Wow.... That must be a terrible feeling. I'm sorry....
I kinda "lost" my step sister in the same fashion. She was in a car accident many years ago and afterwards developed severe bipolar schizophrenia (it was probably always there lying dormant, but no one knew). She's still alive, but everything about her personality has completely changed, so I can't help but feel like the person I knew and loved is gone.
When we say, the 'real' Theseus, do we mean the one originally built, the one originally purchased by the owner, or the one taken for repair, since physically all three might be noticeably different?
I would say the one that was originally labeled "Theseus". So are you saying the real Theseus wasn't in existance when it was taken to be repaired?
The point is: it's all perspective. We are the one's applying identity. If one didn't consider the Theseus 'real' after repair, it wouldn't be 'real' for them; the identity, perceptually, has changed. There's no definite "right" or "wrong" answer here since it wholly depends on the consciousness rationalizing.
My issue with 'identity is in the eye of the beholder' is this: If you have identical twins named Suzy and Lucy, and both tell you they are Lucy, which is the real Lucy? There is a definitive right and wrong answer, at least in any pragmatic viewpoint.
Who are we really? Are we our bodies? If we're not our bodies, are we our consciousness? Have you lost parts of yourself you have forgotten? Would amnesia erase your identity?
Further, if the identity of the ship is bestowed by the owner, he will naturally identify the ship rebuilt from old parts as Theseus since it most resembles Theseus (the other ship is shiny new). Thus again the old-parts ship is the real Theseus, in the only consciousness that matters to the question. The owner may well prefer a new Theseus though.
Pragmatically we can differentiate the two humans as just that -- two humans, two different lifeforms. But once we assign a social identity, we go outside the realm of the definitive and into the realm of the subjective. There's no way to objectively measure which is "Lucy" or "Suzy", we can only assign a subjective identity to each human (through different physicalities, personality traits, etc.). We know they're different, but ultimately social identity really is in the eye of the beholder.
Take this for example:
Woman marries husband to which she identifies herself as "Lucy" to. Meanwhile, Woman initially introduced herself to a close friend of hers as "Suzy". Woman's husband and close friend have different social identities for Woman, and yet both *know*, relate, to the same human. There is no definitive right or wrong answer here; both parties could be correct.
Why is it the only consciousness that matters in question? What if both of the ships had the same amount of old parts, and both the owner and the ship-builder spent the same amount of time with each ship: Who would be correct?
It's not all about physicality, my friend. "Real", in the context we're using, is completely relative to the consciousness rationalizing. What makes a "Real" identity? A consensus or sentimental attachment, usually -- neither of which are 'definitive'.
The problem of re-establishing the identity of Theseus is separate and does not appear to have been asked in the OP unless one already assumes the answer you give to be true (i.e. that there is no 'real' identity, only subjective identity) and the OP doesn't hint at this (in fact, given the word 'real', it hints at the opposite). This is then not a philosophical question so much as a guessing game, a test, a trick question, unless of course you can show completely that individual subjective appraisal is all, that is: that if I identify one twin as Lucy, I am as correct as if I identify the other as Lucy, so that any comlete reasoning of the question must necessarily come to the same conclusion you have come to.
As an aside, the question of the 'real' Theseus is a realist question, so the answer 'it is subjective' negates rather than answers the question, and the answer 'the question can't be answered because identity is subjective' assumes non-realism, an assumption that can't be justified given the question. I'm not saying it's not an answer to be discussed, but it doesn't appear to me as final as it does to you.
In this particular scenario, since the physicality of the ship was disturbed (and assuming visualization is a key for identification of inanimate objects), it really is up in arms. I've seen adaquate reasoning from various perspective [and I've even pondered this with another example dealing with a bike], it really does appear to come down to opinion. If you do believe there is a concrete, "complete", undeniable answer to this problem, please do share. As far as I can see, however, it really is this complicated.
Let's suppose:
Woman A introduces herself as Lucy
Woman B introduced herself as Suzy
...
This isn't even taking into account "Self", which would complicate things even further. Because, as I note, what really defines "Self"? But, we will stay at the surface, focusing on: Social Identity (since this is what I think you're more referring to)
So, of course, if I were to say the 'Titanic' was actually called 'Sobertit', I'd be "wrong" insofar as identification of that object was established already.
In this particular scenario, since the physicality of the ship was disturbed (and assuming visualization is a key for identification of inanimate objects), it really is up in arms. I've seen adaquate reasoning from various perspective [and I've even pondered this with another example dealing with a bike], it really does appear to come down to opinion. If you do believe there is a concrete, "complete", undeniable answer to this problem, please do share. As far as I can see, however, it really is this complicated.
