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Tue 3 Feb, 2009 03:02 pm
I am usually very calm, but lately I have become frustrated in my attempts to negate what I call the infalsifiability conundrum that many people around me have invoked a passion (perhaps subconsciously imprinted doesn't matter....) for so easily, and I can't help but grieve at my own feeble attempts of understanding the situations going on. The infalsifiability conundrum is a disease, a delusion; one that causes a pseudo-reality, co-existing with what is a little more objective.
I don't know if 'conundrum' is the right word, ok... it's simply a delusion, but it's in the objective form of a puzzle sort-to-speak, making it all the more ironic. It is simply when one's logic revolves around the conundrum for the sake of not solving the problem/puzzle, but to maintain it; to maintain the infalsifiability. And generally these people (I mean with the deepest respect and kindness possible) do not care for the improvable aspects to the problem or system at hand in terms of its relevance, thus causing ignorance to what is rational, and accepting emotional frenzies instead.
And I want to understand why this is the case with only certain people. Why are there atheists and theists and those who just don't give a damn? Why aren't we all atheists? I mean, most people do not make the logical fallacies, most have a clear understanding of the logical innateness in the God conundrum, or the alien conundrum. So I thought about what is it that determines beliefs and conceptualizations in general. Why is it so hard to convince or change peoples' minds about ethical matters, or well... simply any philosophy? What is it intrinsically that defends one's own beliefs, what is the grounding to conceptualizations?
Are conceptualizations logically grounded? Obviously not, otherwise, everybody would be agnostic given the right information.
Let's say that all conceptualizations have an intrinsic form, and call it data. And as the data is manipulated as information it has two functions; an irrational function, and a rational function. Indeed the 'data' cannot be awared (by the mind) if it is not a function but just a state of being, therefore the only terms that are of potential are functions, and thus I shall call them functions.
Now this 'data' is able to be computed by people, and I shall call us people, 'sources'.
For example: Let's use Christmas. Christmas is the data, and it needs to have context in order to be information. (The context is not enough to become knowledge, but that's beside the point) Now let's say Christmas is communicated as a word to two sources. The data concurrently is a rational function, because it is able to be computed to the extent that it needs to be by any source interacting with the initial source of the data. The rational function takes any form that can fulfill that obligation, that potential. It can be language, logic, math, signals, etc. Once however, the rational function is computed by any individual source, the function switches to irrational, because it is in a form of which the context of the data can only be fully computed by the one source. This is qualia; emotion, analogous stimuli, etc.
It can be said, that all which has potential is all that is purely subjective. But intrinsically, all is with a purely objective state (just for the sake of argument please, I don't want to take this goose-chase of a tangent and argue the stipulation). And there is room in this potentiality for a partially objective form to the data, in that the word Christmas is objective as a word, but how the word is sensed and interpreted is subjective. Now you might ask, well is there room then for an objective side? Yes, this is the intent from which the source projected the data.
Anyways... it comes clear that Christmas takes on a rational/partially objective function and must have come from and turns into an irrational/subjective function. When the data is undergoing change, it oscillates back and forth from rational to irrational.
So what does this have to do with the infalsifiability conundrum? Well if something is improvable then the source neglecting the fact is either A) believing whatever conceptualization because it is absent of logic/rational function to precede their own irrational function, or B) their logic is flawed.
Which of the two is it? If it was B then the logic can be corrected, because it would seem to be logic vs. logic; easy to trump the other. A) makes much more sense though now I realize it is incomplete. It must be that a belief is (as I think I said before) not logically bound. Logic does not stick with the irrational function, because it is rational. The conceptualization is inherently irrational thus the logic must be converted to irrational (qualia/emotion, whatever...) Indeed, every single belief, conceptualization, is simply the level of 'analog' (irrational function) potential and context. Logic does not directly impact anybody's beliefs on this forum unless you happen to be insane, which is asymptotical, truly. Logic can impact, and in it's partially objective sense, it has context... but the potential comes from it's irrational manipulation.
So it is easy to understand now that since everybody has different experiences and relative information to provide knowledge to the contextual process, there will be varying effects the same logical intentions have in respect to multiple sources.
This explains the correlation between christian fundamentalism and the sources' tendency to've had traumatic experiences preceding the fact, and why it is next to impossible to convert them to atheists. The traumatic experience is a direct irrational (experience) function, and because it is traumatic, no logic can trump it, because logic converted to irrationalities are next to nil in potential, regardless of the powerful context.
But it seems with the phenomenon of the infalsifiability conundrum, that there still remains a problem. When an irrational conceptualization is realized to be rationally hollow, there seems to be an impact which is negative to the irrationals. It is as if even though it would seem the irrational defines beliefs and reality, the irrational functioning is threatened by the rational inputs even if not being trumped.
The rational functions still have a partial impact on the irrational grounding of the conceptualization. If we say irrational is (-)ve and rational is (+)ve then the conceptualization potential is just the sum of the functions. Indeed if the vector is assumed (the context; note the magnitude must be the potential) then it is directed by the ratio of intent from the sending source to the knowledge of the computing source (the one collecting the data). The knowledge in form of memory, etc.