@Setanta,
Setanta wrote:
Thomas Colley, writing a commentary on the United States constitution in 1880 writes:
The arms intended by the Constitution are such as are suitable
for the general defence of the community against invasion or
oppression, and the secret carrying of those suited merely
to deadly individual encounters may be prohibited. (emphasis added)
The members of the current Court at not the only one who can
play a game of quoting historical sources to uphold the points
of view which they wish to further.
Thank u, Setanta, but u know: I don 't recognize Thomas Colley -- so I Googled him to fill this gap in my education.
It seems that Thomas Colley was an English murderer upon whom
a death sentence was executed in 1751, but if u say that he wrote
analyses of the rights of self defense in 1880, I 'll take your word for it.
No, the closest that I am able to get to your exemplar is my hero,
Judge Thomas Cooley, who interestingly enuf, is quoted at length
by the majority in the
HELLER decision. (Rumors to the contrary notwithstanding)
Here r some excerpts from
HELLER, setting forth some of
his views (please tell me how u like them):
Every late-19th-century legal scholar that we have read
interpreted the Second Amendment to secure an individual
right unconnected with militia service.
The most famous
was
the judge and professor Thomas Cooley, who
wrote a massively popular 1868
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations.
Concerning the Second Amendment it said:
“Among the other defences to
personal liberty
should be mentioned
the right of the people to keep
and bear arms. . . . The alternative to a standing army
is ‘a well-regulated militia,’ but this cannot exist
unless the people are trained to bearing arms. How
far it is in the power of the legislature to regulate this
right, we shall not undertake to say, as happily there
has been very little occasion to discuss that subject by
the courts.” Id., at 350.
That Cooley understood the right
not as connected to
militia service, but as securing the militia by ensuring a
populace familiar with arms, is made even clearer in his
1880 work, General Principles of Constitutional Law.
The Second Amendment, he said, “was adopted with some
modification and enlargement from the English Bill of Rights of 1688,
where it stood as a protest against arbitrary
action of the overturned dynasty in disarming the
people.” Id., at 270. In a section entitled
“The Right in General,” he continued:
“It might be supposed from the phraseology of this
provision that the right to keep and bear arms was
only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an
interpretation
not warranted by the intent.
The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those
persons who, under the law, are liable to the performance
of military duty, and are officered and enrolled for service
when called upon. But the law may make provision for the
enrolment of all who are fit to perform military duty,
or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all;
and if the right were limited to those enrolled,
the purpose of this guaranty
might be defeated altogether by the action
or neglect to act of the government it was meant
to hold in check.
The meaning of the provision undoubtedly
is,
that the people, from whom the militia
must be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms;
and
they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose."
The US Supreme Court goes on to say:
" All other post-Civil War 19th-century sources we have
found concurred with Cooley. One example from each
decade will convey the general flavor:
“[The purpose of the Second Amendment is] to secure
a well-armed militia. . . . But a militia would be useless
unless the citizens were enabled to exercise themselves
in the use of warlike weapons.
To preserve this privilege,
and to secure to the people the ability to oppose
themselves in military force against the usurpations of government,
as well as against enemies from without, that government is forbidden
by any law or proceeding to invade or destroy the right to keep and
bear arms. . . . The clause is analogous to the one securing
the freedom of speech and of the press. Freedom,
not license, is secured; the fair use, not the libellous
abuse, is protected.” J. Pomeroy,
An Introduction
to the Constitutional Law of the United States 152"
153 (1868)
I think that u 'd like Pomeroy's comment qua "not license" Setanta.
It will be open for debate what that is.
[All emfasis has been added by David.]