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Free Will?!

 
 
Terry
 
  1  
Reply Sat 2 Oct, 2004 10:35 pm
No one's will is completely free. Our brains were genetically programmed to respond in certain ways, and early environmental influences affect the way the brain wiring develops long before a child is capable of choosing its behavior.

Social conditioning can effectively prevent most people from exercising a desire to hit people when angry, strip off clothing when hot, relieve themselves in public, or steal whatever they want. Our will may be restrained by the dictates of others such as parents, teachers, spouses, or authority figures. People who are mentally ill may be incapable of either exercising free will or restraining themselves from behaviors unacceptable to the rest of society.

But IMO, our brains generate a consciousness which accesses data, predicts the probable consequences of our actions, considers whether the benefits outweigh the costs, and decides to act based on the end state of our neural networks. Some decisions are clear-cut and predictable, others require a lot of dithering and our Will may change with each addition of seemingly-trivial inputs.

That said, punishing criminal behavior would be ethical even in a completely deterministic universe since the fear of punishment is one of the factors that determines whether the criminal impulse is translated to action or successfully resisted. And if a crime is committed, the victims (or their duly appointed representatives) could argue that they have no choice but to act on their predestined urge for revenge.
0 Replies
 
val
 
  1  
Reply Mon 4 Oct, 2004 04:43 am
Joe:
1) If all events are causally related, then a futur event can be entirely predictable, as a result of previous events. And if an event is entirely predictable than it is necessary. We are physical entities, our choices and actions are physical events, so, according to that theory, any choice we make is nothing more than the necessary consequence of a previous event (As I said, I don't agree with this theory).

2) Decision in a determinisc universe, for philosophers like the Stoics or Spinoza is nothing more than acceptance of the inevitabily of all our actions. That means, I decide to do X, knowing I would do it anyway but knowing that doing that I conform myself with the universal necessity (and I also disagree with this).

3) I used the example of the rapist, because it had been already introduced in this debate. So let's say that our rapist, has already raped two people.

4) Yes, that's what I said. He feels the urge of raping another woman (at this level he is not free) but he decides to repress that urge (here he is free).

5) See 2).
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Mon 4 Oct, 2004 09:29 am
val wrote:
Joe:
1) If all events are causally related, then a futur event can be entirely predictable, as a result of previous events. And if an event is entirely predictable than it is necessary. We are physical entities, our choices and actions are physical events, so, according to that theory, any choice we make is nothing more than the necessary consequence of a previous event (As I said, I don't agree with this theory).

You claim that this version of free will is impossible, yet you also say "that free will, defined as the possibility of free intelectual choice between alternatives, does not exist." If free will does not exist, then how can the existence of "choice" undermine this causally based version of free will? Are you trying to suggest that this version of free will is logically inconsistent?

val wrote:
2) Decision in a determinisc universe, for philosophers like the Stoics or Spinoza is nothing more than acceptance of the inevitabily of all our actions. That means, I decide to do X, knowing I would do it anyway but knowing that doing that I conform myself with the universal necessity (and I also disagree with this).

If you believe that free will does not exist, then why do you disagree with this?

val wrote:
3) I used the example of the rapist, because it had been already introduced in this debate. So let's say that our rapist, has already raped two people.

Re-read my question: "How do you determine if someone is a rapist before he has committed a rape?"

val wrote:
4) Yes, that's what I said. He feels the urge of raping another woman (at this level he is not free) but he decides to repress that urge (here he is free).

How can you reconcile this "freedom" with your position that free will does not exist?

val wrote:
5) See 2).

Ditto.
0 Replies
 
twyvel
 
  1  
Reply Mon 4 Oct, 2004 12:26 pm
Terry wrote:

Quote:
That said, punishing criminal behavior would be ethical even in a completely deterministic universe since the fear of punishment is one of the factors that determines whether the criminal impulse is translated to action or successfully resisted. And if a crime is committed, the victims (or their duly appointed representatives) could argue that they have no choice but to act on their predestined urge for revenge.


There would be no ethics in a completely deterministic universe, since ethics would also be determined.
0 Replies
 
val
 
  1  
Reply Wed 6 Oct, 2004 06:13 am
Joe:
I don't believe in free will but I believe in the possibility of conditioned choices. There is no contradiction.
Free will implies absolute freedom of choice. This is what I cannot accept.
But I accept that in given circumstances, within given conditions, we have the option of choosing between alternatives. Although the choices themselves are related to a great number of references - physical, cultural, sociological, educational and many others - there is in the end a volitive factor. For instance, two people who feel the need of raping, with similar cultural and social background can decide differently: one repress the urge and does not commit rape, the other does. But none of them can choose, in the moment of the decision, not to feel the urge of raping.

