Consciousness..Mind from matter or mind controlling matter?

if you take eyes out of the equation, consciousness isn't necessarily rooted in vision.

it's actually a popular theme of fringe science/metaphysics that the brain isn't really the locus of consciousness, more like a transceiver. if you're interested in that sort of thing, i think you'll find lots about it.

Interesting question. I do think that the brain and consciousness are intimately correlated. You cannot see or think without a functioning brain, and you have no sense of the existence of a brain without consciousness or mind.

Some meditators "feel" that their center of consciousness is in the lower abdomen (the hara), about two inches below the navel.

I don't think there's anything in the knees that could produce consciousness.

The theory of consciousness that I go for is the higher-order thought theory. A mental state (such as a perception or a pain) is conscious when one has a higher-order thought about it. These higher-order thoughts interpret the mental states according to various concepts, and we also gain new concepts by thinking about new mental states. Consciousness is produced when our higher-order thoughts make us aware of our mental states in various ways (e.g. aware of a certain sound-state as the sound of a bell). (http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/consc-hi.htm#H3)

I think a brain's neurons could produce higher-order thoughts. I'm not sure that our knees or "hara" could perform that duty.

No matter, never mind.

kraybold and agrote,

I've not read Peter Russell but the field of "consciousness studies" is vast.

http://consc.net/online.html

The term "higher level thought" or even "thought" are pretty nebulous.
There is a succession of terms...cognition/consciousness/ self consciousness/ higher consciousness..... which at the "cognition end" tends to refer to a general "life process" (possibly common to all life) and at the "higher consciousness end" tends refer to holistic (non localized) "field phenomena" or even "spiritual truth". In the middle we tend to involve considerations of the effects of "brain mechanisms" and language.

It might be better to use the term 'mental states' or 'intentional states' (states of the mind which are about something). We have various mental states - such as beliefs, memories and perceptions - and we are concious of them only when we have further mental states about them. So a belief is only conscious if we have a second, higher-order mental state which has that belief as its subject. We are only conscious that we believe in love when we are made aware of that belief by thinking about it. The higher-order thoughts themselves needn't be conscious.

As for the higher consciousness that you mention, presumably that's what some philosophers call 'phenomenal consciousness' or 'qualia'? I believe that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness comes about when we are made aware of the phenomenal aspects of our lower-order mental states. If we see a frog, we have a sensory experience with various qualities, such as greenness. If we are conscious of seeing a frog, or if we have a higher-order intentional state about our frog-induced perceptual state, then we become aware of these qualities. We become conscious of ourselves as being in certain qualitative states, and this creates the qualitative aspects of consciousness. So in the frog example, we become aware of ourselves as being in a green state, and, and this gives us a qualitatively green experience.

This is all taken from here:
David Rosenthal, "Explaining Consciousness," in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. David J. Chalmers, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 406-421

The theory is also described here, as 'Higher-order thought theory (1)', although I haven't read this: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/

agrote,

I have scanned the Stanford reference but at the distinct risk of being over simplistic I would argue that much of the "consciousness debate" falls into what I would call "philosophy seminaritis" or perhaps what Wittgenstein implied by the phrase "language on holiday". It seems to me that beyond the switching on of the perceptual apparatus, most nuances of "consciousness" are about the organization of subsequent action by the perceiving organism. In the case of homo sapiens this tends to involve "internal dialogue" to which we anthropomorphically ascribe the adjective "higher process". (It is interesting to speculate on biblical connections of that term "higher").

Don't get me wrong, I have no doubt Rosenthal has something interesting to say, but Chalmers is something of a self styled "ringmaster of the consciousness circus".....a job for life ( and beyond perhaps !)

But that is itself a theory of consciousness, isn't it? You seem to suggest that philosophy about the nature of consciousness is a bit of a waste of time. But you've just put forward a theory of consciousness yourself. It's a bit simplistic as you've just written it, and it needs clarifying and verifying, but you do seem to have views on what consciousness is. So why not join the circus?

agrote,

I am actually taking a "deflationist" line (see Dennett) in which "consciousness" may turn out be an "epiphenomenon" of life processes. We have discussed this elsewhere. I am not advocating "reductionist materialism", but part of me favours the possibility that the term "consciousness" may be epistemologically vacuous. If this is a "theory" so be it. The other "part" of me tends towards (spiritual) holism. but in this respect "consciousness"again ceases to a long way from the traditional concept of "thought".

