Chumly wrote:Think of the general in the battlefield, in the heat of the moment, preparing to make a pivotal command decision, does he have the time and resources to assess and flesh out all the implications of every action / counter action? No.
How does he rationalize his command decision, which could affect the turn of the war and millions of lives, and perhaps man's survival? I suggest at some point, if he is a rational and honest man, he will have to admit that he applied an arbitrary perception of the risk reward / equation.
Actually, that is an inapt analogy, because it does not take into consideration the nature of discussions such as this (we're not under the kind of pressure to which a battlefield commander is subjected); and it shows a far too simplistic view of what it is that military commanders do.
With regard to discussions such as this, you write:
So it seems to me that such perceptions may have a strong bias in arbitrary risk assessment / perceptions, even if the posters in question would be unlikely to see it, and would thus carry on quoting and interpreting their sources referring to other individualistic rationales outside of arbitrary risk assessment / perceptions. This is precisely why one needs to review the specifics, so that those in the discussion can make a reasonable judgment about the assessments offered by others. Making absolute statements without explaining how one comes to such a conclusion is no different than what Coberst has done here, when he invites you to agree or be damned.
As for military commanders, they know, and have long known, that the hierarchy of command determines success in an engagement. A commander of a corps or an army gathers as much information as possible on the terrain, the condition and equipment of his own forces, the condition and equipment of his opponents, the imperatives of the strategic situation, and the likely imperatives the situation imposes on his opponent. He then decides upon an operation plan, and it has been literally centuries since any commander made an operation plan "all by himself." Having determined upon an operational plan, as the opposing forces engage, the high-ranking commander becomes increasingly irrelevant to the outcome. When the corps commander has committed his divisions, the only significant effect he can subsequently exert on the outcome is by committing any reserves he may have held back. The division commander commits his regiments, and the course of his division's battle is out of his hands, and into the hands of the colonels. The battalions are committed, then the companies, the platoons, the squads, the files. At each level of engagement, the high-ranking commanders become increasingly irrelevant, and the local commanders become increasingly crucial to the success of the effort. Robert Lee once told an observer from England with regard to the course of a campaign that he delivered the army to the point at which he wished them to fight, and that thereafter the outcome was out of his hands. As for "risk/reward" equations, the general will have done his best to give them careful consideration before engaging in battle--men's lives are at stake. After battle is joined, there is little to nothing that general can do to alter the outcome; he had better have done it before a shot is fired.