About the question of the possibility of a rapist to be a rapist before he commits a rape, I think that is a very intersting problem.
In a juridical sense, it's impossible. A crime can only exist if there is an action or a negligence.
In a philosophical sense, I would use Aristotle's concepts of "potency" and "act". In this case, before commiting the rape he would be a potential rapist (that means, he has the conditions that are required for someone to desire to commit a rape). And, if he commits rape he is a rapist " in act".
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Wed 6 Oct, 2004 08:10 am
val wrote:
Joe:
I don't believe in free will but I believe in the possibility of conditioned choices. There is no contradiction.
Free will implies absolute freedom of choice. This is what I cannot accept.

It's easy not to accept free will when it is defined as "absolute free choice." But that's a strawman definition of "free will." No one, not even the most fervent believers in free will, would go so far as to believe that every choice is an unconditioned choice. When you reject that version of "free will," then, you reject a chimera, a nothing.

val wrote:
But I accept that in given circumstances, within given conditions, we have the option of choosing between alternatives. Although the choices themselves are related to a great number of references - physical, cultural, sociological, educational and many others - there is in the end a volitive factor. For instance, two people who feel the need of raping, with similar cultural and social background can decide differently: one repress the urge and does not commit rape, the other does. But none of them can choose, in the moment of the decision, not to feel the urge of raping.

That's a meaningless distinction. It's like saying that someone who is hungry cannot choose not to feel hunger. In effect, you say that one can choose an action but cannot choose the conditions under which one acts. I doubt anyone would disagree with you, but then that's because free will is all about actions, not conditions.

val wrote:
About the question of the possibility of a rapist to be a rapist before he commits a rape, I think that is a very intersting problem.

One that you still have not solved.

val wrote:
In a juridical sense, it's impossible. A crime can only exist if there is an action or a negligence.
In a philosophical sense, I would use Aristotle's concepts of "potency" and "act". In this case, before commiting the rape he would be a potential rapist (that means, he has the conditions that are required for someone to desire to commit a rape). And, if he commits rape he is a rapist " in act".

In other words, a rapist is someone who rapes. No great revelation there.
0 Replies
 
val
 
  1  
Reply Thu 7 Oct, 2004 03:01 am
Jo, sorry but you are wrong.
Most of great moral philosophers, put the question in those absolute terms. See Kant's "moral imperative": it supposes an abstract man and because of that, someone who can choose in total liberty. For instance, killing is wrong, because if all men did it the specie would be extinguished. So, killing is wrong. But, more important, killing is always wrong. And to Kant, men have absolute liberty to make a rational decision. This because he only thinks in terms of an intelectuall decision.
Socrates, Plato and even Sartre are not far from this conception of absolute liberty.

But anyone who deals with problems of criminal behaviour, knows that such a perspective is wrong. The formation of the personality, the volitive factors, are conditioned by multiple circunstances. If you were born and grew up in a violent environment, where violence and crime have almost the status of a value, it would be difficult for you tho choose against violence and crime.
The problem of free will is that the formation of the will is conditioned by so many factors, social, cultural, biological, etc. Any decision you make supposes a background of references. That's why two people who commit two similar crimes, are not similar criminals.
Instead of free will, I prefer to say that we have the possibility of conditioned choices.

As for the definition of rapist, yes, I would say that rapist is someone who commits rape. What would be your definition?
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Thu 7 Oct, 2004 08:24 am
val wrote:
Jo, sorry but you are wrong.
Most of great moral philosophers, put the question in those absolute terms. See Kant's "moral imperative": it supposes an abstract man and because of that, someone who can choose in total liberty. For instance, killing is wrong, because if all men did it the specie would be extinguished. So, killing is wrong. But, more important, killing is always wrong. And to Kant, men have absolute liberty to make a rational decision. This because he only thinks in terms of an intelectuall decision.

You're mixing apples (free will) and oranges (ethics) here. Kant certainly says that each individual is free to make moral choices, but then that has very little to do with the whole notion of free will. After all, ethics centers on what we should do, not what we can do. A person's freedom to make moral choices is fundamentally different from a person's freedom to make unconditioned choices. The former is a matter for ethics, the latter is a matter for free will.

val wrote:
Socrates, Plato and even Sartre are not far from this conception of absolute liberty.

