The Issue of Mental Causation

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To begin let's look at Dualistic Interactionism:

The concept of dualism is still somewhat rampant in the general public and is often accepted as true (which isn't hard to believe when you look at religion) even though any critical thinking course will tear the idea to shreds. But if there is any consolation behind the idea of dualism it would be that mental causation is fundamental to their concept of reality as well. Physical events cause mental events, and mental events cause physical events. This interaction takes place between two different 'worlds' of substances (so to speak) -the 'subjective world' and the 'objective world'. A diagram would look like this:

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep-wp/wp-content/media/mental-causation-fig1.jpg

Now, the benefits from believing this would be the obvious spiritual implications (i.e. a soul) but this also plays on our common sense view that the mental should be distinguished from the physical or 'over-and-above' the brain. To take a page from Nagel it's the 'what it is like' aspect of consciousness that is irreducible to the brain because consciousness, by definition, is a first-person ontology.

Note: This is also interwoven with some supervenience thesis' that wants to incorporate downward causation (hence, Fig. 1.d Annoyance to 1.e Neural Correlate).

There are a few obstacles in your way with this type of Interactionism -and I use the word 'few' generously. The first is the problem of Spatial Location, the second is the problem of Energy Conservation, and the third is the Exclusion Argument. The details of these will be in full length towards the end of this paper.

Of course one can be a dualist and still maintain that the two 'worlds' don't actually interact. This is called Parallelism or sometimes called Occasionalism. The two 'worlds' only interact with their own 'world' so only an illusion of causal interaction takes place. Mental events cause other mental events and physical events cause other physical events:

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep-wp/wp-content/media/mental-causation-fig2.jpg

As you can see there is no interaction at all between the two but the immediate question raised is how well coordinated the two separate 'systems' are. For instance, why do you always feel pain when you stub your toe and not some other sensation if there isn't a causal connection to bridge the two systems? A reply to this by Leibniz is what he called 'Pre-established Harmony'. Basically, it's a 'goddidit' explanation. Some can cope with this as an answer and may even help endorse the idea that god works his magic through evolution, but others (like myself) don't really accept this as an answer. If anything its like saying X did it and accepting that as an explanation.

Now, if you just flat out deny intentionality and you're into mental impotence then epiphenomenalism here we come! Epiphenomenalism is the view that your mind is causally inert and that causation only happens in a 'one-way' direction. Your mind is a superfluous residue excreted from your body. Here's a diagram:

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep-wp/wp-content/media/mental-causation-fig3.jpg

As you can see there is only a one-way direction of causation. The closest analogy would be of a shadow being cast by your body. The shadow has no causal relevance but is only an epiphenomenon of your body (mind you this analogy is inexact). Surprisingly, epiphenomenalism is somewhat coherent in that it doesn't pose any of the problems that the previous stances did. Also, it has some scientific support from the famous Libet experiments too.

Unfortunately, that's about as much as can be said for epiphenomenalism. Taking the stance that your feelings, thoughts, desires, perceptions, etc. have no causal relevance to what you do is highly counter intuitive, to say the least. Fodor seems to say it best:

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It's hard to find people that actually take the epiphenomenal stance seriously mainly because the initial act of claiming epiphenomenalism contradicts its very premise (link) and as William James pointed out its hard to reconcile it with evolution. Also, it must be said that the interpretations from the Libet experiments are definitely under criticism and that even Libet himself still believed in what he called a 'conscious veto' which still renders the mind with some causal powers.

Our last stance is from a reductionist viewpoint. Reductionism says that the mental and the physical are one and of the same event. So when you stub your toe and feel the sensation of pain your neural correlate is equivalent to your sensation. In other words, mental events are physical events. Here's the diagram:

http://www.utm.edu/research/iep-wp/wp-content/media/mental-causation-fig4.jpg

Again, I want to reiterate that I want this to be more of an informative post so that whichever method you want to endorse you are at least aware of what some of the problems are for choosing that particular stance. I would also like to point out that I didn't go into complete detail with all this and that each stance has actually sub-stances that differ within their respected field. For example, I didn't talk about Substance vs Property dualism, Type vs Token physicalism, Multiple Realizability, Anomalous Monism, Emergence/Supervenience, and so forth. So if there's anything you want to add or elaborate about let me know with a PM or something. I will end with the promised detailed arguments from earlier. Anyway, thanks for reading and don't forget to comment.

