Watchmakers guidedog, I think you do yourself a disservice! I think your system of morals seems fairly consistent and logical. However...
watchmakers guidedog wrote:You're trying to point at me and say "You're morals aren't being logical", to which I can only respond, "Yes, I know. Neither are yours but at least I realise it."
I would hope that there is no-one on a philosophy forum who doesn't realise that their morals aren't totally logical! Careful about jumping to conclusions about what others may or may not realise...
Anyway (to jump to a conclusion about you...) your position seems to me to be pretty logical after all. It says, I think: I should behave as is best for me. Sometimes, because of annoying evolutionary adaptations such as guilt, this means acting in a way that appears to be benevolent, but in reality, I am acting in my own interest, in this case, my interest being to avoid guilt.
This seems fairly consistent to me. In fact, it ranks in the top three (closest to being) consistent positions, in my opinion, which are (in no particular order):
(a) I shouldn't care about anything but me in this very moment.
(b) I should care about myself.
(c) I should care about all things that care about themselves.
I genuinely think your position is well thought through. It makes sense, and it takes into account what morals really are: "a confusing and stupid process of mixed up cultural imprinting bonding itself to a few genetic imperatives".
It is based, however, on one dangerous assumption: that the 'me' whose benefit you are acting in is the same 'me' who will benefit from the act. When you sacrifice a moment's pleasure to avoid future pain/guilt/whatever, are you sure that it will be the same 'you' who benefits? If you click you fingers now, are you sure that, in a second's time, it will be you who remembers the finger clicking? Likewise, are you sure, as you remember clicking your fingers, that it was you who clicked your fingers? You know you are experiencing now, but you don't know whether or not you have ever experienced before, or will again. The only evidence you have is memory, and that only proves that you
remember experiencing before now, not that you
did experience before now.
You, I presume, work on the assumption that is it likely that apart from the experience you are experiencing at the moment, there were or will be other experience, in the past and future. You assume that the you that is experiencing in your body now is the same you that experienced in the past and will experience the future. So, you assume that two experiences separated by time are really part of the same experience.
Another assumption you might make is that other things you see are also experiencing. As you see them (ignoring the finite speed of light...) their experience is separated from you by space. Remembering them, their experience is separated from you by time and space.
Choosing between positions (a), (b) and (c) is a question of where we place the benefit of the doubt. Putting words into your mouth (sorry), you choice (b) rather than (a) because were you to choose (b) and be wrong it would likely be less bad than if you choose (a) and were wrong. You give the benefit of the doubt to the 'yous' separate by time being the same 'you'. I choose (c) rather than (b) or (a) because I give the benefit of the doubt to the 'yous' and 'mes' divided by time and space being the same 'me'.
Of course, I have no more evidence that they are all really me than you have that the you who started reading this post is the you reading this now. We have both just made a benefit of the doubt decision. So I, like you, am acting in my own interest. When I read that: "one person being vegetarian means that 250 less animals spend their 20 week life in a factory farm", I think: "me being vegetarian will mean I will spend about 100 years less time in a factory farm", which seems like a good tradeoff to me.