What attitude should we take to 'renounced' philosophical works?

Copernicus was thoroughly scorned and Galileo and Kepler excommunicated due to their philosophyical and scientific works but who among us does not look to them as great thinkers and contributors to the world knowledge today? On the other hand, many lauded as great thinkers of their day have been discredited in light of new intellectual, historical, and scientific discoveries.

So what attitude should we take? I think we each have to consider each work on its own merits and decide if it holds up under modern scrutiny.

Having said that, I don't believe I've had to work "Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" or "Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature" into a sentence all day long.

Yes, but I meant by their authors... as in Wittgenstein rejected his work himself. And Hume re-wrote the Treatise.

Well, Hume revised the Treatise, but more as a matter of style than of substance. Off the top of my head, I can't think of any major philosopher who repudiated any of his earlier work. Jacobi, I think, went back on some of his more Kantian works, but he hardly qualifies as a major philosopher.

As for what we should do with repudiated works: I think we should take the author at his word. That doesn't mean that we should ignore the work (it is what it is, whatever the author says), but we should take the author's attitude into account when placing that work in the context of his philosophy.

Ah, I did miss that one line re authors contradicting their own works.

It is not unprecedented, however, and is likely commonplace if we carefully analyze early works with later ones of prolific writers. The libary is full of writings of people who came to understand differently as they aged and matured and/or experienced different things. It is still incumbant to the reader to consider the merit of the works on the works' merit. We may or may not come to agree with either the earlier or later point of view of the writer, but, if we know of both, honor requires that if we cite an opinion as an authority that we also acknowledge the change of mind by the same author. It was a seminal shift in Martin Luther's view of theology, for instance, that triggered the Reformation that was a signficant catalyst for events that would ultimately transform the Western world. And it did require recanting some of his former views.

So much of the time when we are young, our opinions are dictated by passion and perception of ideology rather than on anything more substantive. Or it is a matter of convenience. As an eager on campus reporter, I joined anything and everything to obtain an inside track for any news that might become important. Therefore at one time I was a member of the Young Communists of America and the John Birch Society. Can you imagine how either one of those things would look on a resume should I run for public office now?

But I have now lived ideology for many decades and my perceptions and experience is much different than it was way back then. And at least some of what I wrote then bears little resemblance to how I see it now.

I should take an attitude of imperious disinterest if I was in your position Queenie.

If we're reading philosophical works to stimulate our ideas, then there's nothing obliging us to treat renounced ideas any differently from non-renounced ideas. If we find the ideas useful, then we use them. If we don't, then we don't. The fact that the authors later repudiated certain ideas should not, in itself, affect the way we evaluate those ideas. To do so would be to commit the Appeal to Celebrity fallacy, in a sort of reverse way.

I suppose the same goes for those who read philosophical works for their historical value rather than for their ideas. Whether or not an idea is later repudiated, it is still a document of its historical moment and thus a valuable indication of the philosopher's role in that moment.

What did I say to deserve that???????

In the case case Wittgenstein there was a significant paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense. (In that sense renounciations could be seen as natural and courageous). Traditional philosophers would of course resist the Wittgenstein shift because it assigned much of their work to the status of "word salad". A later writer, Derrida, can be seen as compounding the demolition. IMO we should take such movements seriously because they focus on the problems of semantic networks which could be seen as pre-empting any debate which takes those networks as "given".

Beware of that sort of thing Queenie.

the idea is not dependent upon the particular person who gave voice to it. An author renouncing his idea should have no negative impact on the consideration of that idea. Keep in mind that stuff is renounced for reasons other than the author no longer believing in it, and in any case the author believed what he said when he said it. In philosophy there are no take backs.

I agree with this. Whatever the field the work stands or falls on its own merits.

In science, and mathematics particularly, it is possible objectively to determine whether a particular theory, model or conclusion is consistent with the assumptions or postulates on which it is based, and in many cases with physical observations. The same is true of some (but not all) aspects of what we call philosophy. There are examples in mathematics and science of insights and conclusions later rejected by their authors that were later proven to have been correct notwithstanding their later rejection by those who first put them forward.

On matters of opinion or judgement the subjective element is significant, and the fact that the author later revised his work in some substantial way should at least be a consideration in the evaluation one makes of the work, but in the end it still rests on the merits (or lack of them) one finds in the work itself.