In terms of ethics or in terms of free will?

val wrote:
But anyone who deals with problems of criminal behaviour, knows that such a perspective is wrong. The formation of the personality, the volitive factors, are conditioned by multiple circunstances. If you were born and grew up in a violent environment, where violence and crime have almost the status of a value, it would be difficult for you tho choose against violence and crime.

The difficulties that one encounters in making ethical decisions in no way vitiates the notion of free will. Just because it is harder to walk uphill than downhill doesn't mean that walking is impossible.

val wrote:
The problem of free will is that the formation of the will is conditioned by so many factors, social, cultural, biological, etc. Any decision you make supposes a background of references. That's why two people who commit two similar crimes, are not similar criminals.
Instead of free will, I prefer to say that we have the possibility of conditioned choices.

Which is another way of saying that we have free will.

val wrote:
As for the definition of rapist, yes, I would say that rapist is someone who commits rape. What would be your definition?

That would be my definition as well. I'm glad you finally see it my way.
0 Replies
 
Terry
 
  1  
Reply Sat 9 Oct, 2004 07:41 am
twyvel wrote:
There would be no ethics in a completely deterministic universe, since ethics would also be determined.

Ethics are ethics, whether or not they are predetermined. Any sentient species with the capacity for empathy could develop a sense of right and wrong which would lead to a system of ethics, and those ethics would be a significant factor in determining subsequent behavior.
0 Replies
 
Terry
 
  1  
Reply Sat 9 Oct, 2004 08:07 am
joefromchicago wrote:
How do you determine if someone is a rapist before he has committed a rape?

You could do so only in a deterministic universe, and only if you could prove that an individual had a compelling drive to rape, would inevitably have the opportunity to rape and would be unable to control his actions in that situation, and no one else would be able to prevent him from raping.
0 Replies
 
Terry
 
  1  
Reply Sat 9 Oct, 2004 08:09 am
val, I agree that absolute freedom of choice does not exist since many of our decisions are tainted by cultural conditioning, expectations of people whose approval we care about, biological urges, fear of punishment or promise of reward, etc.

But suppose I asked you to choose a number between 1 and 100. Are you free to choose any number, or is your choice of "63" inevitable?

If your choice is inevitable, you could still have the illusion of free will even though the clockwork nature of the universe necessarily led to you choosing 63, or an omniscient God knew from the beginning of time that you would choose 63 at this point.

val wrote:
For instance, killing is wrong, because if all men did it the specie would be extinguished. So, killing is wrong. But, more important, killing is always wrong.

You have not established that all men would kill if they had the freedom to do so, or that is wrong to extinguish the species. All you are saying is that killing is wrong because killing is wrong. What about killing in self-defense, for food, warfare, capital punishment, or to extinguish species such as smallpox viruses, malaria parasites, intestinal worms, or roaches?

val wrote:
The problem of free will is that the formation of the will is conditioned by so many factors, social, cultural, biological, etc.

The existence of conditions that influence some of the decisions we make does not preclude the freedom that a person has to make a contrary decision. You can consciously weigh all of the factors that incline you to make a certain choice, and choose to ignore any or all of them. You can choose to rebel against authority and take the consequences. Development of self-discipline enables to you to choose not to give in to biological urges. You can choose to put your own interests above those of everyone else, or to act for the good of others at great personal cost.

Our will is free as long as we have the ability to monitor and evaluate our own motives, and make conscious choices that consider influences without being compelled by them.
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rufio
 
  1  
Reply Sat 9 Oct, 2004 02:43 pm
If you want to say that free will is "tainted" by cultural conditioning, and desire, than what is free will? I always imagined that it was the freedom to do as you wanted to, thus desire (and cultural conditioning, since that plays a large role in what we want) is not a taint - that's what makes it free will. If you consider every bias, and everything that leans you toward a certain decision to "taint" free will, than the only thing that has free will is total chaos. It's perfectly possible to want things and not have your life be totally deremined as a result.
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JLNobody
 
  1  
Reply Sat 9 Oct, 2004 08:03 pm
Rufio, you say, regarding free will, that you " always imagined that it was the freedom to do as you wanted to". That's what most of us think, but consider Schopenhauer's dictum: You can do as you will, but you cannot will as you will.
I do not believe in either free will or determinism since both presume the existence of a metaphysically real individual self that is the agent of free acts and the object of causal forces. I won't go into that since I've done so repeatedly throughout many of these threads.
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Sun 10 Oct, 2004 06:49 am
Terry wrote:
joefromchicago wrote:
How do you determine if someone is a rapist before he has committed a rape?

You could do so only in a deterministic universe, and only if you could prove that an individual had a compelling drive to rape, would inevitably have the opportunity to rape and would be unable to control his actions in that situation, and no one else would be able to prevent him from raping.