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The Problem of Spatial Location:

Causation entails a spatial location (contiguity) and an energy transfer of some sort. This is why poking someone in the arm directly will actually hurt the person and produces an effect, rather than playing voodoo and poking the arm of a doll from a distance (hence, contiguity). Now if the mind has causal efficacy then it has a spatial location. This means we would be able to locate where the interaction is taking place, but nobody can or has which is why dualists make the claim it's immaterial in the first place. Descartes and his colleagues weren't ignorant to the problem of contiguity either which is why he proposed that the Pineal Gland was the 'seat of the soul'. Unfortunately, we know that is completely false. The pineal gland is a light sensitive organ that releases melatonin and helps regulate your circadian rhythm in addition to zeitgebers. The non-spatiality of the mind requires adequate solutions to not only mind-to-body causation but also to body-to-mind and mind-to-mind interaction.

The Problem of Energy Conservation:

The next problem is energy transfer and the law of conservation of energy. The energy of the universe remains fixed at all times, which means the universe is a causally closed system (Entropy is key here as well). Since the body is within the universe it must be caused by something within that system. But if your immaterial mind isn't within the system then the causal interaction is coming from a foreign energy source. Which means it would distort the equilibrium of the universe and violate the law of CoE. Some can see theological implications behind this but all I say is so much for hyperdualism!

The Exclusion Argument:

Principle of Causal Exclusion states as follows in simplification: if an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause of e (unless this is a genuine case of overdetermination). This means there is no reason to bring in an unnecessary causal force into the equation if there is already an adequate solution to the problem. For if the brain and its neurophysiological system is adequate enough to explain bodily motion then the mental is causally impotent bearing overdetermination and nomologically exhausted laws. There is no reason why multiple sufficient causes for X effect is needed when one will suffice.

References:

Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind. 1st. New York: Oxford Press. 1996

Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. 1st. Princeton: Princeton Monographs in Philosphy, 2005.
Print.

Koch, Christof. The Quest for Consciousness. 1st. Roberts and Company. 2004

McGinn, Colin. The Mysterious Flame. 1st. New York: Basic Books. 1999

Papineau, David. Philosophy. 1st. New York: Oxford Press. 2009

http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mental-c.htm#SH1ciii

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/#ExcPro

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Neuronal_correlates_of_consciousness

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@Kielicious,

Excellent post on a topic (perhaps the topic) that any philosopher worth his stripes should take very seriously, indeed. Of all the topics you bring up, I find the question of energy conservation the most compelling. A couple of points (with question marks at the end) on that topic:

- could it be that the "law" of conservation of energy is, in fact, false? There are deep implications to a huge number of questions is CoE is overturned.

- could it be that the mind is able to alter the vectors of physical material travelling through physical space, but not actually change the amount of energy contained in the causal reaction? Particle X with mass Y traveling at speed Z in direction L has the same "energy signature" if it suddenly begins travelling in direction M, does it not? Could it be that the mind can act as causal agent without violating the "law" of CoE?

Thanks for this post.

1 Reply

@Grimlock,

Grimlock;84462 wrote:

Excellent post on a topic (perhaps the topic) that any philosopher worth his stripes should take very seriously, indeed. Of all the topics you bring up, I find the question of energy conservation the most compelling. A couple of points (with question marks at the end) on that topic:

- could it be that the "law" of conservation of energy is, in fact, false? There are deep implications to a huge number of questions is CoE is overturned.

- could it be that the mind is able to alter the vectors of physical material travelling through physical space, but not actually change the amount of energy contained in the causal reaction? Particle X with mass Y traveling at speed Z in direction L has the same "energy signature" if it suddenly begins travelling in direction M, does it not? Could it be that the mind can act as causal agent without violating the "law" of CoE?

Thanks for this post.

Thanks for the reply.

Well, nothing in science is presented as certainty. With that being said it is possible by technicality but the odds of this foundational law being wrong is incredibly high. As for the second part, I dont believe so. Energy by definition is the ability to do work. Unless you are keeping an equilibrium by negating that positive energy. Then again I aint no physicist so idk...

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@Kielicious,

I have a question reguarding each of the four scenarios and it begins with the fact that all cases are overshadowed by awareness. To explain in the diagramical sense, I must add a few intricasies to fulfill the understanding.

