Sergeant Says Intelligence Directed Iraq Prison Abuse

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washingtonpost.com
Sergeant Says Intelligence Directed Abuse
By Josh White and Scott Higham, Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, May 20, 2004; Page A01

Military intelligence officers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq directed military police to take clothes from prisoners, leave detainees naked in their cells and make them wear women's underwear, part of a series of alleged abuses that were openly discussed at the facility, according to a military intelligence soldier who worked at the prison last fall.

Sgt. Samuel Provance said intelligence interrogators told military police to strip down prisoners and embarrass them as a way to help "break" them. The same interrogators and intelligence analysts would talk about the abuse with Provance and flippantly dismiss it because the Iraqis were considered "the enemy," he said.

The first military intelligence soldier to speak openly about alleged abuse at Abu Ghraib, Provance said in a telephone interview from Germany yesterday that the highest-ranking military intelligence officers at the prison were involved and that the Army appears to be trying to deflect attention away from military intelligence's role.

Since the abuse at Abu Ghraib became public, senior Pentagon officials have characterized the interrogation techniques as the willful actions of a small group of soldiers and a failure of leadership by their commander. Provance's comments challenge that, and attorneys for accused soldiers allege that the techniques were directed by military intelligence officials.

In an interview, Brig. Gen. Janis L. Karpinski, the commander of U.S. detention facilities in Iraq at the time of the alleged abuse, claimed that military intelligence imposed its authority so fully that she eventually had limited access to the interrogation facilities. And an attorney for one of the soldiers accused of abuse said yesterday that the Army has rejected his request for an independent inquiry, which could block potentially crucial information about involvement of military intelligence, the CIA and the FBI from being revealed.

Provance was part of that military intelligence operation but was not an interrogator. He said he administered a secret computer network at Abu Ghraib for about six months and did not witness abuse. But Provance said he had numerous discussions with members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade about their tactics in the prison. He also maintains he voiced his disapproval as early as last October.

"Military intelligence was in control," Provance said. "Setting the conditions for interrogations was strictly dictated by military intelligence. They weren't the ones carrying it out, but they were the ones telling the MPs to wake the detainees up every hour on the hour" or limiting their food.

The 205th Military Intelligence Brigade's top officers have declined to comment publicly, not answering repeated phone calls and e-mail messages. Provance, a member of the 302nd Military Intelligence Battalion's A Company, signed a nondisclosure agreement at his base in Germany on Friday. But he said he wanted to discuss Abu Ghraib because he believes that the intelligence community is covering up the abuses. He also spoke to ABC News on Sunday for a program that was to air last night.

Provance was interviewed by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay -- who is looking into the military intelligence community's role in the abuse -- and testified at an Article 32 hearing, the military equivalent of a pretrial hearing, for one of the MPs this month. But Provance said Fay was interested only in what military police had done, asking no questions about military intelligence.

Gary R. Myers, a civilian lawyer representing one of seven MPs charged in the alleged abuse, Staff Sgt. Ivan L. "Chip" Frederick II, said his client does not claim he was ordered to abuse detainees, just that military intelligence outlined what should be done and then left it up to the MPs.

"My guy is simply saying that these activities were encouraged" by military intelligence, Myers said yesterday. "The story is not necessarily that there was a direct order. Everybody is far too subtle and smart for that. . . . Realistically, there is a description of an activity, a suggestion that it may be helpful and encouragement that this is exactly what we needed."

Myers says he fears that officials are covering up the involvement of senior military officers, and that military officials have dissected the investigation into several separate inquiries run by people who have potential conflicts of interest. Earlier this month Myers asked Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, commander of the Army's III Corps in Iraq, to order a special "court of inquiry" to offer an outside, unbiased look at the scandal, as was done when a U.S. Navy submarine collided with a Japanese fishing boat near Hawaii in 2001.

In a short letter dated May 5, Metz declined. Provance said when he arrived at Abu Ghraib last September, the place was bordering on chaos. Soldiers did not wear their uniforms, instead just donning brown shirts. They were all on a first-name basis. People came and went.

Within days -- about the time Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller paid a visit to the facility and told Karpinski, the commanding officer, that he wanted to "Gitmo-ize" the place -- money began pouring in, and many more interrogators streamed to the site. More prisoners were also funneled to the facility. Provance said officials from "Gitmo" -- the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba -- arrived to increase the pressure on detainees and streamline interrogation efforts.

