Axiological Language

I think words like good, wrong, etc. are non-metaphorical use-learned words. Because they are learned by children in social interactions, their etymological roots do not illumine much.
Their meaning is naked in their use and as vague perhaps as music.

Their meaning is naked in their use and as vague perhaps as music.

Austin had an interesting take on this...

He broke "speech acts" into two categories. One, "performative" utterances, such as saying "you are fired!" or "You are now married" change something (in these cases, relationships) in the world. The other, "constantive" utterances, work in terms of truth and falsity.

A very substantial problem in the Ordinary Language Philosophical tradition was whether the kind of terms you are mentioning, such as "Murder is Wrong" or "Mary is good" are performative or constantive.

In one sense, we are making a statement about the world. When I say "Murder is Wrong!", am I stating something metaphysically true, and just conveying the information? or am I making something true by uttering it in this way?




Does this mean that I am not conveying anything substantial, informative or specific when I say the night sky is beautiful?

A very substantial problem in the Ordinary Language Philosophical tradition was whether the kind of terms you are mentioning, such as "Murder is Wrong" or "Mary is good" are performative or constantive.

In one sense, we are making a statement about the world. When I say "Murder is Wrong!", am I stating something metaphysically true, and just conveying the information? or am I making something true by uttering it in this way? (Performative sentences do not convey information. They do things).

Or as is this post. "Good" is not vague at all. It is "the highest adjective of commendation". (Oxford English Dictionary) To call something "good" is to say that it is commendable for certain reasons. The reasons, of course, depend on the kind of thing it is. For example, if it is a watch, then a good watch is one that keeps time well, and has the properties that watches should have. A good can-opener is a commendable can-opener because it opens cans efficiently. There is nothing vague about the the term, "good".

So a good person is...

A little observation of how folks use these simple words is proof enough of their vagueness. "That movie was good." "This soup is good." "I feel good." "He's a good man." "This pot is no good." "That's the right answer." "It was the right thing to do."

"Life before books. Text before criticism." And yes I see the irony is quoting a book on that. But then Schopenhauer was no hater of books. As an old man he had 3000 volumes, most of which he had digested.

There are no performative words. There are performative sentences.

I don't see how the sentence, "murder is wrong" could possibly be a performative sentence, for that would mean that by uttering the sentence, "murder is wrong" that would be a way of making murder wrong. And that is obviously false.

Absolutely true. I see how that is ambiguous, I'll change "terms" to "phrases".



Austin would disagree. I don't recommend reading him though, unless you've had a few cups of coffee first.

While I would tend to agree with you, I do think there are some extremely important performative aspects in stating that "Murder is Wrong".

The key to understanding Austin's position is that rather than looking at what a word refers to for meaning, he looks at the way it is used for meaning. For example, while we all may agree that murder is wrong, when I say murder is wrong the referent is non-significant, rather, its significance is in the manner in which I use it. If I find my son killing someone (hypothetically, of course) and I sit him down and tell him Murder is wrong I am indoctrinating him into a certain set of cultural and social standards. I am using it to stop him from murdering in the future. This, (at least to my reading of Austin) is what is significant.

If I am all confusing:

*Performative utterance - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I have read Austin. He would not disagree. How could saying that murder is wrong make it wrong, as saying (in appropriate circumstances) you are fired, fire a person? Indoctrination has nothing to do with it. Performative sentences (not phrases) perform something. To utter the words (in appropriate circumstances" "I promise" is to promise. But to utter the words, "murder is wrong" is not to......make murder wrong. (It may make someone believe murder is wrong, but of course, that is quite different). I think you should read Austin's, "Words and Deeds", and not some article on Austin.

My words about words are all the wrong words. :brickwall:

I read alot of sense and sensibilia, plus Soame's take in Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century.

My point wasn't that Austin was right, just that his distinction of "performative" vs. "constantive" provides us an interesting perspective for the discussion, and that there are significant performative aspects to the statements/sentences/assertions in the OP.

That, of course, is the interesting question. What are persons commendable for? Generally, honesty, integrity, and so on. But, of course, when the adjective good qualifies the noun "person" the term "good" becomes a moral term. We can agree on watches and can-openers, but agreement on persons take more doing.

---------- Post added 02-05-2010 at 05:34 PM ----------



This isn't a matter of vagueness. It is a matte of disagreement about the criteria for what is a good movie, or a good man. Not much problem about soup though. There are general criteria for what makes soup good. Taste, nutrition, and so on.
The point is, we should not just throw up our hands and give up because it is "vague". It isn't all that vague, and by thinking about it, we can make it less vague. (It isn't vague what makes a watch or a can-opener a good watch, or a good can-opener).

I don't know what "performative aspects" are. But "murder is wrong" is not a performative utterance. And I think you said it was. Sense and Sensibilia has nothing to to with performatives. I have not read Soames.

I was responding to your suggestion that I read Austin.

The "performative aspect" of an utterance such as murder is wrong is very conditional on the speaker. If a judge, in presiding over a case wherein he is deciding the wrongness of murder, utters it, it may bring about a change in the legal definition of murder. Is this not a performative statement by definition...?

Is there not both constative and performative "aspects" to what the judge is saying because he is both describing murder and "bringing about the wrongness" as well?

How is the judge "bringing about the wrongness"? Could you give an example of what that would be like?

Say a judge, in stating his opinion (which will become legal precedent thereafter) says that murder is wrong. In the same way that "I do" is a performative utterance in the context of a wedding (making you legally married), murder is wrong is a performative utterance that makes it legally wrong to commit murder.

But the statement that murder is wrong is a constative, like saying that salt is sodium chloride. And, even if the judge made murder legally wrong (which he did not) he did not make it morally wrong. How could he have done that?

The phrase Murder is wrong is constative, but its performative aspect (in this case, its ability to change legality) can change given the context. That's all I am trying to say.

A more relevant question is; does the meaning of murder is wrong substantially change, given it's use?