Moore's Paradox

Why not then say "I have lost." or "I am no longer a player in that game." It is more to the point. It seems if someone says "I am dead" they are speaking more metaphorically than metaphysically. Is there more to saying "I am dead" in Wittgenstein's language games than this? I guess what I'm asking is why did you use the word "metaphysically" instead of "metaphorically"?

It's very common to say, "I am dead" after dying in a video game. Of course, the phrase is being using metaphorically. The metaphor is X (you) is Y (the character in the game).

Blue, I think, just meant "literally" by "metaphysical frame"

It's very common to say, "I am dead" after dying in a video game. Of course, the phrase is being using metaphorically. The metaphor is X (you) is Y (the character in the game).

Blue, I think, just meant "literally" by "metaphysical frame"

"I am dead" might be true. So the truth conditions for that statement might obtain. But the assertability conditions for that statement cannot obtain. Or, to put it into plain English, it may be true, but it cannot be asserted. Never mind language games, and the rest.

"I am dead" might be true. So the truth conditions for that statement might obtain. But the assertability conditions for that statement cannot obtain. Or, to put it into plain English, it may be true, but it cannot be asserted. Never mind language games, and the rest.

So the paradox arises from the fact that some true statements cannot be asserted.

Blue? Not sure where that came from? W's Blue Book? Or do you mean feeling blue? Still not following the distinction between metaphorical and metaphysical. Is "metaphysical frame" the frame of the language game in which words have a "literal" meaning though they may have a different meaning outside of that frame?

So the paradox arises from the fact that some true statements cannot be asserted.

Where did Barbie come from? Ken says, "It is raining, but I don't believe it" There is no assertion that it is not raining. "I don't believe it is raining" does not assert that it is not raining, if that is what you happen to mean.

An expression of belief is an assertion.

And that was why in my first post I pointed out that Moore has simply joined two contradictory assertions together.

The first conjunct is an assertion about the world, the second conjunct is an assertion about your belief.

Yes. And, more importantly, it points to the distinction between truth conditions and assertability conditions.

Cases that point to the distinction between truth conditions and assertability conditions

1) Assertions about the world in conjunction with assertions of the speaker's belief
e.g. "It is raining, I don't believe it."

2) Assertions about the world that are impossible for the speaker to mean literally.
e.g. "I am dead."

3) ?

No, I believe you are wrong. But that is a natural assumption to make.

Both 1 and 2 are statements that are true, but cannot be understood literally. Since neither case can be asserted, neither is an assertion. I can think of other examples, if that is what you mean. For instance, "I cannot speak a word of English"; "I don't exist" etc.

If you read the early posts in this thread, I believe you will find me agreeing with you, but I have been convinced otherwise.
These two statements are not contradictory:

"The cat is on the mat"
"Ahab does not believe the cat is on the mat"

If I say the above, no problem. If you say it, there is a problem, but it's not that the two statements are contradictory -- they aren't.

Both 1 and 2 are statements that are true, but cannot be understood literally. Since neither case can be asserted, neither is an assertion. I can think of other examples, if that is what you mean. For instance, "I cannot speak a word of English"; "I don't exist" etc.

Is there anything more to say about Moore's paradox then? How about what do we call such utterances? Don't just say meaningless. I think this peculiar type of utterance should have a name.

Cases that point to the distinction between truth conditions and assertability conditions

1) Assertions about the world in conjunction with assertions of the speaker's belief
e.g. "It is raining, I don't believe it."

2) Assertions about the world that are impossible for the speaker to mean literally.
e.g. "I am dead."

3) ?

Perhaps we can just call this set of utterances, "The set of utterances in which Moore's paradox arises"?

Is there anything more to say about Moore's paradox then? How about what do we call such utterances? Don't just say meaningless. I think this peculiar type of utterance should have a name.

Well, there are its implications for arguing from what we can or cannot assert, to what is true.