"The operation was snowballing," Provance said. "There were more and more interrogations. The chain of command was putting a lot of resources into the facility."

Even Karpinski, who commanded the facility as the head of the 800th MP Brigade, had to knock on a plywood door to gain access to the interrogation wing. She said that she had no idea what was going on there, and that the MPs who were handpicked to "enhance the interrogation effort" were essentially beyond her reach and unable to discuss their mission.

It was about that same time that Karpinski felt that high-ranking generals were trying to separate military intelligence away from Abu Ghraib and the military police operation, so it would be even more secluded and secret. Karpinski said in a recent interview that she visited three sites in and around Baghdad with military intelligence officials who were scouting a new compound.

"They continued to move me farther and farther away from it," Karpinski said. "They weren't extremely happy with Abu Ghraib. They wanted their own compound."

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Former Guantánamo chief clashed with army interrogators
Former Guantánamo chief clashed with army interrogators
General's sacking cleared way for Pentagon to rewrite rules
Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington
Wednesday May 19, 2004
The Guardian

The commander of Guantánamo Bay, sacked amid charges from the Pentagon that he was too soft on detainees, said he faced constant tension from military interrogators trying to extract information from inmates.

Brigadier General Rick Baccus was removed from his post in October 2002, apparently after frustrating military intelligence officers by granting detainees such privileges as distributing copies of the Koran and adjusting meal times for Ramadan. He also disciplined prison guards for screaming at inmates.

In one of the general's first interviews since his dismissal, he told the Guardian: "I was mislabelled as someone who coddled detainees. In fact, what we were doing was our mission professionally."

Gen Baccus's unceremonious departure offers a rare insight into how the Pentagon rewrote the rules of warfare to suit the Bush administration's view of a radically changed world following the terror attacks of September 11 2001.

It also suggests what can happen to military personnel slow to sign on to the Pentagon's changed view of the world. Eighteen months after being removed from Guantánamo, Gen Baccus, 51, and a commander of the Rhode Island National Guard, is still waiting for a new military assignment.

Meanwhile, the systems set in place at Guantánamo following his departure have come to govern detention facilities in Afghanistan as well as Iraq.

The connection between Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib grew clearer this month when Gen Baccus's successor at the camp, Major General Geoffrey Miller, was put in charge of the US military's prisons in Iraq. Gen Miller's recommendations for Abu Ghraib - merging the functions of prison guard and interrogator as he did at Guantánamo - were cited in the Pentagon's internal report on abuse at the now notorious prison.

Yesterday, new evidence emerged that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was systematic, part of a policy instituted at US military detention centres from Guantánamo and Afghanistan to Iraq, and not restricted to the seven low-ranking soldiers charged so far in connection with the scandal.

Colonel Thomas Pappas, who commanded the military intelligence brigade at the prison, said interrogators sometimes instructed the military police to strip detainees and shackle them before they were questioned, a report in the New York Times said.

Col Pappas said the practice was among the changes recommended by Gen Miller - and among those resisted by Gen Baccus.

"There is a dynamic tension that exists in that kind of situation," Gen Baccus said. "Often times, those kind of approaches led to questions as to why am I doing that. Am I trying to coddle the detainees? Am I trying to bend to their desires?" he said.

The Pentagon's frustration with Gen Baccus is well documented - although officially denied. Officially, he was unceremoniously relieved of his duties as part of a general re-organisation of the camp, which called for a commander of higher rank.

General Baccus insists that he did his job honourably. "In no way did I ever interfere in interrogations, but also at that time the interrogations never forced anyone to be treated inhumanely, certainly not when I was there."

Although the detainees at Guantánamo were not given the protections of the Geneva Convention, Gen Baccus says he took steps to ensure they were not subjected to abuse.

"We had instances of individuals that used verbal abuse, and any time that that was reported we took action immediately and removed the individual from contact with detainees." Gen Baccus said there were fewer than 10 instances of abuse during his seven months in command.

After his departure, the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, gave military intelligence control over all aspects of Guantánamo, including the MPs, and Gen Miller was appointed commander.

Under his watch, Guantánamo instituted a "72-point matrix for stress and duress", which the Washington Post said set out a guide for the levels of force that could be applied to detainees. These included hooding or keeping prisoners naked for more than 30 days, threatening by dogs, shackling detainees in positions designed to cause pain, and extreme temperatures.

