What next? Avoid repeating past mistakes?

"On the other hand, reports that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have empowered local militias, as they did in Afghanistan, who have imposed their own reign of terror over hapless neighbours in towns like Najaf have created serious embarrassment."
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What Next? - IPS - 4/9/03
Analysis - By Jim Lobe

Even as U.S. troops helped bring down Baghdad's most imposing statues of President Saddam Hussein, the big question here on Wednesday was, 'What now?', not just for Iraq and the Mideast in general, but also for the future of international relations.

WASHINGTON, Apr 9 (IPS) - Even as U.S. troops helped bring down Baghdad's most imposing statues of President Saddam Hussein, the big question here on Wednesday was, 'What now?', not just for Iraq and the Mideast in general, but also for the future of international relations.

Most immediately, U.S. and British troops must still root out the remaining pockets of resistance in the capital and Basra, stop the looting and chaos that has broken out in both cities and many others, and consider how they will take, with a minimum of bloodshed, areas that remain beyond their control, such as Kirkuk, Mosul, and Saddam's hometown, Tikrit.

They must also install an occupation authority, which has been cooling its heels in Kuwait since last month, and address the shortage of medical supplies in Baghdad, which suffered thousands of casualties in the past days' fighting. As well, they must attend to the country's overall humanitarian situation, which has become increasingly desperate in water-short parts of southern Iraq that 'New York Times' columnist Thomas Friedman described Wednesday as ''in a pre-political primordial state of nature''.

''America broke Iraq; now America owns Iraq, and it owns the primary responsibility for normalising it,'' wrote Friedman, who had supported the war, albeit with considerable trepidation over the possibility that the super-hawks in the administration of President George W. Bush would botch the job.

So far, it's too early to judge, although policymakers were greatly heartened by what they described as spontaneous popular demonstrations of support in the capital for U.S. soldiers and rage against the fallen dictator who may have been killed by a ''bunker-busting'' bomb attack directed at a restaurant in an upscale area of Baghdad that he was reported to have entered two days ago.

On the other hand, reports that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have empowered local militias, as they did in Afghanistan, who have imposed their own reign of terror over hapless neighbours in towns like Najaf have created serious embarrassment.

''Whether the administration knows it or not, the war is now really over hearts and minds,'' noted one congressional staffer. ''It can't afford to make mistakes like this, or the occupation is going to be a major disaster.''

Bush is receiving no end of advice from a variety of sources both inside and outside the administration.

Government hawks appear eager to put the occupation in place and have tentatively scheduled a conference of opposition forces for Saturday to determine membership of an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) that will initially advise and then gradually assume power from the occupation authorities over a period of time.

Their favourite is Ahmed Chalabi, the head and co-founder of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), who was airlifted with 500 followers to Nasiriyah Sunday, and immediately began a furious round of politicking, much to the dismay of other opposition figures.

The hawks, led primarily by Vice President Dick Cheney and Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld and their top aides, are eager to establish ''facts on the ground'', before Secretary of State Colin Powell and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, with whom Bush met earlier this week in Belfast, can put together a larger international consensus that would push the United Nations Security Council into a more central role in deciding and authorising the post-war arrangements.

Feeling vindicated by the success of U.S. military operations, particularly after they were assailed so strongly by retired military officers and other critics when U.S. troops appeared to bog down in the face of heavier-than-expected resistance by Iraqi forces, the hawks hope to minimise the U.N.'s responsibility for relief and reconstruction and for screening IIA members.

In remarks Wednesday, Cheney said both reconstruction and the creation of a new Iraqi government ''has to reside with the U.S. government. We don't believe that the United Nations is equipped to play that central role.''

Indeed, both Cheney and Rumsfeld have appeared very much in triumphalist mode over the last day as victory loomed in sight. While stressing the battle is still not completely over, Rumsfeld has clearly relished opportunities to hint that the war could be carried to Syria if Damascus fails to heed U.S. warnings against supplying Iraqi forces.

But the State Department and Blair, along with a number of influential figures outside the administration, are still working hard to broaden international participation and responsibility, if for no other reason than to begin mending ties, particularly between the U.S. and Germany, France and Russia, which were badly strained during the run-up to the war.

As in previous intra-administration disputes, they have the clear backing of the veterans of the administration of the first President Bush, particularly former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft who, in remarks to the Nobel Institute in Oslo on Tuesday, called for the Security Council to organise the post-war administration of Iraq.

Bush's father has himself spoke out publicly on the need for fence mending with the Europeans as a top priority after the war, although it is increasingly unclear whether George W. welcomes his father's advice.

But other voices, some much closer to the administration hawks, have also put forward similar counsel.

In a notable column Wednesday, Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, but more importantly a co-founder of the ultra-hawkish Project for the New American Century (PNAC), offered advice directly at odds with that of many of his associates.

The column, entitled 'Resisting Superpowerful Temptations', called explicitly for Washington to forgo promoting Chalabi's ambitions in Iraq, warning that ''if it ever starts to look as if the United States fought a war in order to put Chalabi in power, President Bush's great success will be measurably discredited''.

The second temptation that Washington should avoid, said Kagan, is punishing Europeans allies, particularly France, Germany, and Turkey, for opposing the war, a course that has been promoted eagerly by most Republicans and some Democrats in Congress, as well as within the administration.

''The world's sole superpower doesn't need to hold grudges, and sometimes can't afford to,'' wrote Kagan, whose spouse is Cheney's deputy national security adviser. In particular, he said, punishing Turkey would be ''politically and strategically insane'' in view of Washington's hopes of building a democratic Iraq.

While Kagan's article did not endorse a major role for the United Nations, he, as well as a dozen other influential neo-conservatives, including PNAC chairman William Kristol, signed a letter late last month calling for Bush to seek the Security Council's endorsement of any civilian administration in Iraq.

''While some seem determined to create an ever deeper divide between the United States and Europe, and others seem indifferent to the long-term survival of the transatlantic partnership, we believe it is essential ... to begin building a new era of transatlantic cooperation,'' advised the letter, which was signed by some 31 prominent foreign policy analysts.