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Tensions between philosophy and politics

 
 
Reply Fri 13 Mar, 2009 06:40 am
What is political philosophy? Many people who are interested in political philosophy like to think of themselves as engaging in the much-needed task of bringing philosophy to bear on political matters.

If we think of 'philosophy', as wisdom, (rather than as the love of wisdom), a lot of people might see a kind of promise articulated in the very idea of 'political philosophy'. The promise is this: political philosophy -- as implying a politics that might be somehow 'philosophical' and a philosophy that is somehow 'political'.

Put this way, 'political philosophy' would be a happy synthesis of two heterogeneous things: we would bring reflection, contemplation, a degree of measure and consideration to politics , here conceived as a realm of frenzied activity where whatever governs it is not 'reason' or thought. In this conception, politics is great, many-headed monster or machine that rolls on insanely doing its own thing, which encounters reason only as an interruption. By contrast, 'philosophy' is seen in this (ubiquitious) story as something that tends to normally have such a tendency to soar of into the aether of pure specualtion that it needs to be brought back down (perhaps) foricbly to earth and the consideration of practical matters.

First question: how accurate are the impressions of politics or philosophy suggested by the above account?

Before suggesting an answer to this, I'd like to say that I personally think of political philosophy as something arises out of the TENSION between philosophy and politics. Because of this tension, I think that political philosophy, must not only be the philosophy of politics, but in another way the politics of philosophy.

What does this mean? To understand this, we need to know what constitutes the tension. I'll give this a (very preliminary) go and then invite your contributions.

Aristotle says somewhere in the Ethics that philosophy requires, above all, else 'skhole' (or leisure). We do not contemplate when we are in the midst of a frenzy of activity. Nor, interestingly do we usually do much philosophising on a 'Perfect Day' (like in the Lou Reed song.) Certainly, at such moments, we are likely to be struck by the thaumasein (wonder of being) that is at the root of philosophy. When we are at the heights of joy or contentment, we can suddenly feel that we have an intuition (an immediate experience) of beauty or truth that might be the goal of all our philosophical labours. Oddly, though at such times, we do not tend to do much philosophising -- even and especially if something feels known to us, intuited here, in this moment (a vision of beauty, a feeling of love for another person) our thoughts tend to float like bubbles or phantasms -- like sentences connected by parataxis rather than hypotaxis. There is a stupour in happiness: soemthing that gives rise to something Kant's 'free play of the imagination' in the face of the beautiful. But, this 'free play' is not the same as rigorous, conceptual 'dialectical' thinking, what Hegel would call 'the labour, patience and suffering of the negative."

So, according to Aristotle philosophy needs us to not be entirely caught up in activity, NOR totally swept away by emotion. This takes leisure (skhole is involved in the etymology of skholastikos -- scholar). And it TAKES TIME, to ask the Socratic questions -- to when confronted with the claim that x is just' ask not only 'is x really just', but 'what is justice?'. And this places philosophy into tension with politics, which usually requires that one gives answers to questions NOW -- people are dying here, people are suffering: we must act, we must decide. We must declare x to be unjust and try and stop it, or we must declare y to be just and try and further its cause. What makes all kinds of political actors frustrated with philosophy -- is that, precisely at its most authentic, at its most Socratic, it has to withdraw from the field to ask questions like "what is justice", "what is the good life" and so on. And yet...political actors often put great hopes in philosophy, because they hope that philosophers, might in having perhaps irresponsibly put themselves above the madding crowd -- might have put themselves in a situation to see past certain illusions of the age, past ideologies into truths, past opinion to knowledge. But can one have 'knowledge' of political things? What kind of knowledge is this? Who possesses it? A statesman (like Obama, Churchill, Lincoln) -- an activist, a group of people working together for a cause; a clear-headed political observer like Orwell, or a political phenomenologist like Arendt? What does 'knowledge' mean here?

And if knowledge is not something appropriate to politics (philosophy is not after all science) then what is it hoped that philosophy will bring to politics. One thing, that I think philosophy offers comes from (in the broadest) sense one of the basic reasons for the existence of phenomenology. The motive, as I see it, for phenomenology is this:

the concepts and categories through which we make sense of the world derive from experience. They thus emerge often from certain contexts of action (ways of being together, 'imagined communities' -- worlds suffused with symbols/myths/traditions what we think of today 'as a cultural context'). But, concepts and categories, over time, lose the connection with the experience that gave rise to them. As they do so, they run a risk of atrophying of becoming in the realm of thought what a cliche is in the realm of language. So, phenomenology exists (as a philosophical operation) to try and suspend the normal categories/concepts (the 'cliches' if you will) and to try and look closer or listen harder to EXPERIENCE in the name of ventilating the categories and concepts that we normally bandy about. My point here is that I think that politics is often a field where we feel that the operative distinctions (left/right et cetera), however vigorously contested are in danger of becoming MEANINGLESS without someone putting these categories through a spin cycle and then hanging them out to dry in crisp, non-partisan air of thought. But, again, this requires a certain amount of leisure, a certain amount of distance from the political fray. And this means, that a philosophy of politics can, become too abstracted from politics -- ignorant of the subject it precisely pretends to pronounce on. At the same time, a politics conceived as being blind activity -- activity divorced from thought has a nightmarish quality to it.

