georgeob1 wrote:Nimh,
I would be interested to know your views of the conduct of Britain and France vis a vis Hitler and Mussolini during the years preceding Munich in the 1930s. Most historians concede that decisive action by Britain and France at the reoccupation of the Rhineland or the takeover of Austria or even as late as the Sudetenland crisis might well have brought about Hitler's fall - before the horrors of WWII.
Right.
And that brings us back to the question of from what moment onwards intervention is justified; what criterium can legitimately be used to justify one. I'd say the military occupation of (parts of) another country, whether wholly forcibly or under duress, as in the case of Sudetenland, would count as one, yes. Thats also why I would say the Gulf War I, which followed Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, was justified.
Now my question would be - how do your speculations about "indications of an adverse future dynamic" equate in whatsoever way with what, in the late thirties, was the actual annexation or (partial) occupation of other countries? Where does a comparison even enter the question here? On the one hand, you have the suspicion that one day, fellow Security Council members might no longer want to uphold the sanctions and that, if they should not, then the other country's ruler might just proceed to, well, not attack any other country himself, but pass along some weapons to some other bad people who might just use them to attack a third country. On the other you have Nazi Germany already actually annexing entire (parts of) other countries with military force or under duress. And one is supposed to say what about the other?
I am neither an isolationist nor a pacifist; that there might be a time when intervention is legitimate is no question for me. What I'm questioning is whether the arguments the US or individuals like you are suggesting for this particular war hold up to any kind of traditional or common sense standard of what a legitimate casus belli would be. Now it might just be me, but speculation about "possible future adverse dynamics" in which one hypothetical diplomatic development (the possible suspension of sanctions) might over time just lead to a domestic military development (Iraq developing WMD for the first time in over a decade again) which in turn might perhaps lead to an actual attack on someone else (if the hypothesis of Saddam passing those WMD along to his Islamist enemies for the first time should actually hold up), of we dont know what scope (no terrorist attack thus far cost the number of deaths involved in a regularly-sized war) ... does somehow
not strike me as enough reason to already start a war in advance, with the tens of thousands of deaths it entails.