@ebrown p,
ebrown p wrote:I thought I was clear Joe. The answer is 'yes'.
Then how do you distinguish morality from esthetics? As I see it, the statements "this action is good" and "this soup is good" are equivalent. Both mean "this thing pleases me."
Now, I'm not saying that you can't equate morality with esthetics. What I am saying, however, is that, if you
do equate morality with esthetics, then you're not talking about morality any more -- you're talking about esthetics.
For instance, if you say "lying in situation X is immoral," you're merely saying "lying in situation X displeases me." In that case, why call that a
moral judgment? After all, you wouldn't say "that painting by Rembrandt is immoral." Yet your moral judgment in the first case is the same as your esthetic judgment in the second. In both cases, you're merely saying "that thing displeases me." Why, then, do you recognize a special category for "moral" judgments? What, in other words, distinguishes moral judgments from esthetic judgments? And if there's nothing that distinguishes them, then why maintain the distinction?