Science proves apophatic theology

Well, for starters, language is inexact. We have 100 000 words to describe infinity with. Some statements are more accurate than others. Your example is a good example of a statement that is pretty accurate.

But in precise terms, the word 'beside' is a bit loose. Certain suburbs of Chicago are quite a distance from the lake. Some parts of Chicago are actually within the Lake.

But the point being made is that language will always be an approximation, and that if one does not understand that language is vague, wrong impressions often result. A better example to use to demonstrate this would be:

'Pluto is a planet'

The definition of what a planet is, is open to debate lately, and thus we are no longer sure wether to classify it thus, or not. Language is vague. The universe is precise. That is something both science and religion agree on.

Poseidon, I think I disagree with the universe being described as precise, not because of some linguistic differentiation but in definition. Precise would conclude that there is no thing that could be added to it. Infinite pasts to be, from countless more possible futures that offer alternative realities to everything and beyond all this, there is ever more.

Good point on the initial claims on this thread, and agree with most all of what's been said here. "Language falsifies reality" is patently false, as a statement/as stated. Although there are undoubtedly more, you could choose from any of the following reasons for this:

• Language *can*, that's not to say "it does". As stated, it's explicitly implied that no other option is available than "it does falsify"
  
• Language doesn't falsify or overly generalize, though our *use* of it often falls into this trap
  
• We can't codify into words concepts of which we're not aware. That's not to say that once such understanding is gained, that "language" won't evolve (as already stated)
  
• Again, as someone already brought up, if you use enough words and have enough knowledge about anything, I think it completely reasonable to say anything could be defined into rock-solid completeness; please refer to my 10,000,000,000,000 volume definition of a rock
  

But such sweeping statements - whose wording has an seeming grace - are often used as a basis for other claims more absurd. Their validity, I believe, relies on the writer hoping no one will think it through.

Thanks for bringing it up Jg.

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Well, to be sure, Chicago does not sit on (top of the water) of Lake Michigan, although there are indeed piers and water intake stations, the latter being somewhat like offshore fortresses.

The point is that language does allow us to make true statements, for example, about many cases of matters of fact, without distortion of reality or the necessity of positing a different and somehow "true" reality it attempts in a slovenly way to depict.

To argue that reality is "precise" and language is not does not get us anywhere, especially if the argument is couched in language, which cannot describe "reality" in the first place. It is open to question how one can know it is "precise"---or anything at all about "real" reality for that matter--- outside of making presumptions that are questionable. Real Reality might just as easily be dancing chaos.

It is only when we don our philosophic robes that the question even arises; language seems perfectly adequate to describe the world in which we actually live.

I want a robe!

:crying:

Are you sure? I would say it is patently true. As Wittgenstein notes, language is the master of man, not vice versa. For a simple example, to say 'It is raining' is to adopt realism, which is a demonstrably absurd metaphysical position. For an apophatic cosmology we must say that it appears to be raining, or that it is raining in a way, or that it is raining and not-raining. For a neutral metaphysical position, which is what is implied by an apophatic cosmology, (for it is not an appeal to ignorance), words that are strictly true will seem paradoxical, as famously noted by Melhuish, Nagarjuna and Lao-tsu. Here 'strictly true' would mean true in philosophy. For this view all propositions about reality which are not paradoxical are false in philosophy, and this is a problem with natural language. Melhuish concudes that we need a language of contradictory complementarity to discuss reality properly, which is also my view, but even that would not entirely overcome the problem.

I'm not sure that physics proves that we require an apophatic theory of everything, although it seems to have almost done so, but I'm quite sure that philosophy does. Kant, Hegel and George Spencer Brown are among the many who reach this conclusion.


Bit of a cheap shot this. I think I've thought it through.

Whoever

When one says, "It is raining," this is not a shorthand version of a metaphysical or ontological or epistemological statement nor does one thereby affirm, when one says something about the weather, that one is holding a realist position.
It is affirming a fact that it is indeed raining. It does not mean that "it appears to me that it is raining" (unless our question is about the appearance and not the rain itself), it does not mean that it is "raining in a way," or that "it is and is not" raining depending on how you look at it. I say "it is raining" to myself and dress accordingly when I take my dog out for a walk.

