@jgweed,
Thanks again for the interesting responses, sorry I couldn't reply earlier.
Dave Allen and Paulhanke, and possibly xris (I'm not sure if this is what you meant): about the difficulty to distinguish between philosophical and psychological motives or incentives to adopt beliefs - I quite agree that practically, it is quite difficult to tell them apart. However, I do think that in the theoretical level the distinction is possible and even necessary, if we want to rationally justify a belief (and don't we?... J)
Jgweed put this rather neatly:
jgweed wrote:As I understand the original question and its suggested answer, the question really is about the philosophic grounds for the belief in the existence of God (vaguely defined for our purposes), and further, are these grounds prior (in thought if not in time) to that belief. Perhaps a more congenial and fruitful discussion could begin by reconsidering this, or restarting from the beginning.
This question, then, does not concern itself with emotional, psychological, or historical causes however interesting or pertinent to religious belief in general or to someone's particular belief in a religious credo.
Doesn't it seem that the "rational" (or philosophic) justification for accepting the existence of God depends on a prior conception of truth, and whether the arguments or evidences or warrants for such belief are "truthful?"
For example, the position that the concept of truth can only be applied with legitimacy to analytic propositions and those matter of fact statements about the universe (defined as everything there is but God), then any statement about God or its existence could not be true.
At some point in one's life, the question of truth in relation to religion arises and a decision is required. And even to avoid this question is to make a decision.
[BTW, specifically about our evolution-originated tendencies - I think these are much more cultural than natural (I wrote about this
here), but it is quite off the present topic anyway, though a fascinating topic in itself!]
Paulhanke, I definitely agree that any a priori acceptance of an idea is a "belief", or in fact, any acceptance of any idea, even irrational (which makes the belief irrational).
As for the hunters-gatherers, I quite disagree: first, I think it is a far-fetched derivative. Why would it be more "intuitive" to assume a Creator than to assume haphazardness? However, I agree that people - even in those ancient times - may have been seeking control, and control cannot be gained without causality. Yet I don't think our so-far ancestors had a religion? Second, again this is closely relevant to the culture-nature debate I mentioned above (and
here), but not to the present debate. J
