Meaninglessness of all views ie mathematics and science

In the 1930s, Austrian mathematician Godel proved a
theorem which became the "Godel theorem" in cognition
theory. It states that any formalized 'logical' system
in principle cannot be complete in itself. It means
that a statement can always be found that can be
neither disproved nor proved using the means of that
particular system. To discuss about such a statement,
one must go beyond that very logic system; otherwise
nothing but a vicious circle will result. Psychologist
say that any experience is contingent - it's opposite
is logically possible and hence should not be treated
as contradictory.

it is the dualism assumed by the action of nominal measurement (naming a "thing"as a member of a set) which is the philosophical stumbling block which in turn renders static binary truth values incompatible with dynamic reality.

At the very beginning of the formulations of logic by Aristotle there was a problem that Aristotle could not solve. A problem which Western philosophy has ignored and which makes Aristotelian logic untenable and thus the whole of Western philosophy. This problem is if there is change then the notion of essence is untenable and thus also Aristotelian logic. As we saw Aristotle grounded logic on the notion of essence but if there is change then essence becomes untenable - a problem Aristotle saw but could not solve. Aristotle notes that in his time people argued that nothing could be said to be true about anything that changes. He goes on to say an infinite regress is set up when there is change for when something comes into being there must be of necessity from which it is produced and something by which it is produced. Now even if we refrain from this regress Aristotle claims that though "nothing … persists quantitatively it is by their persistent form that each thing is known" Aristotle claims that though our corner of the universe has change it is entirely negligible component of the whole universe. Nevertheless he says that it must be demonstrated that there is an unchanging nature and this is the belief that people must acquire. If "… nothing has a substance[ or essence]there is nothing that is of necessity i.e. the laws of logic are invalid as they postulate necessity. Aristotle notes that if every thing is a property of every thing else then instead of change we would have the Parmenidesian notion of every thing at rest or no change instead of the Heraclitusian every thing in motion or change.

On this point O'Hear, in What Philosophy Is, states "…without our terms and our logic being firm and clear at the outset, it will be unclear just what is meant by any statement at all [consequently without fixed terms our system of language will] collapse into an incoherent and featureless pile of statements, the sense of any one of which is indeterminate and perpetually shifting because of changes he may decide to make in other beliefs."

"… whatever the circumstances of writing and speaking, being understood is what counts. Intelligibility depends on the unequivocality of the terms used. Syllogism would be impossible if the sense of the predicate e.g. "being a human being", should change during deduction … the unequivocality the preservation of one meaning, authorizes formalization; thus, one can symbolize the concept "human being" by one letter, for instance a. A symbol represents a thing, a type of entity, a category of individuals and it is on condition of referring to the same thing, the same type of entity, the same category of individuals that the symbol is operational in logical description."

As we have discussed before, it was Piaget who first pointed out the futility of "logic" to "explain" cognitive development, since logic was an end product of such a process (for some). The child without a developed sense of logic still makes his world "meaningful" by accommodating to it

Dean, you obviously can't or won't understand the significance of my example sentence (in that it refutes "logicality" as a necessary condition for "meaning") or the genetic epistemology of Piaget within which logicality is deconstructed and re-constructed with respect to biological and sociological substrata.

you still dont get it dean says even piaget views end in meaninglessness
ALLLL VIEWS END IN MEANINGLESSNESS
DOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO YOU GET IT YET

Much criticism has been aimed at the methodology and sampling on which Piaget based his empirical data and theoretical stances. He used his own children and those of his Genevian colleagues to develop his huge array of concepts about all childrens' cognition. This very small sample - of academic, high socio-economic status and cultural variables, make for the possiblity that his results/data may be unreliable and, at the very least, unrepresentative. Piaget generalized from a tiny sample base, ignored individual differences and prior learning. His experiments were difficult to replicate and artificial, considered too informal and unscientific.
As well, many have criticized Piaget's pessimistic questioning techniques and feel he tried to catch children out in his experiments; i.e. Donaldson in Sutherland, 1992. The use of more optimal language and help is required compared to the traditional teaching styles of Piaget's era. The same source states that he underestimated children's abilities whilst overestimating adult cognition. He is criticized by Hamlyn (1978) in Sutherland for ignoring the value of social learning - in the mother's arms or with teachers, but not as Piaget suggested, in a social vacuum.
Many critics have found fault with his notion of a lockstep progression through the various stages, commenting that more recent studies have discovered discrepancies in the cognitive abilities within any particular child,and between children. They would dispute Piaget's notion of cognitive 'homogeneity' (Sutherland, 1992).

Much of the criticism that has been leveled against Piaget's notion of reflective abstraction, therefore, seems rather hollow to me - at least until someone comes up with an explanation of consciousness that shows Piaget's use of the concept to be mistaken.

Ever since Piaget published his first important works in the 1930s, people have tended to react in different ways. On the one hand, conventional psychologists tried to assimilate his theory to traditional ideas, and in order to do this, they had to disregard whatever did not fit - and the heftiest chunk that could not be fitted into a conventional view was, of course, the constructivist principle that we ourselves build our picture of the world in which we live. Most textbooks of psychology nowadays contain a few pages about Piaget,

Those actually interested in Piaget's epistemology (as opposed to his developmental psychology) should read "The Principles of Genetic Epistemology" (Tanslated by Wolfe Mays, RKP 1972)

Extensions of Piaget's epistemology with particular reference to language are found in the Santiago Theory of Cognition (Maturana). A useful introductory text with respect this is

You've certainly got good eyesight to read that abstract up to the bit which suited you. I note that Piaget's work on an "alternative logic" was conveniently skipped.....And by the way I've just noticed with some hilarity that your second cut+paste box in the previous post was largely supportive of Piaget...a point which seems to have escaped you.

As we have discussed before, it was Piaget who first pointed out the futility of "logic" to "explain" cognitive development, since logic was an end product of such a process (for some). The child without a developed sense of logic still makes his world "meaningful" by accommodating to it

what does piaget mean by logic
what is his meaning of meaning
Quiine says some where meaning is one of the most slippery words there is
dean at least says what he means by meaninglessness