Well, I guess I must congratulate you,
fresco: you have managed to find the
worst definition of "metaphysics" ever written. That it also happens to agree with your position is, I hasten to add, no coincidence.
Metaphysics doesn't deal with
how we know -- that's part of epistemology also. I can only imagine that this strange definition owes something to the fact that it comes from a professor teaching at a Catholic university (and, incidentally, teaching a course in the Education department, not in the Philosophy department).
Regardless of its provenance, however, the definition is clearly flawed. "Metaphysics" deals with "ultimate reality" (or what
Frank Apisa would have called "REALITY"), not with how we know what we know. "Metaphysics" deals primarily with that which is "beyond the physical," i.e. that which is ultimately
not knowable either inductively or deductively.
fresco wrote:According to this, the debate about subjectivity/objectivity is ostensibly "metaphysical" because it appears to discuss modes and methods of "knowing". However, the fact that "what we know" in physics has been shown (by Heisenberg et al) to be necessarily limited immediately triggers "metaphysical questions"....obviously so!..(meta=beyond)...to the extent that "we" and "know" are subject to analysis. At this level subjectivity/objectivity become deconstructed.
No they don't.
fresco wrote:As far as "logic" is concerned,it would appear that it belongs in the "metaphysical camp" because it is a tool in the "how we know" box, operating as it does on the assumption of "truth values" of its objects of focus.. Traditional logic is of course further subject to secondary metaphysical analysis within the area called "philosophy of logic". Unfortunately Joe tends to equate "logic" with "sense" and anything which questions logic as "nonsense", without recognizing that he himself is stuck in a metaphysical rut of his own making.
Logic is not subject to a secondary metaphysical analysis. It isn't even subject to a primary metaphysical analysis.