RUNNING-> Stub toe, as one has immediately decided to hop on the opposite foot, hence there is no immediate step into either c.pain or b. C-Fiber. Now either of d or e can be the next step as simply as c or b can, then there is the possibility of neither. Believe me I am not trying to be facetious.

1 Reply

@urangutan,

urangutan;84671 wrote:

I have a question reguarding each of the four scenarios and it begins with the fact that all cases are overshadowed by awareness. To explain in the diagramical sense, I must add a few intricasies to fulfill the understanding.

RUNNING-> Stub toe, as one has immediately decided to hop on the opposite foot, hence there is no immediate step into either c.pain or b. C-Fiber. Now either of d or e can be the next step as simply as c or b can, then there is the possibility of neither. Believe me I am not trying to be facetious.

Im not sure I understand you correctly.

We dont need to go any further beforehand and state I was running which led to the stubbing of my toe. All we are focusing on here is the apparent direction these events give us.

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@Kielicious,

How about the notion that every "actual occassion" or every "acutal entity" has both a mental and a physical aspect. (neutral monism or panpsychism). The universe is dipolar. What you see depends on how you look.

External observation, science, measurement, etc only detects the physical pole or aspect. There is a non detectable interiority or subjective experience aspect to all of reality.

Mind you this is not dualism. It is more a statement about the limitations of observation, measurement and science. One is getting only a partial and incomplete picture of "reality" using science. The primitive properties of mind (perception, memory and variable response are much more widespread in nature) than is commonly assumed: panexperientialism.

---------- Post added 08-22-2009 at 10:51 PM ----------

Mind and body are different manifestations of the same unitary substance (monism).
Properties of Mind are a fundamenatal attribute of reality.
Ultimate reality is both physical and mental and the attributes are not separable.
How can mind "emerge" from matter with no intrinisic mental attributes or properties?
At what stage in evolution does mind emerge?
What entities possess "mind"? humans, other animals? plants? fundmental particles?
At what stage in fetal development does mind emerge?

Galen Strawson " The notion that mind can emerge from a wholly non-mental, non-experiential substrate is nonsense. I think it is very, very hard to understand what it is supposed to involve. I think it is incoherent, in fact"

2 Replies

@prothero,

prothero;85078 wrote:

Mind and body are different manifestations of the same unitary substance (monism).
Properties of Mind are a fundamenatal attribute of reality.
Ultimate reality is both physical and mental and the attributes are not separable.

I think this is plausible. If mind and body were separable (dualistic), mental causation and physical (neural) causation would pursue their own separate paths, with no guarantee that they would continue to correspond to each other.

In a dualistic interpretation, A1 and A2 would be consecutive neural events, while B1 and B2 would be the mental events simultaneous with A1 and A2 respectively. Assume that A1 is examined and found to be of a type regularly correlated with B1-type mental events. Now, if A1 causes A2, and B1 causes B2, there does not seem to be any logical reason why A2 must correlate with B2 in the same way that A1 correlated with B1. A2 and B2 could be found to bear no direct relation to each other at all. (To give an analogy: A seed develops into a plant, but a picture of that seed does not develop into a picture of a plant, nor does a label bearing the word "seed" develop into one bearing the word "plant".)

That is why the monistic interpretation seems more satisfactory. We then have only two events, 1 and 2, and 1 causes 2 straightforwardly.

The only alternative would be to deny the reality of mental events altogether, but that seems self-evidently absurd.

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@prothero,

prothero;85078 wrote:

How about the notion that every "actual occassion" or every "acutal entity" has both a mental and a physical aspect. (neutral monism or panpsychism). The universe is dipolar. What you see depends on how you look.

External observation, science, measurement, etc only detects the physical pole or aspect. There is a non detectable interiority or subjective experience aspect to all of reality.

Mind you this is not dualism. It is more a statement about the limitations of observation, measurement and science. One is getting only a partial and incomplete picture of "reality" using science. The primitive properties of mind (perception, memory and variable response are much more widespread in nature) than is commonly assumed: panexperientialism.

