Iraq After Saddam[/size]
By Lieutenant Colonel Paul Schreiber, U.S. Marine Corps; Commander Brian Kelley, U.S. Coast Guard; Lieutenant Colonel Gary Holland, U.S. Air Force; and Commander Stephen Davis, U.S. Navy
After decades of brutal dictatorship and countless human rights violations, Saddam Hussein's regime is poised to fall. Combatant commanders understand what needs to occur to remove Saddam from power, but we also must prepare for what comes after.
Winning the peace in Iraq will be as challenging as winning the war. From Somalia to Afghanistan, the United States has executed combat operations effectively only to stumble through postconflict reconstruction. Military leaders have bemoaned mission creep and nation building, frustrated by the intangible nature of success and the seeming reticence of policy makers to lean more equitably on other instruments of national power. Wishing these responsibilities away has not made it so≈and Iraq is going to be more challenging than any situation faced to date.
In the aftermath of regime disintegration in Iraq, coalition forces will address myriad security issues in addition to indigenous governmental functions, economic stability, and the justice system. Though each pillar is essential to viability, the creation of a stable and secure environment is requisite to making progress in the other areas. A number of these security concerns will remain the purview of coalition combat forces, others may be assigned to an ad hoc constabulary force, and, over time, some responsibilities will be assumed by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations.
In the final analysis, success will be measured by more than Saddam's removal and the defeat of his combat forces. In addition to regime change, the broader security goals of postconflict reconstruction in Iraq should be to:
- Eliminate the presence of and capacity for development of weapons of mass destruction
- Provide a safe, secure, and nonintimidating environment for Iraqis and nongovernmental organizations
- Protect the oil industry to secure the country's economic future
- Create a structure sufficiently secure to prevent reprisals, protect borders, and allow Iraqis to shape their future
- Reestablish a military force capable of providing defensive self-sufficiency
Because little is known of conditions in Iraq outside Kurdish areas, analyses are speculative. Assumptions can be made based on information available from open sources. The combat phase will be over relatively quickly (less than 30 days) and should not include massive additional infrastructure destruction. Because of the nature of the conflict and strength of Iraqi security forces, the allied force will consist of approximately 250,000 soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines. There is general consensus that the Iraqi Army will fight poorly and capitulate quickly. Republican Guard units may resist, but also will capitulate in the face of the lethality of precision munitions and well-trained coalition troops. Because of the likelihood of rapid regime disintegration and rampant military disaffection, house-to-house urban combat is unlikely. It is possible that chemical or biological weapons will be used≈if they were to be, they would have an impact on postconflict security and justice/reconciliation efforts but would not affect the outcome.
The Iraqis will treat coalition combat forces with polite reserve ?- guerrilla war, insurgencies, or mob actions are unlikely assuming humanitarian needs are addressed. Despite his recent 100% electoral "victory," Saddam is not popular. Wars, purges, or the draconian actions of security forces have touched every citizen. Iraqis will be relieved to see him go, but reluctant to embrace a conquering army, particularly if Arab participation is minimal. Iraqis remember well the disappointments incident to unsupported uprisings in 1991 and 1996, and need tangible proof of a commitment to self-determination.
Iraq is not likely to devolve into anarchy. Despite years of agitating for independence, even the Kurdish opposition recognizes that balkanization is in no one's interest. A comprehensive and well-executed security plan will serve as a linchpin for postcombat stability in Iraq and have profound positive impact throughout the region.
The Day After
The situation in Iraq will be different from that at the end of World War II. Germany and Japan were homogeneous nations that surrendered unconditionally at the end of a protracted conflict. Iraq is made up of widely disparate ethnic groups that have been subjected to degrees of oppression for years. U.S. officials in postwar Japan had an advantage they are unlikely to have in Iraq: No one questioned their legitimacy. The United States had not only the power to impose its will on Japan but also, in the world's eyes, the undisputed right to remake a militaristic society.
The security of Iraq's borders and the safety of its people are the first elements in postconflict reconstruction. It is not possible to rebuild without a polity that feels safe and retains some sense of "Iraqiness." In a society where revenge is often a cultural imperative, retributive killings run the risk of being chronically destabilizing.
The U.S. postconflict mission should be articulated clearly. Regardless of the governance model adopted for postconflict reconstruction, U.S. forces will be inescapably involved in seven areas that cannot be delegated to a constabulary or local police/security force:
Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction[/b]: Weapons of mass destruction pose a serious threat to allied forces, the Iraqi people, and regional security. The collapse of the Iraqi regime could lead to a proliferation disaster if these weapons and materiel are not collected quickly. Success will rely on an unprecedented level of cooperation between U.S. and international governmental and intelligence organizations. Because of their destabilizing influence, sites and production facilities for weapons of mass destruction must be held until the material can be inspected and controlled. International experts, including the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, will need to assess potential dual-use facilities to preclude shutting down areas critical to reconstruction.
