cheloo03 wrote:
I believe that moral relativism is true, however, and because of that, it is in MY best interest to have a social system based on seemingly "objective" moral codes, where everyone is accountable. I have no problem being punished if I break the moral codes of the society...that doesn't mean it is right or wrong what I did, it just means that for society to be fair, we must leave aside some of our own instincts, OR take responsibility for it.
How do you determine whether something is actually right or wrong?
Finn dAbuzz wrote:How do you determine whether something is actually right or wrong?
by whether Humanity survives in the end
Actually, moral relativism cannot be reconciled with its own inherent contradictions, let alone with "social imperatives."
Finn dAbuzz wrote:Actually, moral relativism cannot be reconciled with its own inherent contradictions, let alone with "social imperatives."
If you are referring to the contradictory nature of a system which prescribes anti-prescriptivism, I agree. But moral relativity is a putative fact, and it is difficult to account for it in a prescriptive moral system without arguing that either:
1. most or all people are incorrect in their moral beliefs;
2. many beliefs which are putatively morally evaluative are in fact morally indifferent;
3. or, moral truth is context-sensitive (which I would argue amounts to saying that moral description is moral prescription).
To be clear, I said that, not Finn. He only wishes he had said that.
First of all, I don't agree that moral relativity is a putative fact. I'm not even sure what a "putative fact" is.
Second, even if rejecting moral relativity means that many (I wouldn't say "most") people are incorrect in their moral beliefs, so what? That just means there are a lot of mistaken individuals out there. That's not much of a revelation.
Again, so what? I don't see that as a relevant objection to rejecting moral relativism.
You'll have to explain that one. What do you mean by "moral truth?"
By moral relativity I mean descriptive relativism: that what is considered to be a moral fact, for example whether it's acceptable for a parent to beat their children, is relative to location and time.
If moral relativism (or contextualism, which is similar but I'll explain the difference below) is wrong, then moral facts do not vary; but all I'm saying is that moral norms and standards do. Moral anti-relativism has to account for this.
Well, it leaves us with the unfortunate task of deciding which, if any, moral theory is correct.
This is a problem because it isn't a question which can be empirically investigated, or it doesn't seem to be. Empirical investigation yields moral relativity (in the descriptive sense), but no normative theory. So how do we work which moral theory is true?
It just makes anti-relativism counter-intuitive. What I specifically mean is that, if most people are not incorrect in their moral beliefs, and moral truth is not context-sensitive, then only those beliefs which are universal are morally evaluative and there is no moral disagreement (I'm also assuming descriptive moral relativity here, and hypothetically assuming that there is a moral truth which is universal).
In which case, a lot of things which we take to be genuine moral convictions are not actually morally evaluative. If an ethical vegetarian says, "it's morally wrong to eat meat", it turns out they are not making a moral statement.
This is very counter-intuitive; moral disagreement is meant to be possible. Only possibilities 1 and 2 account for moral disagreement.
So perhaps saying "witch-burning was acceptable in medieval Europe" is a true statement, in the same way that "the soil is red on Mars" is true; but the statement "which-burning is acceptable" is not true (if it is read as a universal statement), just as "soil is red" is not universally true, because there exist some communities for which it is not acceptable to burn witches. This is still counter-intuitive, because most people take their moral statements to be universally true, but I think it's the most plausible choice.
If you're saying that different people at different times act according to different standards of morality, then that's unquestionably true. It's also nothing that we haven't known for thousands of years, but I suppose people still have to re-invent the wheel every so often.
buffalobill90 wrote:Well, it leaves us with the unfortunate task of deciding which, if any, moral theory is correct.
We're always left with that task.
buffalobill90 wrote:This is a problem because it isn't a question which can be empirically investigated, or it doesn't seem to be. Empirical investigation yields moral relativity (in the descriptive sense), but no normative theory. So how do we work which moral theory is true?
Through reason.
How do you figure? If there are only universal moral truths, why would that preclude disagreement? Or does the existence of universal moral truths also preclude error?
buffalobill90 wrote:In which case, a lot of things which we take to be genuine moral convictions are not actually morally evaluative. If an ethical vegetarian says, "it's morally wrong to eat meat", it turns out they are not making a moral statement.
Of course they are. How is that not a moral statement?
buffalobill90 wrote:This is very counter-intuitive; moral disagreement is meant to be possible. Only possibilities 1 and 2 account for moral disagreement.
Is it possible to disagree about a mathematical proposition?
Absolute morality may, indeed, be counter-intuitive. But then that says nothing about whether it's correct. And if, as you contend, most people take their moral statements to be universally true, then it is just as counter-intuitive to posit that morality is relative. I don't see how the issue of intuitiveness weighs against absolute morality.
To explain the above, objective empirical truth is determined by appeal to truths which are independent of subjectivity (they are not truths about people's minds) and which can be ascertained through observation. Objective non-empirical truth is determined by appeal to truths which are independent of subjectivity, but which can be ascertained by reason alone. Subjective empirical truth is determined by appeal to truths which are dependent on subjectivity, and which are ascertained by observation.
Reason is nothing without facts; I am skeptical about whether any fact is supportable via pure reason. Perhaps you aren't, and are a Kantian, or something similar. In any case, I'd be interested in hearing a support for a purely rational moral theory which makes no use of empirical fact (or non-moral theory, for that matter).