However, I think that in the Lucy/Suzy case the distinction between names and identity has become somewhat blurred. The question is not so much whether Woman A calls herself Lucy or Suzy; it is whether she can be re-identified as the same person (regardless of her name) at a later date. If we have all the relevant knowledge, we clearly can re-identify her, and likewise Woman B, because the two women have a continuous existence as whole persons. (Even if they were identical twins, we could theoretically keep an eye on them all the time to remain aware of who is who.)
The Theseus case is different, because the two ships do not have a continuous whole existence. Here, having all the relevant knowledge will not enable us to decide the issue. Whereas the problem in the Lucy/Suzy case is only semantic (naming) and/or epistemological (recognition), in the Theseus case it is ontological. In the former, there is a clear 'realist' answer, but in the latter there is none. If pressed, I suppose you could say that neither ship is the true Theseus in a realist sense, as neither meets the clear criterion of continuous whole existence. But that does not stop people from reaching a social consensus to call one of them Theseus (or calling them Theseus 1 and Theseus 2).
Since I didn't see any threads on this (except maybe one post), I thought I'd start one to see what everyone's view is on this paradox. There have been many different variations of it, so I'll post the one I like the most....
Let's say there's a really old ship called Theseus. This ship is really famous; it had been in several movies and was even the scene of a crime when a famous rapper was shot and killed on it. Well, anyway, the ship is in need of numerous repairs. The owner finally decides to get it fixed, and docks it at the repair shop. After the mechanic starts repairing it, he realizes that the entire ship needs to be repaired, so he slowly starts replacing it bit by bit. Well, because of the ships fame, the mechanic thought it would be a neat idea to, instead of throwing away the old parts, build an identical ship out of the remains. So, as he's replacing the parts on the existing ship Theseus, he starts assembling the new ship Theseus. When he gets done, he has two identical ships; one made entirely out of new parts, and one made out of the old parts.
Which one is the real ship Theseus?
I don't see this as much of a paradox as a play on words; not a very good one either.
- Which is the "real" ship (as "real", in this context, remains undefined) is a semantic way of trolling for debate.
- One having "old" parts then another, "... made of entirely new parts" equals to two "identical" ships? Woops, that's not identical
- Naming them both "Theseus", alone, makes them both "Theseus"; while having the comprised of different components makes them not identical - a play on 'titling' and similarity
We see these from time to time. They don't really speak to contradictions and paradox of a situation, only to word meanings and context. As such, I suppose it could be a good exercise in linguistic use - but not much more
Thanks
Again, though, you've shifted the issue to the establishing of identities not the re-establishing of previously established identities. The fact that you can't treat the problem I posed suggests you may be well aware of the limitations of your theory of identity.
Let's suppose even further woman A actually decides to have her name changed (via city hall, an 'official' social identity change) to Suzy. You're saying I was "wrong" (identity-wise) up until the point she went to city hall, or was I "wrong" up until the point woman A decided to have her name changed? Is social identity completely dependent upon personal appraisal at any given point in time (the latter), or are there other factors (ie. "official" - city hall, former)?
Yes, I could differentiate her from women B because of the properties you explain, but in terms of social identity, regardless what name I was presented with, that person would still be that person.
Not at all: I'm referring to identity as a means of differentiating between unique objects, be they people, boats, whatever. A set of properties that completely and uniquely define such an object. Objective identity, I suppose.
Precisely, and the identity of the Theseus (and Lucy) is similarly previously established. The question then is: if the identity of the Theseus survives (and the question appears to presuppose that it does), how does it do so: by continuity of physicality or continuity of form? This would provide a means of re-establishing subjective identification.
Well, I gave my answer but I'm not a formalist - that doesn't mean I can deny formalism, alas. I think it's less a matter of opinion and more of definition: one person says the new-parts ship is the Theseus because of continuity of form; another that old-parts ship is Theseus because of continuity of matter; a third that either is fine because identity is subjective. All are really talking about three different types of identity.
However, I think that in the Lucy/Suzy case the distinction between names and identity has become somewhat blurred. The question is not so much whether Woman A calls herself Lucy or Suzy; it is whether she can be re-identified as the same person (regardless of her name) at a later date. If we have all the relevant knowledge, we clearly can re-identify her, and likewise Woman B, because the two women have a continuous existence as whole persons. (Even if they were identical twins, we could theoretically keep an eye on them all the time to remain aware of who is who.)
Yes, I could differentiate her from women B because of the properties you explain, but in terms of social identity, regardless what name I was presented with, that person would still be that person.
