timberlandko wrote:He is not stupid; it may be hoped he recognizes the dire ramifications of further overt Russian heavy-handedness in this matter. For the future of Russia as he envisages it, his best, and only viable, option is to cut his losses
His
best option, theoretically - absolutely - in the sense that unlike Kuchma or Lukashenka, Putin still has the advantage of actually commanding a sincere popularity among what appears to be a clear majority of his own people. So at this moment, if he were to "withdraw" to his own country, he would not actually need to worry about his position
there quite yet.
The irony of course though, as Timber did already also allude, is that the "loss" of the Ukraine could be the one thing that
could lose him his popularity. But then again it is only through his own and allied nationalists' current rhetorics about what the Ukrainian events mean (and the way they've been echoed throughout the loyal media) that a Yushchenko victory has come to be popularly seen as the "loss" of that country in the first place. There's no reason it
needs to be seen like that. After all, it's not like the EU is going to warmly welcome the Ukraine as a new member state any time soon, so actual uncontestible evidence of its "loss" will not immediately materialise - any lesser form of co-operation with the EU could still be massaged away in the news propaganda.
So I think that theoretically, if Putin, say, symbolically reconciles with Yushchenko at some highly hyped Russo-Ukrainian summit, and gets Yushchenko to utter enough symbolic words there about the historical spiritual unity of Russia and the Ukraine and so on (in exchange for a non-publicized promise of non-intervention) - and he has that summit reported in endless propaganda coverage on Russia's TV stations - then he might well still be able to square the circle. He was effective enough in framing a Yushchenko victory as meaning the loss of a historical heartland - it would be up to him to reframe that again too, with the help of loyal politicians and commentators. And stranger reversals have been gotten away with in states with a "trusty" media system.
Theoretically, he might well get away with it still. But a true reconciliation with Yushchenko and his allies and a contentment with symbolic, "spiritual" alliances alone would imply a total reversal of the foreign policy line Russia has set out regarding its "Near Abroad" thus far. Whereas that policy seems to reflect a sincere and deeply-rooted enough ideology, and is one Putin has implemented more or less effectively and quite ruthlessly throughout the Former Soviet Union (barring the Baltics). So I doubt whether he'd take that opportunity even if he
would believe it existed.
Not quite sure what the alternative is though. Splitting up the Ukraine is in nobody's (immediate) interest. Sponsoring, even covertly, a last-minute coup of sorts in the Ukraine to prevent Yushchenko from winning the repeated run-off - or even simply again banking on fraud to deny him the victory a second time - is a theoretical possibility, but a drastic one, whereas Putin thus far has preferred more under-the-radar operations. Seemingly recognizing a future President Yushchenko's authority in the diplomatic arena, while at the same time undermining the Ukrainian government through political allies, the Russian minority and economic blackmail would on the other hand be the "traditional" approach, tried and tested in variations in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbajjan, etc; but then, the Ukraine is no Moldova.