If you read what you quoted again, you'll see this is on the assumption that most people are not incorrect in their moral beliefs.
It is not, assuming option 2, and assuming that some people disagree with it (they in fact do). At least, it's not a statement of moral fact. So it seems option 2 is implausible without some serious reinterpretation of the semantics of moral statements (non-cognitivism might be something of a way out here).
Superficially, yes. But this kind of disagreement is supposed to arise because of ignorance or irrationality. It seems option 1 assumes that moral truths are like mathematical truths in this respect: to disagree with them implies ignorance or irrationality. If you make an incorrect moral statement, it's because you are either ignorant of the facts or simply being irrational, according to option 1.
I'm just setting out the alternative theses which you are committed to if you reject moral relativism but want to retain moral realism of some kind; they are mutually incompatible but if moral realism is true, one of them is.
This is my problem with realism: moral truth seems to be socially constructed, which is why it varies, just like non-moral cultural differences.
As a description, moral realism is unhelpful because it provides no satisfying explanation of the universality of the moral justification procedure (I will explain and support this below), unless it says that everyone in all cultures, up to this point, has been attempting to morally justifying their conduct in the wrong way; and perhaps Kantian ethics can help us here by providing a fundamentally different way of justifying conduct morally.
If a moral realist accepts that the moral justification procedure I have set out is a valid way of justifying beliefs, then they must accept that some particular set of beliefs are true and so a particular set of actions are justified. But if this could be determined objectively and empirically, then there would be widespread agreement on moral issues, or at least their would be a 'moral' scientific community with a scientific moral consensus.
You're obviously taking your "options" far more seriously than I am. I can't see why your option 2 isn't simply subsumed under your option 1.
buffalobill90 wrote:I'm just setting out the alternative theses which you are committed to if you reject moral relativism but want to retain moral realism of some kind; they are mutually incompatible but if moral realism is true, one of them is.
Well, I'm not convinced. For my own part, however, I believe that, if such a thing as morality exists, then it must be an absolute morality. Moral relativism is inherently contradictory.
buffalobill90 wrote:This is my problem with realism: moral truth seems to be socially constructed, which is why it varies, just like non-moral cultural differences.
I'm not sure why you think that. Moral realism simply means that, when someone makes a moral claim, that claim purports to be a statement of fact.
buffalobill90 wrote:As a description, moral realism is unhelpful because it provides no satisfying explanation of the universality of the moral justification procedure (I will explain and support this below), unless it says that everyone in all cultures, up to this point, has been attempting to morally justifying their conduct in the wrong way; and perhaps Kantian ethics can help us here by providing a fundamentally different way of justifying conduct morally.
Why does it matter whether people have been attempting to justify their moral choices in the right way or the wrong way? That's not an issue of morality, that's an issue of logic or rhetoric. Or are you suggesting that the manner in which people justify their moral choices is, itself, a moral choice?
buffalobill90 wrote:If a moral realist accepts that the moral justification procedure I have set out is a valid way of justifying beliefs, then they must accept that some particular set of beliefs are true and so a particular set of actions are justified. But if this could be determined objectively and empirically, then there would be widespread agreement on moral issues, or at least their would be a 'moral' scientific community with a scientific moral consensus.
That doesn't follow -- not by a long shot. Just because people use the same procedure to justify their moral choices doesn't somehow imply that there should be widespread agreement on moral issues.
Because option 1 assumes that there is a moral truth which is not self-evident.
2 assumes moral truth is self-evident, such that there is no moral disagreement.
If, by absolute, you mean universal, then you are committed to either option 1 or option 2.
But option 3 allows for a moral realist approach which is not absolute; by rejecting anti-prescriptivism (which I agree is contradictory) you are not committed to moral absolutism. Moral contextualism is also a theory of moral relativity, it only says that the truth of moral statements is context-sensitive. It still allows for moral prescription which can be true or false, so it is broadly realist, but it does not allow for absolute moral prescriptions.
According to the literature, moral realism means that when someone makes a moral claim, that claim can be true or false. It is hence a form of cognitivism; moral statements are statements of belief or judgement which are truth-apt. But there can be anti-realist cognitivism, namely error theory, which says that moral claims are truth-apt but necessarily false.
It matters for the moral realist because of what I've written below.
My point is that the scientific community uses the same method of justification for supporting scientific theories as we use for justifying moral claims.
If moral facts were objective and empirical there would be a similar consensus among ethical researchers, who could simply appeal to observable evidence in the physical world to support their theories.
Instead, moral consensus is found only regionally, in the same way that language customs vary. This encourages me to think that moral facts are just facts about your moral community's beliefs, so they are subjective. For example, the moral fact 'eating pork is immoral' is true of the Islamic moral community but not the Catholic community.
To understand Moral Relativism (as with any other form of relativism), you must first understand Solipsism. The only defined truths I have are "I think, therefore I am," and "My perspective is informed by physical sensations perceived through my senses."
Conclusion: I have no argument for moral relativism, and no argument against moral relativism. I have refuted arguments against moral relativism by asserting my own perspective as correct. In short, I have accomplished nothing (philosophy never has other than the two truths stated at the beginning), and drawn no conclusion.
But I might have influenced some perspectives, and that's why I bothered to post this.