So, second point: philosophy often stands convicted for not being able to provide 'political solutions'. And yet, many people in modern democracies (I can think of liberals, anarchists and conservatives who would subscribe to such belief) are suspicious that politics is the kind of thing that can be ruled in an 'ex cathedra' way by philosophy. This leads people to suspect philosophy -- to suspect that it is an idle distraction from the real business of politics. Which calls to mind, amongst other things, the fate of Socrates. The first, and only universally acknowledged giant amongst philosophers put to death by a jury of his peers for corrupting the youth and refusing to believe in the gods of the city. And all cities have gods, no matter how determinedly secular we may be, there are always things that we consider sacrosanct, and always things that will make one group of people distrust another person who seems to lack their beliefs.

But enough for now. I know this is pretty vague, but I thought it might start a discussion if I asked:

What is the relationship between politics and philosophy?
What (ergo) is political philosophy?
What role can philosophy have in politics? What attitude should political actors have to philosophy and philosophers?
What of the tension between philosophy's demand for 'leisure' (including the right to treat political matters with a seeker's constant inquiry rather than a partisan's fervour) as opposed to politics tendency to be preoccupied with the kairos (time of decision)?

Thoughts from the history of political philosophy? Rousseau? Marx? Hobbes? Locke? Hegel? Habermas? Arendt (who I think is good on the distinction between politics and philosophy?)

-Mal
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Ola
 
  1  
Reply Sun 15 Mar, 2009 07:28 am
@Maladjusted,
"Tensions between philosophy and politics"
Is that code for tensions between intelligent people and (US) republicans?
VideCorSpoon
 
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Reply Sun 15 Mar, 2009 09:32 am
@Ola,
I could believe that politics and philosophy have some sort of bi-equivalency. However, I'm not too fantastic about your analogy though. Seems like you have on one hand a monster conceived by Dante in Inferno and the idealized sense of a philosopher embodied as Socrates was in Aristophanes CloudsMetaphysicsEthics though, but it is always taught in a relative way. Teachers always tend to mix the two in order to align a common message. But as far as I am aware, the literal interpretation of Ethics revolves around following book VI about "pleasure," the etymological root of "leisure." Direct translation issue? Text issue? It also seems like you using points from Ethics and Politics. I'm not sure I agree with the mix. But this is all relative anyway, both in your information and my response.

What is the relationship between politics and philosophy? Like I had stated previously (and assuming that we are using Aristotle as the fund for our assumptions), politics and philosophy both maintain that certain quality of "what is" best, virtuous, good, etc. As in the basis for Metaphysics in book Alpha as in Book I of Ethics, what is done for its own sake and not for any other is best. Aristotle in many ways notes that though there are different perspectives (especially in ontology), the ends of obtaining what is best remain the same. This seems to work out very well textually, because Aristotle analyzes "the nature of science" in the same breath, which is essentially done in Metaphysics
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Maladjusted
 
  1  
Reply Sun 15 Mar, 2009 04:54 pm
@Maladjusted,
Dear VideCorSpoon,

I hope this finds you well. (Did I mention that I like your pseudonym immensely).

You are absolutely right to mention the Socrates of 'The Clouds'. My question, could be rephrased in essence to say: what is it that makes the Platonic Socrates (who is concerned with political things) different from the Aristophanic Socrates -- who is caricatured for an ignorance and indifference to such things that ends with him having a deleterious effect on the life of the city and its citizens.

This is a question (not at all original or emanating from myself) that cannot avoid taking on the question of hte meaning of a Platonic corpus as a whole. So, to reitreate: what is it that makes Socrates the Socrates we think we know (from Plato and Xenophon) as opposed to the Socrates of "The Clouds"?

The importance of this question comes from Plato's "Apology". Socrates suggests to the jury that the accusations against him (of piety and corrupting the youth) have an antecedent in Aristophanes play: suggesting that "The Clouds" is not only written out of the purely idisoyncratic resentment of a rival, but at some level represents the response of the 'city' the 'polis' to the figure of Socrates. If we look at someone, like de Tocqueville, we surely see that philosophy can still be suspicious to people with their mind on (variously defined) 'practical things'. Thus, someone says: "pah! it's all mind-games and idle speculation." Someone, else says: but doesn't this all waste time in driving away from the active engagement of my anarchist collective/my daily involvement in Amnesty International and so on. Do people not still accuse philosophy for corrupting the youth (by say suggesting that it leads people to become eccentric, idle cranks, rather than useful citizens) and charge it for not believing in the gods (which does not require theism -- per se, only things held sacrosanct in our society). Thus, a philosopher, I would argue can be attacked for simply questioning things that people take for granted as the good. It has been ever thus.