I didnt talk about panpsychism so youre more than welcome to, but it seems more of a dualistic approach to these two 'fundamental substances'. In fact, what you say seems alot like Chalmers views about panpsychism and the mental as foundational to reality, but if you can present it in a way that supports monism then more power to ya. Of course, Im inclined to disagree with much of what has been said but as I stated before this is more of an informative thread, rather than an argumentative on 'whos right'. However, in response to the quote (to which I appreciated) couldnt the same be said of water from H20? or salt from NaCl? or anything of that matter?

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@Kielicious,

I don't see why "causal drainage" is a problem. Especially since I am convinced by Hume's arguments that the idea of the force or necessity that we presume causes to possess arises from our internal sensations as we consider such objects, and not from any qualities of the objects themselves.

I hold with the reductionist view, and accept that this means consciousness isn't necessary for any of our actions. Neither do I find this contrary to experience, as any practiced action can be done automatically, or by the common manners of speaking "without thinking about it," or "subconsciously."

Also, experimental psychology has produced a lot of interesting experiments that indicate that our experience of consciousness is not one and the same with the causes of our actions. Daniel Wegner wrote a book about this called "The Illusion of Conscious Will." It is about these experiments, and also proposes that our experience of consciousness arises not from the mental processes that cause our actions, but from the mental processes that consider our actions, and modify our future behavior depending on how we judge of the results.

As far as I can tell, this offers a perfect reconciliation between the experience that our conscious experiences directly cause our actions and the evidence that they do not.

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@alcaz0r,

Im curious of your response to the causal drainage argument and hope you can elaborate in more detail about it. I read Kim's reply to Ned about the causal drainage issue but wasnt really satisfied with his response. Perhaps you can shed some light on the issue?

2 Replies

@Kielicious,

I'm going to read Ned Block's causal exclusion argument in full before I get back to you on that, I found a .pdf of it. Also do you know a convenient place online to read Kim's response?

1 Reply

@alcaz0r,

alcaz0r;85224 wrote:

I'm going to read Ned Block's causal exclusion argument in full before I get back to you on that, I found a .pdf of it. Also do you know a convenient place online to read Kim's response?

Online? No. I have his book and he goes into some detail but, to me, most of the time he seems to be BSing alot in his response to Ned... But maybe I just need to re-read it? idk...

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@Kielicious,

I just got done reading Block's argument that Kim's causal exclusion argument would result in "causal drainage," that was hot. Good stuff! However, as far as I understand it this is only a problem for Kim's argument if matter is made up of an infinite number of smaller and smaller "layers" each with different properties? Also, I don't consider it a problem at all for reasons I'll try to explain!

I'm definitely feeling a little limited by my lack of a higher education, but hey I'll give this a shot anyway.

Both Kim and Block seem to agree that this "Causal Drainage" occurs, they just disagree on where it stops. Where I start to have a problem is when I consider just what is it that is supposedly draining away here? Neither of them seem to be making the case that this disctinction has any bearing on how objects interact, or how we should predict their interactions. Nor does this distinction seem to bear any relevance to the objects themselves. So, if causal drainage doesn't change any of the attributes of an object considered in and of itself, and doesn't change the manner in which we expect this object to interact with other objects, there is only one thing left that can be affected, and that is our conception of the interactions of these objects.

Hume's arguments regarding causation: paraphrased by me!

To make this a little more interesting I'm going to proceed in a manner somewhat opposite to how Hume lays it out. First I'll start with the consideration that our perceptions and the objects they represent really are seperate. Actually I'm very sure you're familiar with this concept! I'll try to quickly move to the part that is important to the present subject.

We recognize that our perceptions are dependent on our senses, and appear to us in an interrupted manner, yet we observe a constancy in the manner in which our perceptions appear to us, so it is to reconcile the contradiction between the constancy in our perceptions and the inconstancy of our senses that we presume the existence of external objects. However, even though we make this distiction we still have no manner of forming an idea of these external objects but to conceive of them as the very same perceptions which we presume only to represent them.

In Hume's words "...it is impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are spefically different from each other." The consequence of this is that the connections we observe between our perceptions or impressions cannot be safely assumed to apply to the objects they represent. The connection between a cause and it's effect, that necessity or power which we presume the cause to possess, is a connection that we observe between our impressions, which we cannot attribute to any specific attributes of the objects which we reason concerning. Nor does this idea of necessity arise from a view of the cause and its effect considered together. It is only the compulsion we feel to pass from the consideration of a cause to the consideration of it's effect which can account for this idea that a cause must produce its effect. I also tried to explain/paraphrase this in the Hume forum but I'm not sure how successful I was in either case.