There's an inconsistency in method here. The Lucy/Suzy problem is a problem of subjectively appraised identity. For the owner of the Theseus, for instance, it matters not if the boats do not have a continuity of existence if he does not see any disruption. The disruption is objective. If this defines or changes or destroys the identity, then identity is objective also.
The question is born from illusion.
Everything is always different (nothing ever 'changes'!), the entire universe is (a) different (manifestation/perception) from moment to moment.
Although the ship looks like 'the same' ship/body/univese for a minute/day/decade, it is a completely different ship. The illusion is that it can ever 'be the same', from moment to moment; it cannot, nothing is.
As, in actuality, nothing can ever be 'the same' from moment a' moment (not even memory!), the original question is a false dilemna.
We see similarity, and in our ignorant and inherent limitations, imagine 'continuity'.
Too bad old Theseus (and Aristotle and Plato and Newton and Buddha...) didn't have the benefit of QM!
nameless wrote:
The question is born from illusion.
Everything is always different (nothing ever 'changes'!), the entire universe is (a) different (manifestation/perception) from moment to moment.
Although the ship looks like 'the same' ship/body/univese for a minute/day/decade, it is a completely different ship. The illusion is that it can ever 'be the same', from moment to moment; it cannot, nothing is.
As, in actuality, nothing can ever be 'the same' from moment a' moment (not even memory!), the original question is a false dilemna.
We see similarity, and in our ignorant and inherent limitations, imagine 'continuity'.
Too bad old Theseus (and Aristotle and Plato and Newton and Buddha...) didn't have the benefit of QM!
This is just dismissing the problem completely.
Of course one can still identify with an object even though it's never the 'same'.
These 'ignorant limitations' are seen in every human -- do you not apply meaning, identity to anything because you understand the universe is in a state of flux?
That's absurd.
It's important you put focus on the human condition instead of just making this rationally abstract, dismissing the problem completely.
If, however, you can sincerely say you never apply identity to inanimate objects because you understand nothing is the 'same' moment to moment, I'll give you a cookie.
Remember, Quantum Mechanics is a new way of making sense of the world, yes, but it doesn't remove initial handlings with the world we understand so dearly!
You understand that we could extrapolate your perspective out to nearly everything; you could argue that at the planck level everything is probabilistic and we never really know anything.
This is just sidestepping problems
The 'problems' that flat earthers find are of no interest to anyone who is not a 'flat earther'
The 'flat earth' that you dearly love and attach to is now obsolete.
Quantum is not a way to make sense of the 'world', it describes an entirely new reality/universe!
Notions and emotions (though part of 'truth/reality') have no importance in the answering of a scientific/logical question such as the one posed.
'Meaning' is in the eye of the beholder.
'Identity' is different from moment to moment.
What you emotionally/egoically 'identify' with is not logic or science, it is ego and psychological processes.
Welcome to the 'new' QM world. You can never really 'know' anything, you 'believe/think' that you do is all, emotion and ego and psychology rather than science and critical thought.
As I said earlier, 'Lucy' and 'Suzy' are just labels for the identities. Perhaps I need to go into more detail as people keep adding their own in order to solve the problem. Let's say you meet Lucy on Monday. She's a happy-go-lucky type, quick to laugh, loves dogs, hates cats, and is good with children. You meet Suzy on Tuesday. She's a bit edgier, a bit competitive, like she's got something to prove, loves cats, hates dogs and keeps children at arm's length. You (a man now, irrespective of your actual gender) much prefer Lucy but think you've got a chance with Suzy.
On Wednesday you walk into a room and Lucy and Suzy are there. Which is which? You don't have all the relevant knowledge, but the relevant knowledge does exist. The identity of Lucy is not subjective: Lucy doesn't hate dogs just because you've mistaken her for Suzy. In other words, the previously established identities are not mutable, and are not just names either.
For the owner of the Theseus, for instance, it matters not if the boats do not have a continuity of existence if he does not see any disruption.
The disruption is objective. If this defines or changes or destroys the identity, then identity is objective also.
I don't see this as much of a paradox as a play on words; not a very good one either.
- Which is the "real" ship (as "real", in this context, remains undefined) is a semantic way of trolling for debate.
- One having "old" parts then another, "... made of entirely new parts" equals to two "identical" ships? Woops, that's not identical
- Naming them both "Theseus", alone, makes them both "Theseus"; while having the comprised of different components makes them not identical - a play on 'titling' and similarity
We see these from time to time. They don't really speak to contradictions and paradox of a situation, only to word meanings and context. As such, I suppose it could be a good exercise in linguistic use - but not much more
Thanks