In response to this, Xenophon and Plato have very different answers. Xenophon's Memorobilia suggests (if I ignore his other Socratic writings) takes a direct route, that Plato does not. It says: all of the accusations are false, Socrates was the best of men, and you cannot fault a teacher for the failings of his worst students (Critias and Alcibiades.) But what does Plato say? The answer is more complex as it is an answer that ranges across the dialogue: posing any number of questions about love, the soul, the people, et cetera.

And one of the answers that I think that is given there is that it is not enough to reconcile politics and philosophy to simply have philosophy 'turn to' political things? After all, is it really so hard to imagine a politically disastrous situation that came out of an earnest attempt to rationally found or rationally manage the 'ideal city' (as in the Republic)? The Aristotelian point here would be to say, indeed, that this is why political philosophy involves CIRCUMSCRIBING philosophy -- tracing the limits of philosophy to allow room for judgment -- for phronesis. This point is also very central to the works of Hannah Arendt (who is in many ways an Aristotelian.)

It is these kind of tensions, including, the tension between the need to act NOW (in the present, faced with a particular situation) and the philosophical imperative to think PAST the exigencies of the situation to the truth, that I have outlined, albeit in a provisional fashion as tensions between philosophy and politics.

If, you think that, in fact, no, they are simply continuous than this is excellent. Caloo Calais! Philosophy and politics are reconciled only by virtue of the one choosing to pay attention to the other. But I am not so sure myself. Tell me more about why you think this is the case? Can the synthesis not be UNHAPPY? An unhappy marriage where an overly philosophical politics becomes a purely speculative or academic politics or an overly 'political' philosophy, where philosophy subordinates itself to partisan dogma? I'm not sure what you think, but I'm sure I'll hear more from you.

Also: I agree with your point about philosophy and politics both being oriented to what is good. But is there not a tension in their manner of seeking it? What of the final book of the ethics where it outlines the tension, but also the hierarchy between the "bios theoretikos" (vita contemplativa), and "bios praktikos" (vita activa). Are these things so easily reconciled?

P.S. Not sure how you conceive of pleasure (hedone) as bieng the root of skhole (leisure).

P.P.S. Your final 'take home exam' point is delightfully supercilious. There is a joy that only snideness can bring that I hope you got to wallow in for a while.

-Regards and talk to you soon.

-Mal
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Maladjusted
 
  1  
Reply Mon 16 Mar, 2009 05:31 pm
@Ola,
Dear Ola,

You decide on the "intelligent people vs US Republicans thing." Smile

But actually: I think you raise something germane to my point here:

Normally, people can see a tension between philosophy and what they consider to be STUPID politics, i.e. the politics of their ideological opponents. Here the tension, we tend to think, consists in the fact that philososophy (here meant as reason, good sense, intellectual merit and so on) belongs on my side, whereas my opponent seems all too obviously devoid of thought. Note, of course, that I am not saying that it is good that we tend to think such things (i.e. assume that our political opponents are morons) -- I actually find this one of the biggest political problems in our culture (something that militates against that old democratic dream of a vigorous public sphere) But, I still note that we tend to do this.

But I'm thinking instead, in this thread, of a tension between philosophy and the politics of a group that we (or, in my example our hypothetical philosopher) might actually ourselves endorse -- a politics with which our philosopher might actually align herself.

So, say you are attempting to live the examined life, but are also (as is perfectly probable) a socialist/a conservative/an anarchist/a liberal (in the English sense) or whatever. The kind of tension that I've been trying to articulate in this thread is the kind that might arise, not between you and your opponents, but between you and your political allies.

Example, say I'm part of a group of neo-anarchists and I'm living in a squat, protesting the need for better housing in my home city (and at the same time against the alienating, atomising living conditions of life under late capitalism.)

Now, while I'm living in this house (run as a co-operative) I happen to be reading a copy of say Machiavelli's Discourses. I'm also writing a PhD on Gramsci. While doing so, a strange detour in my research leads me to becoming interested in -- I don't know -- Edmund Burke. Suddenly (like lots of people who were not themselves conservatives -- I'm thinking of William Hazlitt for instance) I actually start thinking that Burke is pretty cool, and that I'm going to write about Burke, read more Burke and moreover that while I don't -- qua anarchist -- agree with the man that there's something in Burke that ISN'T present in the preferred readings of my squat (which might not even be Noam Chomsky and Giorgio Agamben so much as pamphlets put out by our sister 'direct action' organisations. In fact, let's say, the rest of the guys don't undersatnd why I'm doing something as institutional as doing a PhD -- but here it's not just an anarchist's suspicion of institutions that's at issue -- it's the fact that to the minds of my fellow activists, time spent on 'philosphy' takes time away from 'action', where it is action that is pre-eminently (or so say the rest of these people) 'political'.