So then, the only way to describe a causal relationship between external objects, without appealing to internal connections which we can't safely presume to have any external counterpart, is to say that when two [objects] are observed to be constantly conjoined in time and space, with one precedent to the other, that the one is the cause of the other. I put objects in brackets for emphasis, since the particular qualities of objects, being distinguishable by the mind, can be considered seperately and observed to be causes on their own, or to be the causally efficacious properties of an object if you prefer.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I hope this satisfies your curiosity about my earlier response to the Causal Drainage issue.

As a result of my being convinced by Hume's reasoning, I don't find Kim's causal exclusion very convincing, and even while I admire how concise Block's response to it was, I don't find causal drainage very alarming. What I do find convincing are experiments which carefully expose constant conjunctions between physical events and conscious experiences, and those which expose disjunctions between conscious will and actions.

2 Replies

@alcaz0r,

I read your post and Im going to make a full response tomorrow because its almost 1am and I have to get up super early for an appt. but I must say that was a great response. Be prepared though because Ive got questions! Wink

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@alcaz0r,

alcaz0r;85470 wrote:

Both Kim and Block seem to agree that this "Causal Drainage" occurs, they just disagree on where it stops. Where I start to have a problem is when I consider just what is it that is supposedly draining away here? Neither of them seem to be making the case that this disctinction has any bearing on how objects interact, or how we should predict their interactions. Nor does this distinction seem to bear any relevance to the objects themselves. So, if causal drainage doesn't change any of the attributes of an object considered in and of itself, and doesn't change the manner in which we expect this object to interact with other objects, there is only one thing left that can be affected, and that is our conception of the interactions of these objects.

What seems to be draining away is definately our conception of what we have come to know about ourselves and the objects around us. When a baseball breaks a window, what exactly is it about the baseball that broke the window? Some would say the hardness or solidity of the baseball is what broke the window. But solidity is an emergent property of its constituent microstructure which renders it a macro-level phenomenon. So when we say the hardness of the baseball is what caused the window to break, this seems to be in direct contradiction to what Block is asserting. Macrostructures dont actually have causal powers. Only basic physical particles are endowed with causation. Likewise, we wouldnt say the basic particles of the baseball are what caused the window to break.

alcaz0r wrote:

So then, the only way to describe a causal relationship between external objects, without appealing to internal connections which we can't safely presume to have any external counterpart, is to say that when two [objects] are observed to be constantly conjoined in time and space, with one precedent to the other, that the one is the cause of the other. I put objects in brackets for emphasis, since the particular qualities of objects, being distinguishable by the mind, can be considered seperately and observed to be causes on their own, or to be the causally efficacious properties of an object if you prefer.

Yes I agree but Im afraid this doesnt help the issue. Constant conjuction, as Hume would say, and necessity is definately something we infer from induction but I dont think the issue is whether or not X is a cause for Y but rather: what is it about X that causes Y?

alcaz0r wrote:

As a result of my being convinced by Hume's reasoning, I don't find Kim's causal exclusion very convincing, and even while I admire how concise Block's response to it was, I don't find causal drainage very alarming. What I do find convincing are experiments which carefully expose constant conjunctions between physical events and conscious experiences, and those which expose disjunctions between conscious will and actions.

As I do too.

However, in my opinion the problem of endless supervenience is still a valid problem. Cyanide is highly toxic to humans, so when someone drinks cyanide, is the supervenient property of cyanide killing the person? If so then the supervenient property of cyanide is killing the person -not its basic free-floating particles- which entails causal efficacy, right?

Either (I hate so use the either/or fallacy) we have emergent causal powers for each level of phenomena or there is but one causal efficacy residing in the foundations of the physical. If the former then biological phenomena interact with other biological phenomena, and chemical with chemical, and so on... If the latter then biological phenomena = all its microstructures (ML*). ML*= L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4, and lets say it stops at L-5. By this then all biological phenomena are explained by causal interaction at ML-5 ? In fact all levels above L-5 are causally impotent. This doesnt make sense to me at all. I wouldnt say the outcome of the football game was decided by quantum physics, would you? Maybe Im missing something though idk...

