Do scientists and contemporary philosophers believe that it is correct to think of objective reality, as opposed to reality percieved by humans?
If so, what is this reality like?
Independence from the manifestations of human sense does not mean independence from the constructs of human thought. There's no need for boot-thumping metaphysical reification of such revisable descriptive approaches -- it adds little apart from a soothing balm for transcendent realists.
"Real" is a status originally extracted from the external world
, which is actually interpretative contact with yet another form of representation rather than with existence as non-knowledge. The objectivity of this extrospection is derived from the inability of one's will, by itself, to affect that exhibited or felt environment. The objective perspectives and models are derived from interpersonal observations, tests, and discussions about its content. And the perceptual independence of things is derived from their reliable behaviors of being visually, audibly, tactile-ly present and potent according to expectations and predictions.
Going beyond this empirical realism stance, to the transcendent realism about concepts and abstract schemes, is descended from the "intelligible" domain posited by ancient Greek philosophy. Of which only reason could apprehend such in some way, and linguistic or quantitative symbols were left to describe rather than provide a "concrete presentation" by perceptual content. This was before Kant undermined any accuracy or immutable proof about such noumena or their specific details with his critique of speculative reason.
When atoms and particles are detected and even manipulated by instruments, they are obviously made part of the empirical rather than just the theoretical "world", become things measured outside themselves
whose appearance is dependent upon extrinsic relations . They acquire membership in the conventional "external world" of outer sense. But the endless confusion and debate over what they ultimately are (wavelike entities, oscillations of superstrings, entropic bits in holographic theory, products of Planck-scale geometry, etc.) simply illustrates the mere comforting facade of metaphysical realism about this zoo of appearances and abstract descriptions. As if through sheer authoritative declaration it will make one of those versions into THE static or immutable non-representation over future centuries of research.