US draws up secret plan to impose regime on Iraq

Iraq After Saddam[/size]

By Lieutenant Colonel Paul Schreiber, U.S. Marine Corps; Commander Brian Kelley, U.S. Coast Guard; Lieutenant Colonel Gary Holland, U.S. Air Force; and Commander Stephen Davis, U.S. Navy

After decades of brutal dictatorship and countless human rights violations, Saddam Hussein's regime is poised to fall. Combatant commanders understand what needs to occur to remove Saddam from power, but we also must prepare for what comes after.

Winning the peace in Iraq will be as challenging as winning the war. From Somalia to Afghanistan, the United States has executed combat operations effectively only to stumble through postconflict reconstruction. Military leaders have bemoaned mission creep and nation building, frustrated by the intangible nature of success and the seeming reticence of policy makers to lean more equitably on other instruments of national power. Wishing these responsibilities away has not made it so≈and Iraq is going to be more challenging than any situation faced to date.

In the aftermath of regime disintegration in Iraq, coalition forces will address myriad security issues in addition to indigenous governmental functions, economic stability, and the justice system. Though each pillar is essential to viability, the creation of a stable and secure environment is requisite to making progress in the other areas. A number of these security concerns will remain the purview of coalition combat forces, others may be assigned to an ad hoc constabulary force, and, over time, some responsibilities will be assumed by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations.

In the final analysis, success will be measured by more than Saddam's removal and the defeat of his combat forces. In addition to regime change, the broader security goals of postconflict reconstruction in Iraq should be to:

• Eliminate the presence of and capacity for development of weapons of mass destruction
  
• Provide a safe, secure, and nonintimidating environment for Iraqis and nongovernmental organizations
  
• Protect the oil industry to secure the country's economic future
  
• Create a structure sufficiently secure to prevent reprisals, protect borders, and allow Iraqis to shape their future
  
• Reestablish a military force capable of providing defensive self-sufficiency
  

The Day After

The situation in Iraq will be different from that at the end of World War II. Germany and Japan were homogeneous nations that surrendered unconditionally at the end of a protracted conflict. Iraq is made up of widely disparate ethnic groups that have been subjected to degrees of oppression for years. U.S. officials in postwar Japan had an advantage they are unlikely to have in Iraq: No one questioned their legitimacy. The United States had not only the power to impose its will on Japan but also, in the world's eyes, the undisputed right to remake a militaristic society.

The security of Iraq's borders and the safety of its people are the first elements in postconflict reconstruction. It is not possible to rebuild without a polity that feels safe and retains some sense of "Iraqiness." In a society where revenge is often a cultural imperative, retributive killings run the risk of being chronically destabilizing.

The U.S. postconflict mission should be articulated clearly. Regardless of the governance model adopted for postconflict reconstruction, U.S. forces will be inescapably involved in seven areas that cannot be delegated to a constabulary or local police/security force:
Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction[/b]: Weapons of mass destruction pose a serious threat to allied forces, the Iraqi people, and regional security. The collapse of the Iraqi regime could lead to a proliferation disaster if these weapons and materiel are not collected quickly. Success will rely on an unprecedented level of cooperation between U.S. and international governmental and intelligence organizations. Because of their destabilizing influence, sites and production facilities for weapons of mass destruction must be held until the material can be inspected and controlled. International experts, including the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, will need to assess potential dual-use facilities to preclude shutting down areas critical to reconstruction.
Preserving the Oil Infrastructure[/b]: Iraq is capable of developing economic stability and self-sufficiency relatively quickly. Its petroleum industry, with the world's third-largest oil reserves, will be able to fund much of the reconstruction effort and provide essential capital to the government. Saddam must be prevented from destroying the oil infrastructure in a paroxysm of vengeance as he did in Kuwait in 1991.
Securing National Borders[/b]: Coalition leaders must obtain border guarantees from Iraq's neighbors and be prepared to use combat forces in a deterrent role to secure Iraq's borders. Regime change and demobilization easily could be seen as an opportunity to settle scores or put a stop to ethnic insurgency. Similar guarantees must be obtained from Kurdish opposition parties specifying that they will not declare Kurdistan an independent state or move militarily in the wake of regime collapse.
Paroling and Retraining the Regular Army[/b]: The formal parole of the Iraqi Army is an important part of the reconciliation process, not unlike stacking-of-arms ceremonies throughout history. Soldiers must be returned to garrison, fed, and clothed. Many will be paroled and transported home. Their equipment must be collected and stored securely. Each soldier must be identified, photographed, and provided with paperwork validating a legitimate parole. Based on historical precedents, planners should allow approximately 180 days to complete demilitarization and begin a training program for a reconstituted defense force.
Demilitarizing and Eliminating the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard[/b]: The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard were created to protect Saddam and provide a counterweight to the regular army. These private armies must be demobilized quickly and thoroughly. They have received sufficient funding and training to continue to be a threat to a new government and are too closely aligned with Saddam to be reliable security forces in the future. Members of the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard may be eligible for parole or reaccession into the military after being cleared of potential war crimes.
Securing Ba'ath Party Headquarters and Saddam's Palaces[/b]: Information relevant to the war crimes and reconciliation tribunals will be held in Ba'ath Party headquarters or in palaces in Baghdad or Tikrit. Much of this information may be destroyed as soon as regime disintegration begins. Combat forces must stop the destruction of these facilities and prevent looting after Saddam falls.
Dismantling Security and Intelligence Apparatus[/b]: The five primary elements of the Iraqi security apparatus (General Security, General Intelligence, Special Security, Military Security, and Military Intelligence) permeate every aspect of Iraqi life and have been instrumental in the survival of Saddam's regime. These security forces have to be dismantled carefully, quickly, and thoroughly, avoiding reprisal killings while maintaining war crimes trial evidence.

The Iraqi Army [/b]

Iraq lives in a tough neighborhood. Requirements for defensive self-sufficiency are too great to demobilize completely. If Iraq does not re-create a credible army, the United States will bear the burden of defending borders indefinitely.

The regular army of approximately 350,000 soldiers should be resized and retrained for defensive purposes. Based on legitimate security needs, the requirement to maintain 3,650 kilometers of border area (including 1,500 kilometers with Iran), and the size of neighboring military forces, the Iraqi Army should have no fewer than 150,000 regular troops, with a capacity for reserve augmentation. The officer corps needs to be ethnically balanced, better trained, and promoted based on merit and service rather than familial or tribal affiliation.

The net change from roughly 400,000 to 500,000 military and security personnel before the conflict to approximately 200,000 indigenous army and police personnel is significant. The postconflict environment may be fertile ground for discontent. It is imperative to develop a productive outlet for these individuals who represent an added risk to stability.

In the final analysis, the reconstituted army should distance itself from political confrontation, focus on defensive strategies, and create a dialogue based on mutual respect and tolerance. Many soldiers currently in the army have provided honorable service to their country under challenging circumstances. It is in everyone's best interest to leverage their expertise, training, and organizational skills to play a role in reconstituting this force.

Constabulary Forces