Philosophy's Job: Critique Assumptions

Spendius,

Re "his cranial elecrical circuits" I seem to remember that some later "Wittgenstein" was written by others. However, even if he had written "the lot" I don't think looking at "his circuits" would have have given us any more insight into the niceties of "the performance" than watching a ballet dancer's knees would tell the story of Swan Lake.


JLN,

I don't think W. had your analogy in mind. He was more concerned with usage of words out of their normal context. For example for him the question "What is time ?" is a pseudo-problem because "is-ness" is only meaningful in full contexts like "what is the time ?".
However, in as much that "normality" is a mutual experience, your idea of idiosyncratic interpretations has some bearing on the matter.

Fresco, I had no real hope of reflecting W's perspective; I was imposing mine. Language ceases to be what it was "intended" to be when it behaves "as if" it were picturing reality rather than constructing it.

So, are you saying that W considered language to be OFF holiday when it was actually working to get work done, i.e., asking the time, rather than being metaphysical (going on holiday) about "time" as some kind of abstract thing that "is?" If so, does that mean that all ontology reflects language on holiday, that language pertains only to the "doing" of everyday practical life?

You're kinky fresco.

Fancy looking at their knees.

I used to look at their gussets especially during the "pointillismesthingiemajiggs" with RN holding the tips of their fingers gently high above their heads as in "light touches of the rudder" situations.

I have X-ray eyes thanks to Google.

That's why front row central was the most expensive seat in the house and often sat in by a bloated capitalist who had self-evidently earned the right to merge his crude greed with artistic appreciation thus creating "love at first sight" and bouquets of roses delivered to the Stage Door by a minion grinning like an old ape.

Oh- and a knighthood of course.

I never noticed their knees. Their toes I did notice. And their flashing eyes.

How else do you raise a gusset six inches higher than it normally is without resorting to a crane hire firm?

I never liked them being thrown into the air though. I prefer them keeping still but I am aware that a ballet performance has to have a plot and move otherwise the Grauniad audience gets restless.

Spendius, you ask if my idealistic proposition is only one way of looking at it.
Of course every way of looking at something is "only one way of looking at it". There are nothing but interpretations on the bases of perspectives. Nevertheless, I love the saying: "There are always two ways of seeing an issue, mine and the fool's."

As Flaubert said- "He grinned sheepishly."

JLN,

What you or I think about language is bound to be different to W. because he was enmeshed in retracting from some of his own earlier ideas about logic in the Tractatus. To this end his later dictum "meaning is use" is historically a Behaviourist stance where language is essentially an adjunct or commentary on "action".(like telling the time). For him situations of "inaction" ( musings) were "holidays". We might personally commune with this because from an "interactionist view of reality" nether subject nor object have "meaning" except within active relationship. On this basis I might agree with your ontological conclusions.
But this is a departure from W's primary focus on "words" to that of "scenarios".

(Apologies for the onomatopoeia with "act" )

Fresco, actually I am not adverse to thinking of meaning as use. The use of language in metaphysical discourse is, as far as I'm concerned, of value only insofar as it gives pleasure to the metaphysicians; their conclusions have no bearing on the quality of everyday life (of the metaphysicians as well as ordinary people). Language, in other words, is a tool that serves everyday purposes. "Deep truths", as far as I'm concerned, are best grasped intuitively by means of extralinguistic mystical (not linguistic metaphysical) operations.

JLN,

A bit off topic, but have you noticed the paradoxical nature behind your seemingly intuitive tagline?

Yes, Stuh. That is its charm, I think. It's the PROCESS, the direction or trajectory of one's life rather than some static CONDITION. A is "inferior" than B with regard to certain static criteria, but he is "superior" to him in that he is improving with regard to the same criteria.

The paradox I see is that you have defined goodness to be the rate of change of goodness. It's circular logic.

The rate of change? Wm. James was referring, I believe, to the direction of change (up or down, forward or backward, progress or regress).
Anyway, it IS off track.
And why do you refer to the tagline as "intuitive."

Because this sounds very logical and obvious at first glance:





If a positive rate is better than a negative one than it seems a small step indeed to conclude that a highly positive rate is also better than a low positive rate. Regardless, even if you only consider the sign of the rate, you would still need to have a non-circular definition for goodness to define even that much.

As an aside, the online magazine New Music Box recently ran an article demonstrating how pervasive this principle still is in some academic institutions. Discussing the merits of "academic composers," Colin Holter wrote this:



Predictably, the article caused a lot of people to wonder exactly how one determines that a certain work of art is "needed" even when not wanted, or by what standard a work of art can be said to be "needed" when it has no audience outside academia.

Shapeless, the question you raise of the necessity--both the wanting and needing--of art (music, literature, and the visual arts) for the meaningful or gratified life is fundamental. It is obvious that some people do not need "high" art while others do. I sometimes think that Abraham Mazlow or Nietzsche have something vital to tell us about that. I don't want to sound "elitist" but I cannot avoid the impression that some people have come to a condition in life, mainly because formal and informal education where they both want and need the more refined and "deeper" forms of "entertainment." Others are content--but I suspect never fulfilled--with mere distraction and titilation.

Artists, composers, poets SHOULD be able to thrive in an academic setting, but unfortunately universities are becoming mere money-making ventures wherein their faculty cannot persevere without bringing in grants and patents. This applies mainly to the hard and soft "sciences." Artists, historians, philosophers are at best tolerated unless they are able to bring acclaim to their school. To prevail (i.e., tenure, promotions and merit pay) generally requires a sacrifice of time and energy pursuing emblems of academic-professional success that leaves them little left for their own creative goals. Not always but often.

In the case of music, I would go further and say that composers today--at least the kind that C. Holter represents--can only thrive in the academic setting. As his essay notes (in euphemistic terms), academia is the only place where composers can write music that deliberately shuns the public but can still be funded. It's a rather ingenious racket, really, and a far cry from the days when composers had to earn their livings by convincing people that they had something to offer them.

I agree. In my university there seems to be much freedom for composers, at least as reflected in the works they produce.