@ebrown p,
ebrown wrote:1) I asked why minimizing suffering was better then any other basis for a system of morality. I
Although that happens to be (part of) what I hold to be true, it wasn't the point I was arguing at the moment. The point I was arguing started by observing that there are different fundamental approaches to doing ethics. One way is to wite a rulebook and require that people follow it. Another is to judge acts by their consequences (or by the statistical expectation value of their consequences before you commit the acts), and to set a criterium for judging how desirable those consequences are. And yet another is to assume that "people know it when they see it", where "it" is either good or evil, and deduce rules about right and wrong from polling people's intuitions.
My point is that for each of these approaches there are different amounts of disagreement between cultures, justifying differently prominent roles for moral relativism. You advocate a very high level of moral relativism. At the same time, you start by taking the deontlological approach to ethics, which would generate the greatest conflict between rules when universalized.
ebrown p wrote:4) The Catholic Church here was offering a vision of Universal Truth based on unprovable axioms. T
Before you can offer versions of Universal Truth, you have to assume there is a universal truth to be offered. This assumption is a leap of faith in morality, but it's also a leap of faith in science. For example, one leap of faith that scientists have to take is what's called the inductive hypothesis: If the cloudless sky at daytime was blue the first N times you looked, it will be blue the N+1th time you look. (For sufficiently high values of N.) There is no
logical reason to assume that. You have to take it to be true before you can do evidence-based science at all. And you cannot prove the inductive hypothesis without first assuming it: Without assuming it, the fact that the inductive hypothesis has worked each of the gazillion times we relied on it says nothing about the next time.
My purpose in this sub-thread isn't to defend my opinion about what the objective truth about morality is. It's to assert that there even is an objective truth to defend. My evidence for that is that notions of good and bad are a lot more similar across the world when you start with a non-deontological approach to ethics, and barely distinguishable when you test it with concrete, Marc-Hauser-type scenarios. This suggests, if not a universal truth about morality, a pretty universal consensus about morality if you state the moral conflict in a concrete way.