Preserving the Oil Infrastructure[/b]: Iraq is capable of developing economic stability and self-sufficiency relatively quickly. Its petroleum industry, with the world's third-largest oil reserves, will be able to fund much of the reconstruction effort and provide essential capital to the government. Saddam must be prevented from destroying the oil infrastructure in a paroxysm of vengeance as he did in Kuwait in 1991.
Securing National Borders[/b]: Coalition leaders must obtain border guarantees from Iraq's neighbors and be prepared to use combat forces in a deterrent role to secure Iraq's borders. Regime change and demobilization easily could be seen as an opportunity to settle scores or put a stop to ethnic insurgency. Similar guarantees must be obtained from Kurdish opposition parties specifying that they will not declare Kurdistan an independent state or move militarily in the wake of regime collapse.
Paroling and Retraining the Regular Army[/b]: The formal parole of the Iraqi Army is an important part of the reconciliation process, not unlike stacking-of-arms ceremonies throughout history. Soldiers must be returned to garrison, fed, and clothed. Many will be paroled and transported home. Their equipment must be collected and stored securely. Each soldier must be identified, photographed, and provided with paperwork validating a legitimate parole. Based on historical precedents, planners should allow approximately 180 days to complete demilitarization and begin a training program for a reconstituted defense force.
Demilitarizing and Eliminating the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard[/b]: The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard were created to protect Saddam and provide a counterweight to the regular army. These private armies must be demobilized quickly and thoroughly. They have received sufficient funding and training to continue to be a threat to a new government and are too closely aligned with Saddam to be reliable security forces in the future. Members of the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard may be eligible for parole or reaccession into the military after being cleared of potential war crimes.
Securing Ba'ath Party Headquarters and Saddam's Palaces[/b]: Information relevant to the war crimes and reconciliation tribunals will be held in Ba'ath Party headquarters or in palaces in Baghdad or Tikrit. Much of this information may be destroyed as soon as regime disintegration begins. Combat forces must stop the destruction of these facilities and prevent looting after Saddam falls.
Dismantling Security and Intelligence Apparatus[/b]: The five primary elements of the Iraqi security apparatus (General Security, General Intelligence, Special Security, Military Security, and Military Intelligence) permeate every aspect of Iraqi life and have been instrumental in the survival of Saddam's regime. These security forces have to be dismantled carefully, quickly, and thoroughly, avoiding reprisal killings while maintaining war crimes trial evidence.
The Iraqi Army [/b]
Iraq lives in a tough neighborhood. Requirements for defensive self-sufficiency are too great to demobilize completely. If Iraq does not re-create a credible army, the United States will bear the burden of defending borders indefinitely.
The regular army of approximately 350,000 soldiers should be resized and retrained for defensive purposes. Based on legitimate security needs, the requirement to maintain 3,650 kilometers of border area (including 1,500 kilometers with Iran), and the size of neighboring military forces, the Iraqi Army should have no fewer than 150,000 regular troops, with a capacity for reserve augmentation. The officer corps needs to be ethnically balanced, better trained, and promoted based on merit and service rather than familial or tribal affiliation.
The net change from roughly 400,000 to 500,000 military and security personnel before the conflict to approximately 200,000 indigenous army and police personnel is significant. The postconflict environment may be fertile ground for discontent. It is imperative to develop a productive outlet for these individuals who represent an added risk to stability.
In the final analysis, the reconstituted army should distance itself from political confrontation, focus on defensive strategies, and create a dialogue based on mutual respect and tolerance. Many soldiers currently in the army have provided honorable service to their country under challenging circumstances. It is in everyone's best interest to leverage their expertise, training, and organizational skills to play a role in reconstituting this force.
Constabulary Forces
When the fighting stops, a security void will emerge. A strong constabulary presence would provide a calming and deterrent influence, bridge the military-civilian law enforcement security gap during the transition, help open lines of communication, and reestablish infrastructure. Traditionally, constabulary forces have been ad hoc and not of particular interest to U.S. forces. Elite combat troops end up filling the void because there is no one else to assume these critical but generally noncombat security and policing responsibilities. There will be a predictable need for constabulary forces, and the planning for and organization of forces must take place in conjunction with combat planning, rather than in its wake.