The work remains the same, even if the philosopher's opinion of it may not. Suppose Galileo's repudiation of his astronomical work had been honest, and not coerced by the Catholic Church. What difference would it have made to this work? None at all! The Earth would still be rotating around itself, the sun still wouldn't be rotating around the Earth once a day, and the renounced work still would have been right to say so.

I hardly think that references to scientific speculation are equivalent to references to philosophical speculation. The ideas of Galileo Galilei were based on his observations, and what he observed had not changed. His renunciation was not motivated by a change of his point of view, but rather by political pressure brought to bear by the church. I don't think this is equivalent to the revisions of one's own point of view, freely made, which i believe is what PQ is referring to.

1) That's why stated it as a hypothetical by saying "suppose". Suppose it had been an honest change of mind....

2) If you read Galileo's works, you will find that underneath the observations he describes and the inferences he makes from them, there is a whole layer of epistemological points he argues. Points about what should count as evidence in astronomy, what kind of reasoning is sound, and so forth. Today we take these philosophical points for granted and don't bother teaching them in school explicitly. (I'm not sure that's such a good idea; much of the now-obsolete epistemology Galileo fought is returning today in the arguments of creationists. But I digress ....) In Galileo's time, however, these epistemological points were evidently not taken for granted, and needed to be defended. I, for what it's worth, have no problem counting Galileo as a philosopher of science, and his scientific insights as an application of his philosophy.

3) Even if I granted points 1 and 2, it still wouldn't change my conclusion, because it wouldn't change the core of my point: An insight is an insight. It is either valid or not, either interesting or not. The originator's opinion of his own insight doesn't affect its validity or its relevance at all. Therefore the opinion, and any changes therein, should be a matter of indifference to those who evaluate a philosopher's insights. Or anyone's insights in any field.

And none of that changes my point that Galileo's "renunciation" of his work was based on political pressure, and that PQ's question is about retractions of one's earlier views based on conviction, and of course, has to do with philosophy. I am not prepared to discuss Wittgenstein nor Hume, but do point out that that seems to be what the author of this thread had in mind.

There is no reason to suppose that Galileo's advocation of a heliocentric cosmic model proceeds from his philosophy of science. It proceeded, undoubtedly, from the simple application of the Copernican model, supported by the observational data of Tycho Brahe, to his own observational data. I would suggest to you that his philosophy of science proceeded from the observational base upon which his own work was founded, and not the reverse.

None of which, of course, constitutes a reply to PQ's question, since Galileo only renounced his work under duress.

E pur si muove..

I'm sorry, Setanta -- I forgot your attention span is short. I forgot that reading the last 100 words of a 250 word post is tough for you. So let me answer Pentacle Queen's question again. I'll do it especially for you, in as few words and as short sentences as I can.


Reader's Digest of my answer, especially for you: We should take an attitude of utter indifference to the renunciation. The work continues to stand or fall on its own merits. The philosopher's changing opinion of said merits has no effect on them at all.

Was that short enough for you to register my point?

And as to your own point: I agree that Galileo renounced under pressure. I never said he didn't.

I understood your point, you snide jackass. Since you don't seem to be very good at getting points which aren't spelled out for you: i don't deny your point as you have limned it out with regard to Galiloe, i question its applicability to Wittgenstein and Hume. With Galileo, we can test his cosmology by observation, and we can" test" his philosophy of science by judging its applicability, its utility to scientific inquiry. But the issue of whether or not your use of Galileo is a useful example for this question would depend upon whether or not one can reasonably assert that what Wittgenstein and Hume proposed philosophically, and then renounced, constitute valid points of view which can be similarly tested.

I've already acknowledged that i can't comment on that, not knowing enough about Wittgenstein or Hume. So it take it you are asserting that you know W and H well enough to comment on whether their initial philosophical positions, which they subsequently renounced, were valid points despite that renunciation? That would be the applicability to this question, smart ass--whether or not W's and H's positions remain "valid" (to use your term).

Of course, you could just weasel out by saying they were interesting points, as opposed to valid, and leave it at that (which is to say, meaningless).

Y'know sometimes Setanta and even Thomas make me look like a calm, even-tempered, utterly reasonable guy. No "snide jackass" here; no cheap shots about attention spans and the like.