@Mr Fight the Power,
Mr. Fight the Power wrote:How would the existing rules of the universe imply how we should behave?
I'll have a go at an answer, but I'm afraid I don't see how to make it a brief one.
First, let me say that I don't want to force my view of the universe on you, only to show that the rules of the universe
may be such as to allow us rationally derive a system of behaviour from them that would seem to embody a moral code.
For such a universe, in addition to those laws we all agree are discernable, those of physics, logic etc., there would have to be the laws of karma. These latter laws would be natural and strictly deterministic, no different in their operation from the laws of physics. The experiences we have over our lifetime would somehow leave their mark on us, an imprint if you like, and these would somehow be carried over in such a way as to determine 'our' (or perhaps it would be better to say 'a') rebirth.
The context for these laws would be the unity of all sentient beings. The universe would reduce to some kind of spiritual unity or monistic Absolute, in line with the view of Spencer-Brown, Bradley, Hegel, Spinoza, Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus and so on.
The situation in this (hypothetical) universe would be that for a person who is aware of the identity of all beings and who is also aware of the karmic laws at work, moral behaviour would simply be rational behaviour. We would not jump off a cliff because of the consequences for ourself. We would not push somene else of a cliff for precisely the same reason. Moral judgements would be made entirely on the basis of self-interest, but (and this is the crucial bit) only to the extent that we are aware of those laws. If we are not aware of them then we must act according to a more subjective judgement of what constitutes right and wrong.
What would follow is that there would be no objective morality, if what we mean by this is that there is a cosmic rulebook somewhere which serves as an absolute standard for human behaviour. There would be no action which is
a priori 'bad or 'good' in such a universe. Everything would depend on the context, our motives and our knowledge of the facts, and not our visible actions. Yet at the same time moral judgements would not be subjective, since (in principle) they can be made entirely by reference to the laws of the universe, with no room for personal foibles.
According to the worldview I have just described (horribly inadequately) the argument as the whether a system of morality should be or can be subjective or objective becomes pointless. We could look at it either way.
Behind this hypothetical universe lies a bigger idea, and this helps to make sense of this view of morality, which is that all distinctions are resolved in the Absolute. The subjective/objective distinction would be just one of these distinctions.
Bradley puts it like this in his
Essays on Truth and Reality.
"There are those for whom the outer world is one given fact, and again the world of my self another fact; and there are others for whom only one of these two facts is ultimate. It is in philosophy a common doctrine that there is immediate certainty only on the side of my self, a basis from which I should have thought that Solipsism must demonstrably follow.... But in truth neither the world nor the self is an ultimately given fact. On the contrary each alike is a construction and a more or less one-sided abstraction. There is even experience in feeling where self and not-self are not yet present and opposed; and again every state where there is an experience of the relation of not-self to self is above that relation. It is a whole of feeling which contains these elements, and this felt containing whole belongs to neither by itself. 'Subject and object', you say perhaps, 'are correlated in experience'; and, I presume, you would agree that we have here one experience which includes the correlation. But are we to say that this experience itself is a mere correlation?"
For Bradley subject and object would be two aspects of an 'all-containing Universe' and the distinction between them relative, while to take them as two ultimately different things would be quite simply an error.
This is the view reached by Erwin Schroedinger, who from an analysis of freewill and determinism concluded that these must be somehow non-different, merely contradictory and complementary aspects of one phenomenon, and that this entailed, as he puts it, 'I am God.' Iow, for an ultimate view we all share the same identity. (Even as late as the 1950's his regular publisher refused to publish the book in which he makes this claim on grounds of heresy).
There is therefore a problem for anyone holding this worldview, for one must half-agree and half-disagree with those who claim morality is subjective, and half-agree and half-disagree with those who claim it is subjective, where both sides will think one is nuts.
Put simply this view would say that the old advice, 'Do as you would be done by,' is sound, and it would be sound because of the way the universe is.
I can only hope some of that made sense.
Regards
Whoever