Moral relativism

Frank: Briefly stated, the paradox of moral relativism is this: if we state that everyone's morality is subjective, and that no one's morality is superior (or even applicable) to someone else, then that establishes an objective standard of morality. In other words, if X contends that "all people are free to follow their own versions of morality," then how can that be reconciled with Y when he responds: "my morality requires that all people follow my morality"? If we say that Y is free, per X's theory, to follow his own version of morality, it would require that all people follow Y's version of morality, which is clearly inconsistent. On the other hand, if Y is prohibited from adopting a version of morality that requires adherence by others, then that is imposing an objective standard of morality, which is specifically ruled out by X's initial formulation.

In effect, then, Woody Allen was right when he pointed out, in Love and Death, that "subjectivity is objective." Moral relativism, which permits everyone to "be right according to his/her own standards," is, in fact, an absolute system of morality disguised as a relativistic one. It is logically inconsistent, and hence a paradox.

Joe

I confess to being in considerable awe of the breadth and depth of your intellect. At first I thought you were using smoke and mirrows to dazzle us but now I'm convinced.

You mentioned Kant's "categorical imperative" ----would you please clarify. Since I had no ability to decipher his page long sentences I must depend on others to tell me what he said.

I note that you see the practical inconsistency here regarding the U.S.'s capability to intervene (i.e. it is the most capable, but it does not have unlimited capability), but I think you overlook the ethical dimension of this problem.

"Obligation" to act entails both a "duty" to act and an "ability" to act (or, to put it another way, "should" entails "can"). I may be under a duty to act to save a person in distress, but if I'm 1000 miles away I cannot be said to failed in my obligation to act (i.e. I cannot be blamed for failing to come to the person's assistance), since I was simply unable to do anything to save that person.

In the same manner, if the U.S. is not capable of acting in all circumstances, it cannot be said to have an obligation to act in all circumstances. If the U.S., in other words, cannot intervene to stop every genocide, then it is, at most, only under a positive obligation to act in those cases where it can act. Furthermore, in this regard, we need to be aware that an individual's freedom of action is often less constrained than a nation's freedom of action. A nation, although more powerful than any single individual, is often less able to act in a given situation (there is, I think, a vast difference between an individual acting to halt an act of genocide and the U.S. intervening in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state).


It's possible that moral relativism comes into play here. For instance, if someone were to say "all military invasions are alike, and so the coalition's invasion of Iraq in 1991 was as bad as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait," then that would be moral relativism.


Interesting questions. Unfortunately, I don't have the time to address them right now.

This is getting interesting! Thanks Joe.

First of all thanks for your reply and am looking forward to your response to my questions which you thought interesting. Your reference here to the US or any country intervening in the affairs of another sovereign country has relevance to this discussion in the following manner:

Many people here have an absolute intolerance for any thought regarding the removal of a Dictator who has seized power illegitmately (By military coup or any manner other than by consent of a majority of the people ). Do you believe this criminal is untouchable? What is so sacrosanct about sovereignty when the majority of the people have been imprisoned against their will and are crying out for assistance from the outside world? Most countries have laws against kidnapping, and extortion, but when it happens in a "sovereign" country the world is "helpless"???? This brings us to your response to my questions about trying the perpetrator in abstentia for which I'm anticipating.

Dlowan

You requested a reference for some comments from Craven. This a thread in politics that I started dealing with "moral imperative":
http://www.able2know.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=14486&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=0

Kant formulated his categorical imperative in a number of different ways. In the "Grundlegung" he put it this way: "I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." Or, in other words, you should never act in a way that you wouldn't want everyone else to act. In the "Grundlegung" Kant gave as an example the practice of lying. If I lie to get out of a disadvantageous promise, I can justify it on purely personal grounds, but I could not will it to be a universal rule that everyone should be allowed to lie to get out of promises. For, as Kant pointed out, "by such a law there would really be no promises at all," and so "my maxim would necessarily destroy itself just as soon as it was made a universal law."

As many people have pointed out, Kant's categorical imperative is this close to the "Golden Rule," but Kant's explanation, of course, is far more complicated.

If we presume that there is an ethical ground for intervention (we'll ignore, for the moment, any political or legal justifications, since we're focusing on morality here), then there are three reasons for trying the dictator rather than doing something else with him (such as summarily executing him).

1. Because the intervening state has undertaken some type of promise (e.g. a treaty, a pledge to allies, a declaration of war aims) to put this dictator on trial;
2. Because the intervening state is bound by a general law (e.g. the law of nations) to put all such dictators on trial; or
3. Because the intervening state deems it prudent to put this dictator on trial.

The third rationale can be easily disposed of: as it is the product of a prudential calculus, it does not bind the intervening state as a matter of ethics.

The first and second, however, ethically bind the intervening state to put the dictator on trial. A state, like an individual, is bound to keep its promises, so it cannot enter into a treaty and then break it whenever it gets its hands on even the most brutal dictator. Likewise, if a state adheres to the law of nations, acting contrary to that law is much like a broken promise, in this case a broken promise to every other nation (because international law is not "binding" in the same fashion as domestic law, it's more like a promise than a legal obligation). Breaking international law, then, is much like contravening Kant's categorical imperative: a state cannot break the law if it wouldn't want every other state to follow, as that would be the end of international law itself.