In a completely deterministic universe, what does it mean to "be unable to control" one's actions or to "be able to prevent" someone from doing something?
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Terry
 
  1  
Reply Sun 10 Oct, 2004 09:49 am
Rufio, of course you can "want" things without compromising your freedom to choose, as long as your desires do not become the entire focus of you existence. But my point was that biological urges can indeed compel people to do things against their "will." Try not breathing, for instance. Obsessive compulsive disorders, aggression, the urge to molest children, and paranoia can cause people to do things that a person with free will would not, while fear or severe depression can make it impossible to act as you will yourself to.
0 Replies
 
Terry
 
  1  
Reply Sun 10 Oct, 2004 09:54 am
Joe, a deterministic universe does not preclude acting to prevent someone else from doing something. Yes, the outcome of your attempts is predetermined, but that does not excuse you from the ethical obligation to try since your intervention may also have been predetermined.

Likewise, some people will be able to control their urges and some won't, just as in a non-deterministic universe. They could still increase their level of self-control with practice, drugs, or psychological counseling. Of course whether they got such help would be predetermined, and it would not really be their fault if they were unable to control themselves. But punishment would still be necessary since the threat of retribution is a factor in determining what choice each person makes. In a deterministic universe it is still necessary to act as if we have free will, otherwise people would have no incentive to try to do good or refrain from doing evil.
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rufio
 
  1  
Reply Sun 10 Oct, 2004 01:30 pm
JL - even if you could "will as you will" could you "will as you will as you will"? I think it's pointless to go back recursively like this. When you accept Free Will as a truth, you elevate will to a superior status. It doesn't matter if the will is willed, because it's will. On the other hand, if you believe that free will constricts you, what do you then place your confidence in? When you take away will, what is left that makes us human?
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JLNobody
 
  1  
Reply Sun 10 Oct, 2004 03:46 pm
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that freedom of will was not an issue in antiquity (classical Greek times). It was understood then that will is an innate quality of man, something taken for granted--the basis for all actions. Freedom of will as a moral issue was not salient in the Old Testament. Eve and Adam disobeyed God because the serpent made them do it, just as Greek actors were manipulated by the Gods. But I think it was Agustine and Paul who turned the will into an organ of morality. Only with free will can we be held responsible for our moral transgressions. This is also the case with the Law. We can only be held responsible for our legal transgressions when we are considered "responsible" for our actions.
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JLNobody
 
  1  
Reply Sun 10 Oct, 2004 03:54 pm
But I do agree that, whatever the metaphysical reality of this matter, we must act AS IF we had freedom of will. Our society has come to rest on this principle, a principle of our own making in a social reality of our own design.
0 Replies
 
joefromchicago
 
  1  
Reply Mon 11 Oct, 2004 12:00 am
Terry wrote:
Joe, a deterministic universe does not preclude acting to prevent someone else from doing something. Yes, the outcome of your attempts is predetermined, but that does not excuse you from the ethical obligation to try since your intervention may also have been predetermined.

I cannot understand that at all. How can anyone act to "prevent" something if everything is predetermined? In a deterministic universe, one acts because one acts, not because one is attempting to do anything. I cannot act to prevent something if that something is bound to happen. Indeed, I cannot act to prevent anything because nothing is preventable. If it is meant to happen, it will happen, and nothing can prevent it. If it is not meant to happen, then it will not happen, and nothing can make it happen.

Terry wrote:
Likewise, some people will be able to control their urges and some won't, just as in a non-deterministic universe. They could still increase their level of self-control with practice, drugs, or psychological counseling.

What does it mean to "control one's urges" in a deterministic universe?

Terry wrote:
Of course whether they got such help would be predetermined, and it would not really be their fault if they were unable to control themselves. But punishment would still be necessary since the threat of retribution is a factor in determining what choice each person makes. In a deterministic universe it is still necessary to act as if we have free will, otherwise people would have no incentive to try to do good or refrain from doing evil.

What does it mean to have an "incentive to act" in a deterministic universe?

All of these notions of acting (e.g. controlling one's urges, preventing something from occurring, etc.) are based upon a belief in free will. Without that foundation, however, all of these statements are the purest nonsense. We cannot say that a person prevented something from happening if we do not believe that he had the ability to prevent something from happening. "Prevention" implies a counterfactual situation where the person could have failed to prevent, yet in a deterministic universe there are no counterfactual situations. Everything happens because that's the way things happen; there are no alternatives. At most we can say that a person who acted simply acted.
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