1 Reply

@Kielicious,

There is something I should have been a lot more clear about. I do see causal drainage as a problem with the application of Kim's causal exclusion. So if when you say that you still see causal drainage as a problem, you mean as a problem with causal exclusion, then I agree. I don't see it as being a problem with reductionism in general though. If you do, please explain why, and maybe we can go somewhere from there. Smile

I also have a couple clarifications to make.

Quote:

Yes I agree but Im afraid this doesnt help the issue. Constant conjuction, as Hume would say, and necessity is definately something we infer from induction but I dont think the issue is whether or not X is a cause for Y but rather: what is it about X that causes Y?

We can't infer necessity, we have no reasonable basis for concluding that certain objects must cause certain effects. We are determined to expect that they will, but this can only come from a general expectation that future experiments should resemble past experiments. While this is a very natural expectation to have, and I'm not saying we should doubt it, it isn't by logic that we come by it.

Quote:

Either (I hate so use the either/or fallacy) we have emergent causal powers for each level of phenomena or there is but one causal efficacy residing in the foundations of the physical. If the former then biological phenomena interact with other biological phenomena, and chemical with chemical, and so on... If the latter then biological phenomena = all its microstructures (ML*). ML*= L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4, and lets say it stops at L-5. By this then all biological phenomena are explained by causal interaction at ML-5 ? In fact all levels above L-5 are causally impotent. This doesnt make sense to me at all. I wouldnt say the outcome of the football game was decided by quantum physics, would you? Maybe Im missing something though idk...

It is a strange way of thinking about it, yes. It is my opinion that this absurdity is a symptom of Kim's attempt to treat our idea of causal force or necessity as if it were an attribute of external objects. Assuming that I am right, when I say that this force, efficacy, power, or necessity is in fact not an attribute of external objects, but is a sensation we receive when considering such objects, then such absurdities are to be expected.

So considering the reason I reject causal exclusion, it should be clear why I consider Block's causal drainage argument as being correct, but kind of superfluous.

1 Reply

@alcaz0r,

alcaz0r;85929 wrote:

There is something I should have been a lot more clear about. I do see causal drainage as a problem with the application of Kim's causal exclusion. So if when you say that you still see causal drainage as a problem, you mean as a problem with causal exclusion, then I agree. I don't see it as being a problem with reductionism in general though. If you do, please explain why, and maybe we can go somewhere from there.

In reality, I dont think it is that much of an issue for reductionists. However, I do think that the causal drainage argument is an issue that needs an explanation from the reductionist standpoint. If the reductionist says "the mind is reduced to the brain to save mental causation" then this heads straight for the causal drainage dilemma. Although, if mental causation isnt of much importance to you then causal drainage isnt a issue. But if you are trying to save mental causation by reducing minds to brains, are you really saving it? Block says no which is why he made the argument. I hope Im making it clear.

alcaz0r wrote:

We can't infer necessity, we have no reasonable basis for concluding that certain objects must cause certain effects. We are determined to expect that they will, but this can only come from a general expectation that future experiments should resemble past experiments. While this is a very natural expectation to have, and I'm not saying we should doubt it, it isn't by logic that we come by it.

Yes, I understand Hume and induction.

alcaz0r wrote:

It is a strange way of thinking about it, yes. It is my opinion that this absurdity is a symptom of Kim's attempt to treat our idea of causal force or necessity as if it were an attribute of external objects. Assuming that I am right, when I say that this force, efficacy, power, or necessity is in fact not an attribute of external objects, but is a sensation we receive when considering such objects, then such absurdities are to be expected.

So considering the reason I reject causal exclusion, it should be clear why I consider Block's causal drainage argument as being correct, but kind of superfluous.

Exactly. Some reductionists can handle the problem, while others cant. If you arent really looking to save causation then, ya, none of this applies. But if you are looking to save mental causation then it is a problem. It all depends on your particular stance.