Boy: "Is it raining? I want to go out and play."
Me: "Yes,I am a realist."
Boy: "But sir, is it raining?"
Me: "Rain is and is not, it is maya, it is but an illusion of language."
Boy: "Please, sir, can you answer my question and tell me if it is raining outside?"

Plato's cave:
The shadows on the wall are the words-forms,
Open to distortion and ambiguity.

Whoever,

Well, I'm not quite sure what to say that I didn't already state that could help with this. But I'd like to try; Unfortunately I'll have to do so with language since my telepathy-beanie is broke :bigsmile:[INDENT]IN DEFENSE OF YOUR POINTS: The view of word collections (i.e., statements) into different classifications can help perspective. As you adeptly stated, they can speak to different "levels" or "dimensions" of the spoken word; and as such, the can increase our effectiveness at conveying meaning on various levels. That is, what I see, the good and productive aspect of the philosophies you're referencing.
[/INDENT][INDENT] TO THE CONTRARY: But I'll state again, and I don't think there's anything here or within the references that negates what I said before; that being: To say that language can falsify our descriptions of any sort is not to say that in all cases it does. Even within the most-recent explanation you so considerately gave, it's shown that some explanations/phrasing are more accurate then others; thus, again, illustrating that there are language-element combinations that reflect accuracy on different plans of understanding; thus reinforcing my original assertion that language can falsify, but doesn't necessary.
[/INDENT]As far as my "cheap shot" goes: Value judgments aside, it's not a "shot" at you friend. I don't know you at all! My statement of derision is pointed directly at what you typed, which is not you as a person. I do; however, offer my sincere apologies at speaking ill of something that - it seems - you closely identify with. I know how that feels and beg your patience.

This all being said; I'd like to add one thing. There exists the distinct possibility that I'm missing something in what you're trying to explain. If that's the case, I hope you'll further indulge me (and others) in trying to explain it.

I appreciate the exchange and hope for more

Thanks!

Wittgenstein would be the first to suggest that our language has many uses and levels (horizons of meaning), and that when we expect language (words, thoughts) to always act the same way in each occasion, we become confused.
Language, for example, seems perfectly adequate to describe matters of fact or to give instructions (turn the page when I say "go") but not so when used to discuss abstract concepts or universals (what is "justice?")

We seem to have one picture of language, and want to superimpose it on every example; when this causes problems, we want to say that the picture is wrong, when what we mean is that it is incomplete.

Khethil - Perhaps I used an unfortunate phrase. I didn't mean to accuse you of anything terrible, and was not in any way offended. I was just pointing out that to say that the person who started this thread had not thought their view through was not a very philosophical response. I piped up only in their defence. I wasn't offended, just pointing out that I could equally well say that you haven't thought your view through. This would get us nowhere. That's what I meant by 'cheap shot.'

Of course you are right to say that if language can falsify our descriptions is not not to say that in all cases it does. Unfortunately this would have no bearing whatsoever on whether or not in all cases it does.
Jgweed is obviously correct in saying that when one asserts, "It is raining," this is not normally a shorthand version of a metaphysical or ontological or epistemological statement implying a realist position. But in philosophy this is exactly what such a statement would imply. After all, if the statement is true then we could say, 'It is raining therefore scepticism is false.'

We do not usually bother to extrapolate from 'it is raining' to realism. It would be impractical in everyday life to ring our statements around with provisos to make them acceptable in philosophy. But in philosophy we have no choice. If it is your view that the proposition, 'It is raining' is rigorously true in philosophy (under the appropriate weather conditions) then you are a realist. If you are not a realist then this shows how language can cause problems in philosophy.

A great many philosophers have concluded that the statement 'It is raining' is not strictly true even when it appears to be raining. Only for naive realism would the statement be strictly true. You may not agree, but this is a respectable and popular position, it was Kant's after all, and it cannot be defeated by making fun of it.