It happens. If all the rules are followed, it's valid.


It depends. A state cannot act as if its actions affect only the dictatorial regime (negatively) and the oppressed people (positively). It must, instead, look at all the possible ramifications of intervention -- practical, political, legal, and moral. Look at it this way: am I justified in putting out an isolated house fire by destroying an upriver dam? Surely the house fire is an evil, and putting out house fires is, in general, a good thing. But destroying the dam is a greater evil, and its destruction affects far more people than the initial house fire. And even if I have a great deal of sympathy for the people in the house and rightly grieve for their fate, and even if I can point to my handiwork afterwards and say that the house and its inhabitants are far better off after I destroyed the dam, I am also obligated to see to it that my actions, laudable though they may be in the abstract, are not disastrous in their overall consequences.


In international society, states are like individuals. The society of states is a very small society -- less than 300 members. As such, acting against a state is like an individual in a very small community acting against another individual. Not only do the consequences of an action usually reverberate more profoundly in a small, closed community, but any violation of the norms is usually more disruptive. And, taking a Kantian perspective, any violation of sovereignty by one nation is an open invitation to all other nations to act in precisely the same fashion.

Nations, then, are not necessarily "helpless" in the face of a brutal dictator. Rather, they are "restrained" by practical, political, legal, and moral considerations.

That's an interesting though, Joe, but every lie is not going to be qualitatively the same. One might very well think it's OK to lie to tell someone they look ten pound lighter, but not OK to lie about something more dangerous. That doesn't make them morally relative, because in all likelihood, they'd be fine with other people lying in the same situation.

Rufio: Two comments:

1. I only mentioned Kant's categorical imperative because the initial quotation offered by perception stated that secular morality was inevitably relativistic. Kant was a moral absolutist, so his ethics are not relativistic. I never said that I thought that Kant was right.

2. Kant gave a better example in his short essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns." If a murderer, intent upon killing your friend, comes to your door and asks "is your friend there?" are you entitled to lie to the murderer? Kant said "no." Frankly, I have mulled over this situation for a while and I remain unconvinced by Kant's explanation. I think there are good reasons for saying that a lie, under these circumstances, is not only "good" but that it may very well be a duty.

Do you believe in moral absolutism in general though, if not Kant's specific application of it? I think there are two levels of morality, one where you think of the welfare of yourself, and one where you think of the welfare of the world at large, since that affects your own welfare. In that case, I think Kant's ethics would apply in a more narrow sense - I would lie to save my friend, because I would hope that everyone would do the same in that specific situation. This doesn't mean that I condone all lying though, because all lying is not equal. In the higher level of morality, the world become analogous to the self, and is treated the same way - it is not possible for your right arm to want something different than your left arm, so in thinking of the world as an extension of the self, by defining a morality for yourself you define a morality for everyone. Everyone has both levels - they say, well, if I were in this situation, I would probably do x, but I should do y. X is level 1; Y is level 2.

Joe

Thanks for your response and of course I am compelled to accept it primarly because of your logical legal argument. Do you see my practical reason for asking those questions?

I assumed it had something to do with U.S. policy and Iraq.

I believe that there must be some sort of objective morality.


Unless there would be some kind of substantive difference between the levels of morality (e.g. if different definitions of "good" applied, depending on the level), there's no need to make a distinction between "personal" and "world-at-large" morality. Applying Ockham's Razor, you should end up with only one "universal" morality.

But people still act on whatever brings them happiness even though they know they would be against it if someone else did the same. In the case of objective morality, than morality would be born in and not learned, and these actions wouldn't fit that universal morality.

I suspect one of the reasons I argue against the notion of objective morality -- is that so much of what people want to pass off these days as objective morality -- sucks.

Perhaps there is an objective morality -- but I want personal subjective veto power over it.

It did have something to do with Iraq----I was curious if I could drum up some support for our actions on that basis (moral imperative----not moral relativism). As far as I could tell there was little or no support for this propostion. I truly believe we (the world) will continue to be confronted with situations where the UN has a responsibility to intervene to save the citizens.

I'd like some sort of informal vote here:

Do we (the US) have a moral obligation to push for intervention :

1.In some cases.

2. Never

Ahh, this is about Iraq? I don't think it was a matter of morals in the higher sense. It was a matter of oil and appearances. If Bush really believed that Saddam had WMDs, I doubt he would have provoked him unless he (Bush) truly was incompetant.

In the hypothetical case that we really decided to invade a country simply to oust a dictator only for the sake of the people who lived there, I would be in favor of it, as long as it didn't overtax our own country. It's one thing to say that you would hope that everyone would become a freedom fighter, and another to say that you would hope that everyone would kill themselves being a freedom fighter.

It is not logically necessary for an objective morality to rest on a foundation of flawless individuals.


It is not logically necessary for an objective morality to be innate.

In some cases, yes. In the case of Iraq, no.