Could you explain what you mean by spiritual holism? I'm not familiar with this.

I'm on guard here, as this seems like the language of superstition. I hate the 'S' word with a passion... if there's no such thing as a spirit, then the word 'spiritual' can only be used as a metaphjor for something non-spiritual, and I don't see how that metaphor is useful in any way.

i think if our eyes were in our knees we wouldnt survive in a competitive environment long enough to gain conciousness.

agrote.

I use "spiritual" to denote a "state of consciousness" which transcends "self" and involves "timeless unity with the universe". Although this state is well known to meditators it is characteristically "ineffable" or "beyond discourse between individuals". Those who are theistically inclined might be tempted to call this state "God", (in which case they are God) but I tend to think that an "ultimate creative essence" need have no aspect of "personification" attached to it.

Perhaps because there's no such thing?

agrote,

In line with our discussions of "things" requiring a "thinger", this state has a different "thinger" to "self", but I am confined to "self" in order to discuss it. That this state "occurs" is beyond question to meditators, but as I have argued elsewhere. whether such a state is merely an aspect of brain chemistry or an "actual" experience of "higher consciousness" remains unanswered and perhaps unanswerable.

if you intensely dislike "spiritual (holism)" how about jung's "collective unconscious" instead?

scientists used to propose an "aether/ether" theory to explain things they couldn't explain otherwise. i think they threw it out eventually, but when referring to the theory, you still need the term to describe the thought.

i don't think you need to believe something exists to discuss it- although you may feel any mention of it is an exercise in futility, which of course is your right. i see many old "spiritual" beliefs as similar, early theories on things we can partially explain with science. they may be discarded by science, but i think we can still get/clarify new scientific theories by examining old ones.

beginning with the assumption there's no god, and no spirit, i certainly don't think these older theories are useless or futile to discuss, particularly when examining consciousness- a nebulous thing scientists admit they're still trying to better grasp.

I like Agrote's reference to "higher-order thought" process--"A mental state (such as a perception or a pain) is conscious when one has a higher-order thought about it. These higher-order thoughts interpret the mental states according to various concepts, and we also gain new concepts by thinking about new mental states"

One might argue plausibly that our very awareness of culture is the product of anthropology's (and other well-travelled individual's) consciousness of alternative forms of consciousness, i.e., worldviews that contrast significantly with that of the anthropologist.
The notion of the "hick" refers to one who is the opposite of "cosmopolitan": the "hick" has, because of his isolation, the perspective that his perception of the world is the only possible one. For the cosmopolitan (and the cultural anthropologist) his worldview is only one of many possibilities--hence his inclination toward culural (and moral) relativism.

Yes, you've expressed my thoughts more precisely than I did. I do not wish to deny that there is a qualitative experience which some people have, and which they may call "higher consciousness" or spiritual experience, or whatever. What I do deny is that this experience is actually best explained in those terms: as something spiritual, or as a "timeless unity with the universe". I would not deny that, say, meditators do have such experiences, but I would argue that they can be accounted for in terms of brain chemistry. In fact, I'd say that physicalist explanations are the most reasonable accounts for these phenomenal experiences.



Well I would say that, assuming there are no spirits, the term 'spiritual' becomes a bit redundant. It can work as a metaphor for the non-spiritual, but in the context of science or philosophy I can't see that this is helpful in any way. Better to call things what they are.

agote,

The problems of physicalism as "an account of experience" is that the concept of "physicalism" is itself a product of "consciousness"....whence lies the road to analysis of "account" and alternative epistemologies....

I find both mentalism and physicalism to be partial components of a philosophically dualistic mismanagement of experience. Both serve sloppily for everyday purposes, but for the "truth-seeker" the bifuraction of reality they represent must be transcended.