Human rights organisations say the directive shows that practices exposed at Abu Ghraib took place on a far wider scale than the Pentagon is willing to admit. "The pattern of abuse and disregard for fundamental human rights has been set by the continuing indefinite detentions at Guantánamo bay, and at other undisclosed locations around the world," said Sarah Green, of Amnesty Internation. "Detainees are already denied their basic rights in these locations, and the context has been set for abuse at Abu Ghraib."

Former inmates at Guantánamo have levelled the same charge. Last week, two British men who were held at Guantánamo claimed their US guards had inflicted abuse similar to that perpetrated at Abu Ghraib. In an open letter to President George Bush, Britons Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal described a prison regime that included assaults, prolonged shackling in uncomfortable positions, strobe lights, loud music and being threatened with dogs.

Guantánamo formally came to Abu Ghraib last August, shortly before the abuse reportedly began, when the Pentagon dispatched Gen Miller to Iraq on a mission to improve the intelligence being extracted from prisoners held by the US military.

He recommended that prison guards become "actively engaged" in helping to gather intelligence from detainees at Abu Ghraib.

Major General Antonio Taguba's report on Abu Ghraib said Gen Miller's instructions to military police to "set the conditions" for interrogation "would appear to be in conflict" with army regulations.

In the wake of the prisoner abuse scandal, Gen Baccus is loth to criticise the entire corps of military police at Abu Ghraib. "They were in a war zone. They were under constant attack so I hesitate to make comments as to what or did not happen over there, but there were military police involved, and they were trained not to do the kind of things that we have seen," he said.

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Thanks, BBB. The night before last, I heard a blurb on the news about Sgt. Provance's revelations and that his was told to keep quiet by a general. I was waiting for more news, but there was none, not even on NPR. I didn't know what to think.

This scandal gets stinkier and stinkier despite the Bush administration's efforts to cover it up. I think the commission quickly ended before any embarassing witnesses like Sgt. Provance had a chance to appear.

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Interesting.

I also need a place to move a bit of discussion, too, I'll do it here, will also help to bump this thread up.

On a thread on the election's numbers, debate got sidetracked (my fault) to the Iraqi prisoner abuse, and

neil wrote:

In time of war it is important to extract information from prisoners if possible. If little information was forth coming, I can understand trying some innovative methods, not approved by the Geneva convention. We can rationalize that the terrorists and others trying to prevent democracy in Iraq are not restrained by the Geneva convention rules. Do you think we should sacrifice the lives of 1000 American soldiers to abide by the Geneva rules? I don't.
I'm not sure the USA should have invaded Iraq, but we did, and we should finnish the job as efficiently as possible, even if it involves bending some rules which have rarely been followed by anyone except as pretence. I'm not sure why the main stream media, Democrats and liberals are spinning this the way they are, but the firing squad would have been seriously considered for such traitors 65 years ago. Neil

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neil wrote:

If little information was forth coming, I can understand trying some innovative methods, not approved by the Geneva convention.

If we use "innovative methods" such as torturing people (suffocating them, drowning them), how can we claim that we are in Iraq to free the country from torture?

I am sure Saddam used the same logic: well, I have to torture these opponents and saboteurs, otherwise they just won't fess up. It's not just that we're supposed to be better than that, in general - it's that the very rationale for us being there is anchored in us being better than that.

neil wrote:

We can rationalize that the terrorists and others trying to prevent democracy in Iraq are not restrained by the Geneva convention rules.

Yes, if you accept a rationalisation that elevates the worst in any comparison to be the new standard.

Of course, if politicians had done that in the past, we wouldn't have any Geneva conventions. It would be a vicious cycle: as soon as one of the fighting parties stoops a level lower, the other would have the rationale to do so too.

Luckily, there is resistance - even in this administration, at the State Department - to accept such a rationalisation. As each party would up the ante, the end result would namely be Liberia-style "innovative methods". (No wonder that many conservatives are against a world court on war crimes.)

neil wrote:

Do you think we should sacrifice the lives of 1000 American soldiers to abide by the Geneva rules? I don't.

1) Do you think accepting torture as a standard means of treating local opponents is going to save people's lives in the long run? What do you think those people, their brothers and sons - hell their neighbours - will do once they get out? It's a build-a-next-generation-of-mortal-enemies DIY package.

2) Who are in these prisons? (Suspected?) "terrorists" - and (suspected?) "insurgents". What did they do? What did the guy on the leash do? Do you know? Was he planning a chemical attack on a thousand US troops - or did he take a potshot at one American GI? Who says that each of the "cases" treated in this way involved the imminent danger to a thousand American soldiers?