1 Reply

@Kielicious,

I just wasn't expressing myself clearly enough from the beginning then. That's a big part of why I'm on this forum, to improve my ability to discuss such things. Thanks for being patient! :bigsmile:

1 Reply

@alcaz0r,

No problem buddy. I, too, often dont find the words to articulate. Smile

0 Replies

@Kielicious,

[QUOTE=Kielicious;85183]I didnt talk about panpsychism so you're more than welcome to, but it seems more of a dualistic approach to these two 'fundamental substances'. In fact, what you say seems alot like Chalmers views about panpsychism and the mental as foundational to reality, but if you can present it in a way that supports monism then more power to ya. Of course, Im inclined to disagree with much of what has been said but as I stated before this is more of an informative thread, rather than an argumentative on 'who's right'. However, in response to the quote (to which I appreciated) couldn't the same be said of water from H20? or salt from NaCl? or anything of that matter?[/QUOTE]

Panpsychism is an ancient view. Probably the dominant view of nature for most of human history until the modern scientific period. It is still a common viewpoint.

Fundamentally panpsychism is a form of monism not dualism.
Panpsychism is not idealism, materialism or dualism but a form of monism.
In the process view of panpsychism reality is composed of events.
All events have both a physical (material) aspect and a mental (psychic) aspect.
The mental can not be separated from the physical or the physical from the mental.
The "material" is "reality" from the outside the "mental" is "reality" from within.
There exists one single ultimate reality which exhibits material or mental properties depending on the method of observation, measurement or view.

Sir Arthur Eddington-"Physics only addresses the surface structure of matter and energy, and does not have anything to say about the inner content of reality"

The use of the term "mental" in a panpsychism discussion does not mean "consciousness" or human like self awareness. It refers to more primitive qualities of mentality such as non sensory perceptions, awareness, non deterministic response, forms of memory, etc.

Panpsychism is essentially a metaphysical not a scientific theory. There are many questions you should ask yourself when considering accepting or rejecting any form of panpsychsim.

What is mentality?

What entities, actualities or organizations possess it?
We are all acutely aware of our own mentality. We attribute similar properties of mentality to other humans on the basis of our own experience and analogy?
Do you attribute mentality to animals? To plants?
Where in the chain of life or existence do all forms of inner perception, memory and response end?
On what basis do you impute or deny mentality to particular life forms or objects?
When, where and how did properties you would call mental appear?
How do you know when primitive qualities of mind are present of absent?

In Panpsychism
Mind is best conceived of as a general property of nature
Mind or mind like qualities exist in all sufficiently organized entities.
There is no reason to limit the concept of mind only to humans and higher organisms

David Bohm (physicist)- "in a way nature is alive all the way to the depths"
William James- "pure experience" is the basis of all reality.
Aristotle- "nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless (mindless) to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation"
Kant-"panpsychism imputes life to everything, materialism carefully considered kills everything"

Panpsychism basically asserts that inherent qualities of mind are much more prevalent and pervasive than any "materialist" theory of reality or emergent theory of mind would permit.

The alternative theory of mind to panpshycism; primarily emergence postulates at some point the appearance of a quality fundamentally different in ontologic character than what had existed before. Some would say a form of "magic". The inherent gradualism of evolution demands that mind as experienced in humans must have had a long and slow step by step development. This implies that in a certain sense the inherent qualities of mind must be embedded deeply in nature.
William James- "if evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness (mentality) in some shape must have been present in the very origin of things"

The mechanist account of nature knows only its spatial and temporal qualities.
Fechner- "materialism views humans alone as an isolated point of light in a universe of utter blackness"
Materialism denies spirit, idealism denies matter.
William James- "There are two kinds of philosophers, the cynical and the sympathetic, the former inevitably develop materialistic philosophies, and the latter spiritualistic ones"
Charles Hartshorne-"mechanism and materialism are really two aspects of the same view- the view that nature is fundamentally dead, blind, uncreative and insentinent".

In contrast the panpsychist view:
Hebert Spencer- "The conception to which the enlightened tends is much less that of a universe of dead matter than that of a universe everywhere alive"
Morton Prince-"Matter is no longer the dead senseless thing it is popularly supposed to be"
Charles Pierce-"What we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hide bound with habits"
Charles Pierce-"Viewing a thing from the outside it appears as matter, viewing a thing from the inside it appears as mind"

In summary, Panpsychism is a form of monism, not idealism, materialism or dualism.
panpsychism asserts that primitive qualities of mind are inseparable from matter and thus pervausive and inherent in nature.
Panpshycism is not a scientific theory or assertion but a metaphysical speculation.
In gerneral panpsychism views the universe as alive and enchanted and is thus spiritual, life affirming, optimistic and ecology friendly.

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The Issue of Mental Causation

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