Upon the Iraqis' retreat from Kuwait in early 1991 at the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein had his armies set fire to nearly 700 oil wells across Kuwait City. Iraq's oil infrastructure must be protected from revenge-based sabotage by an embittered despot so that it can fuel the country's reconstruction.
For example, in the absence of a security force in Kosovo, local crime bosses and impromptu militias were drawn into the power vacuum and were the root cause of months of unnecessary violence. Afghan postconflict reconstruction has been slowed by the lack of security forces outside Kabul. If the U.S.-led coalition does not coordinate the augmentation of legitimate security forces, Iraqis will look to undemocratic tribal and religious factions. The in-and-out model (invade quickly, depart as soon as basic governance has been reestablished) will not work and runs counter to long-term stability in the region. The bottom line is that someone has to provide local security in a nation of 23 million ethnically diverse people after 30 years of dictatorial rule.
The constabulary force must be trained, equipped, sufficient in number, sustainable, multicultural, and capable of training police. It is essential that the force understand local feuds and tensions and arrive with a plan for passing power to a local constabulary. The unfortunate reality is that even if the U.S. State and Defense departments were to decide quickly to create a multinational constabulary force of willing participants, there is not sufficient time to organize, train, and deploy before the operation begins.
Consequently, the Department of Defense ?- the Army and Army Guard in particular ?- needs to be ready to create a transitional security force to fill the policing role in the absence of a dedicated constabulary force. This force should be functionally different from the combat forces ?- it should arrive as soon as possible after areas are liberated, report to both Commander, Central Command, and the designated interim civil administrator, be outfitted for policing duties, and receive civil-military and police training prior to deployment.
Moreover, the coalition must provide provincial security detachments to provincial administrators. These detachments will serve as a bridge between the interim civil administration, U.N. officials, coalition combat forces, and constabulary forces. The coalition also should be prepared to maintain combat-credible, rapid-reaction forces near potential flash points such as Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk until the security situation is stable and local police forces are capable of meeting basic needs.
It is unrealistic to expect the U.N. Security Council to authorize, fund, and organize a constabulary and security force in Iraq before combat begins. During the six-month demobilization period in which a U.S.-led transition security force will coordinate actions, the United Nations should authorize, train, and deploy a force of 10,000-15,000 civilian-police-style officers to provide policing functions, retraining, and response to civil disturbances should the need arise. Partners who are politically deterred from participating in combat operations likely will be willing to support security and retraining operations. Troops from sympathetic states (not including immediate neighbors) such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and France should be encouraged to participate in the constabulary force.
Coalition and U.N. leaders should leverage the Iraqi police force as much as possible. Iraq has a 25,000- to 35,000-man force currently providing policing functions in the municipalities. These officers neither are members of internal security forces nor are they Republican Guards. Senior Ba'ath Party functionaries or leaders of the security forces should not be considered candidates to assume responsibilities for police functions. Local leaders can be given maximum leeway to select police officers. De facto selection will occur as compromised candidates flee and citizens reassume responsibility for their areas ?- a sort of self-purging.
Iraq's police may be the best short-term complement to the initial presence of U.S. soldiers; if control of the police is transferred to the community level, stability will be hastened. Assuming that 10% of the police force is unusable for political or historical reasons, there will be approximately 25,000 local police who may be available to assist with reconstruction. Kurdish regions have been self-sufficient since 1996 and would need only nominal additional support or retraining. The reorganization should be toward a force divided into geographic elements, not a national police force. Using rough estimates of one police officer per 500 citizens, the coalition and United Nations will need to maintain a constabulary force of 40,000-50,000. The potential contributions of 25,000 knowledgeable, local Iraqi police officers are self-evident.
Reestablishing local authority quickly may make the difference between success and failure. A U.S. occupation force, though credible in the short term and a relatively easy default position, will not provide the structure or indigenous involvement necessary for future stability.
The postconflict period in Iraq is not going to be easy or short-lived. Coalition partners should be prepared for a three- to five-year presence on the ground with sufficient forces to guarantee internal and border security. The numbers required will depend on the success of efforts to capitalize on Iraq's organic capacity for self-policing and defense, but may include up to 25,000 dedicated paramilitary/police officers, in addition to combat forces to secure sites for weapons of mass destruction, oil fields, and Ba'ath Party headquarters over the short term. In the final analysis, the United States will be seen as the guarantor of Iraqi borders and security; detailed advance planning will help make this process less complicated than it has the potential to be.
The establishment of security in postconflict Iraq will drive a return to economic and social stability. It need not be a period of unchecked violence and deprivation. The final results will have a significant impact on U.S. influence as a catalyst for regional stability.
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