When do you start considering such "innovative methods" legitimate? Only for top terrorists, or for anyone who fires at you? You're firing at them, too - would you accept it as normal if they applied the same logic, and started torturing every soldier they captured the same way? Or is it only OK for "our side" to "save people's lives" by torturing a captive until he gives us the information we want?

neil wrote:

even if it involves bending some rules which have rarely been followed by anyone except as pretence.

What in heaven's name do you mean by "have rarely been followed by anyone except as pretence"? Al Qaeda may not follow the Geneva conventions, the Colombian paramilitaries or the Ugandan troops may not, but your allies do.

What is signalled in that memo, in this new NBC story, etc, is a suggested change in practice. That is - a suggestion to not keep to the rules we otherwise would keep to.

neil wrote:

I'm not sure the USA should have invaded Iraq, but we did, and we should finnish the job as efficiently as possible

I assumed "finishing the job"meant bringing freedom from torture and dictatorship to Iraq. As of now, there is no semblance of democracy in Iraq, and now we have started to torture those who oppose us.

neil wrote:

I'm not sure why the main stream media, Democrats and liberals are spinning this the way they are, but the firing squad would have been seriously considered for such traitors 65 years ago.

And 30 years ago, you tried to win a war by napalming and torturing your enemy into submission, only to find out that it caused their number to multiply. I guess people have learned something from that.

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What coverup? The only thing covered up in the flap is the abundance of information regarding the incidents, the investigations into them, and the corrective actions implemented. As usual, lots of folks depend on what others have editorialized or opined about something as opposed to taking the trouble to discern the facts of the matter. A good place to start, for those who care to take the effort, a longish read, including the references and annexes, is the link below, which leads to a transcript of the Taguba Report. Further critical research into the matter does nothing to butress allegations of coverup.

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

Salient, I believe, is the following specific of recommendation concerning the ranking pricipals in the debacle:

Quote:

(excerpt) ... RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.
Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer misconduct.
Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum.
Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.
Failing to properly ensure the results and recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinate commanders.
Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her command.
Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to properly ensure the results, recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes and shootings over a period of several months were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by BG Karpinski.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and to task organize to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew, understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct authority working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to Soldier and not filed.
Failing to take corrective action and implement recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.
Failing to take appropriate action and report an incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had "never" been admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at the holding facility.
Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements contradict this assertion.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands and feet in his presence.
11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file, termination of employment, and generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security clearance for the following acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Made a false statement to the investigation team regarding the locations of his interrogations, the activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of abuses.
Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by "setting conditions" which were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.
12. (U) That Mr. John Israel,Contract US Civilian Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file and have his security clearance reviewed by competent authority for the following acts or concerns which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness statements.
Did not have a security clearance.
13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their culpability. ...

Not only some real carreer damage there, but also criminal charges ... hardly a whitewash.

All of this and far more is open record. Naturally, as with any ongoing investigation or other legal proceeding, more details will emerge as time passes and further testimony and evidence develop and are submitted ... that's the way things are done. What remains, however, is that neither has there been any effort to cover anything up, nor has there been any effort to shield anyone from deserved consequences of proven malfeasance. It seems to me the "Rush to Judgement" folks once more are engaged in an effort to ignore reality and attempt to convict through allegation. Unfortunately for that crowd, in the real world of actual fact-and-evidence-driven legal proceeding and policy development that isn't the way things are done.

Yes, mistakes were made, oversight and training were lacking, inadequate resources were provided, and crimes were committed. The facts are coming out, the process of uncovering them is ongoing, and lessons will be developed and learned. Hindsight is always 20-20, and it is far easier to be reactive than proactive. Had the design, structure, and operational flaws of RMS Titanic been known, the ship never would have sailed. What was learned from the disaster has, on the other hand, been employed to great advantage. Had the US Government known in 1941 what had become clear a generation later, Pearl Harbor would not have happened. Had any of a plethora of later-known facts disclosing the causes of disasters, tragedies, outrages, crimes and atrocities been known beforehand, the ills would not have come to pass. Mistakes will be made, disasters, tragedies, outrages, crimes and atrocities will occur; that is the human condition. The works of humankind are imperfect. What is inexcusable is to fail to profit by the lessons delivered through examining the causes and consequences of those shortfalls.

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Sergeant Says Intelligence Directed Iraq Prison Abuse

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