I'm not suggesting that the statement 'it is raining' is false in philosophy. As jgweed points out, 'we seem to have one picture of language and want to superimpose it on every example; when this causes problems, we want to say that the picture is wrong, when what we mean is that it is incomplete.' This was my point, that propositions such as 'It is raining' are inadequate in philosophy, not exactly wrong. Even the statement 'I think' is considered inadequate by many philosophers.

Yea, I wouldn't disagree with almost anything you've said; only what seemed to be a very generalized, broadly-painted inference that since something "can", it always "does".

And, actually, all this was articulated in my original response.

I find it ironic that as we speak about the various levels of truth (or falseness) that can be expressed via language, that we are here falling into the same trap. It's almost as if we don't much work very hard to clearly state - to carefully qualify - our statements right as we talk about how language can falsify. Haha...

In any case, thanks again for the interchange. It's always nice.

Thanks from me also. I suppose the survivors of the Tower of Babel fiasco must be prepared to live with these problems. Lao-tsu sums it all up, I'd say, when he asserts that the Tao that is eternal cannot be spoken, and then adds the proviso that the Tao must be spoken. Iow, we must do the best we can under the circumstances.

Cheers
Whoever

I thought this forum was for scientific debate. Surely language reflects the way our brains work, i.e. a gradual flow from an approximation to exactness. However, (and there always seems to be one) I would not rely on anything written here if I wanted to know anything more about Chicago.

I'm sure you're right about language reflecting the way our brains work, or at least our minds, but the question here is whether, in physics and philosophy, we should allow our minds to be constrained by the way language works. In physics we have discovered that the answer is no, but in philosophy things are less clear.

'Whoever', it worries me that much of physics seems to be about prediction and prizes. It worries me that the 'grown-ups' are now looking for 'invisible things' and are involved with playing with 'string' almost as a therapy. It seems that whenever there is a difficulty in modern 'physics' it is only too easy to factor in a new term to correct the problem.
In a previous post I wrote, 'prediction is not the same as understanding and that is a lesson from the past'. There are other examples, but the oldest where prediction with limited understanding gave rise to not only a culture but also an industry, I believe, was 'Stonehenge'. I don't think I need to elaborate.
I think language is important, not just to inspire the peasants but to convince them that their taxes are being well spent. In the struggle it might be that physics would also benefit but that is a guess.

I don't know. Doesn't the ability to predict imply some sort of understanding? Still, it does seem that people sometimes confuse the two. Quantum mechanics seems the paradigm case of prediction unaccompanied by understanding, and string theory seems to be the absence of either.

I'd say the language question is deeper than this, however. It shows up most clearly in metaphysics, where natural language contrains us to ask questions which don't have answers in natural language. In fundamental physics this causes all sorts of problems, perhaps even the problem that fundamental physics is not yet fundamental.

But I would agree that a lot of rubbish is talked in order to justify the absurd costs of building things like Large Hadron Colliders.

I throughly disagree with such British disagreeableness!

The development and correct use of language is not a panacea for appeasing the masses. Were this the case we would all still be living in mud huts and drinking fermented barley much like the English themselves.

I also disagree with the analogy that language is an attempt to progress the vague thoughts of mind to some form of precise expression. The mind may conceive of all manner of abstractions in terms other than oral or written language, that these are abstractions does not mean that such ideas are not completely formed. The struggle to present new ideas within a lingustic framework is not a fault of the mind, nor a poverty of language; it is the means by which language develops.

As for the theme of this thread it strikes me as an appropriate starting point for a scientific understanding of theology in that it seeks to cast out preconceived convictions on the subject of theology. Scientific procedure would require constant evaluation of its findings until a new paradigm is conceived and defined. But the thesis of this thread, as stated, strikes me as wickedly ironic.

Wow, now THAT would be the life! Where do I sign up?

But seriously: I heard somewhere that over 90% of human communication is done so using non-verbals (which is to say in forms other than words per say; body language, gestures, facial movements, voice inflection, etc.). I personally believe we *can* get very far in expressing ourselves through words alone; however, I think it takes a lot of careful thought, work, a proper vocabulary and using the right sort of language for the right situation.

... and if I ever get all this right, I'll probably retire back to that mud hut! Woo!

Thanks - sorry for the misdirect there.

Bravo Well said!

-Marc