So, here we'd have what I'd consider to be a playing out of the tension between politics and philosophy in the tension between my (imaginary) philosopher in the squat -- thinking about the nature of republican (not Republican) government and the rest of the guys who, being confident that they know 'what is to be done' -- wonder why my philosopher is wasting her time examining propositions that the rest of the collective consider self-evident. One of my major points about the tension throughout this has been to try and say that in politics, people want to say: 'hey, we have to oppose this OBVIOUS injustice NOW. We need to get so-and-so out of jail, we need to repeal this piece of legislation, we don't have TIME to sit around and ask 'but what is the good?' Or, if we do, we need to do get to answers quickly -- even if they are not ultimate, we need answers about what has to be done now -- if we're to -- save the planet from ecological degradation/stop this theocracy coming to power/help these refugees from being locked up in detention centres.

Given this: can we not imagine a situation where the rest of the 'autonomous collective' (note I'm not trying to say anything snide about anarchists -- substitute them for a group of young conservatives or moderate liberals if you prefer) are a little suspicious of the person with the Machiavelli? It's not that I think that they necessarily WILL, but I think it is a distinct possibility that some of them MIGHT.

My thought would be that the suspicions of the collective might be of the following sort: what is she (our philosopher) doing? How does her thinking herself into a scholarly stupour help the cause? Doesn't she potentially distract herself from her commitment by idly asking questions like 'what is justice' and reading books about it, when she could read a few books about it -- and come to the position of the rest of the collective?
Could it even be regarded as suspicious -- as involving deviations from the ideological line (e.g. she's reading Machiavelli and not Giorgio Agamben.)

So, obviously I'm not just saying that the anarchists prefer ideology to 'thought' (let's say many of them think of themselves as intellectually distingusihed in various ways), let's say they see a a definite place for 'theory' (that it might even have played a prominent role in making them do what they do), but that they at the same time, the whole fully Socratic 'examined life' thing seems excessive, like a luxury that we cannot afford, while real political battles continue to rage.

Some of what I'm saying here, is coming from (my admittedly limited personal) experience, but also from anecdotes from others -- of differing political commitments.

But, if I could also put it in terms of philosophical expereinces as opposed to political ones. I'ts like this: I often find myself feeling quiet alienated amongst political allies because of what I think of is the at best indifference if not active scorn of said allies for philosophy.

Of course, we can feel alieanted from people for all kinds of reasons, and God knows, I can be as graceless and charmless as the next person, but I'm not talking about situations where I feel unhappy because people are just generally thining: "Wow, that Mal's really a bit of a prat."

Instead, I'm thinking of times when, I've thought my philosophical interests -- in taking me away from the ideological orthodoxies of my fellow-traveller's looked suspicious to what you could see as the guys fighting on the ground. My activities look hopelessly self-indulgent, impractical, youthful. These people, I've found, often end up sounding like Callicles in the Gorgias: philosophy's all very well for the very young or the very old. It can be nice, it can be stimulating: but to devote too much time to it is to lose sight of the real situation . Surely, every would-be philosopher faces such objections to philosophy every day from friends/family/colleagues et cetera?

I've also heard very many similar reports from other "philosophy types" talking about their non-philosophcially inclined political allies and heard these stories from people from all over the political spectrum.

Conversely to this, I've often found myself to be friends (often good friends!) with philosophers with whom I have very strong political disagreements.

Nonetheless, I have sometimes seen (and I'm imagining you have) a rigour, and depth of conviction amonst my philosophically-trained political opponents that I have found lacking in my political allies? Does this ring any bells for anyone?

I worry, actually (also possibly apologising to VideCorSpoon) that my initial post was too vague, for anyone to see what I was getting at. Hope this helps.

-Mal.
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rhinogrey
 
  1  
Reply Sat 21 Mar, 2009 01:37 pm
@Maladjusted,
This topic is faulty from my point of view. From where I'm standing, politics either just is or is emergent from the philosophy of governance.
Khethil
 
  1  
Reply Mon 23 Mar, 2009 03:34 pm
@rhinogrey,
rhinogrey wrote:
This topic is faulty from my point of view. From where I'm standing, politics either just is or is emergent from the philosophy of governance.


Concur,

The two areas have no inherent conflict; only in those instances that are more a clash of 'implementation', perhaps, than one to the other. But in and of themselves, they're neutral.

Thanks
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