, and the lowered probability that an all-good God exists, is unjustified.

Okay, so some theists want to wiggle their way out of this conundrum by adopting a selective inductive skepticism (one they would never employ in their daily lives!). But for the moment, let's allow them this.

Now, you'll recall the Argument from Design: in brief, the very fabric of the universe seems to exhibit certain cosmic features that admit of order, pattern, design, elegance, mathematical precision, irreducible complexity, intelligent agency, and grand purpose. The cosmological constants appear to be finely-tuned, and were they adjusted but a hair, life as we know it would go extinct. Notice that these are all inductive inferences. The argument from design is itself an evidential argument. But for argument's sake, let's allow the theist that the universe does appear to exhibit these features--just enough to infer that they significantly raise the probability that the universe was created by a Designer.

Here's the problem. Most people who accept the argument from design also tend to be theistic. They subscribe to a particular religious tradition--i.e., they believe that the Designer is God, and an all-good God at that. But consider: if theists embrace the inductive inference that the appearance of design raises the probability of a Designer, and if they also believe the Designer is omnipotent and all-good, then why are they so inimical to the same sort of induction at work in the evidential argument from evil?

In other words, if theists make no misstep when they infer that the appearance of certain cosmic features raises the probability that the universe has a Designer, why do atheists allegedly misstep when they infer that the appearance of gratuitous natural evils lowers the probability that the Designer is all-good? Theists, you cannot have it both ways! Either you are an inductive skeptic, or you are not. This is a strange sort of selective bias. I'll tell you what I think--I think that the selective inductive skepticism theists employ to reject the evidential argument is motivated, at least in part, by an emotional need to shield one's cherished religious convictions from rational inquiry. What other explanation could there be? If you are willing to infer that the appearance of design raises the probability of a Designer, you should be equally willing to infer that the appearance of gratuitous natural evils lowers the probability that the Designer is all-good. Indeed, the world is exactly as we'd expect it to be if it were created by a process of pitiless indifference (evolution), rather than an all-good Designer. Thoughts?