Prickly, aren't we? Geez, the Australians seem to be far from the jolly, knife-wielding blokes that we've come to expect from popular media depictions.
Normally we are Joe but in case you didn't know this thread was started the day after ANZAC day. Aussies tend to get a little emotional around that time of year.
Gallipoli weren't no victory. Without casting any disrespect to the fine men that were there, we went overseas and Turkish people kicked our asses. Apparently Turks don't win that much and even they were shocked.
We still killed more Turks than they killed of us.
Yeah, I had no point.
I'm always emotional.....no sense of humour at all...
For what it's worth, the entire concept of knocking Turkey out of the war early by occupying the Sea of Marmara and shelling Constantinople was a good one. However, British and French naval commanders were conditioned by generations of peace to abhor any damage to their ships, and when they were heavily pounded on the first day attacking the Turkish forts, they withdrew. In fact, the Turks were nearly out of ammunition, and the government of Enver Bey was loading up the documents, and had a train ready to evacuate the city. German advisors there informed the government in Berlin that the Turks were on the point of collapse. Had the Allied naval forces renewed the attack the next day, the entire operation might have succeeded.
But they were horrified at risking their ships (despite their profession involving them in "going in harm's way"), and so they decided to land troops instead. This was done in about as amateur and ham-handed a manner as one could conceive, and many, many Turks and Australians lost their lives to no purpose. Kemal was the regimental commander of one of the regiments of the division defending the Gallipoli penninsula, and when his division commander ordered him to withdraw, he attacked instead, and convinced another regimental commander to join him. They suffered horrible casualties, but Kemal was given the division, and then command of the entire defense. It degenerated into trench warfare in place where simply digging trenches was a nightmare. Mustafa Kemal appears through the lens of history as the one competent responsible individual in the entire scenario.
Set, the fact that the Germans had one submarine at the landing site and damaged at least one battle cruiser may have contributed to the decision to withdraw the navy.
Acq, my source is Winston Churchill's World Crisis. Although he is an obviously interested witness (he planned the operation as First Lord of the Admiralty), his account is compelling in its condemnation of the operation. What i referred to was a decision not to renew the contest with the Turkish forts before the landings. In fact, the initial attack, when not promptly renewed, lead the Turks to beef up their defenses. The Germans were able to get a resupply of the ammunition for the Krupp guns they had sold the Turks, and an infantry division (of which Kemal's regiment formed a part) was rushed to the area. Had the Allied naval forces renewed their attacks the next day, or even the day after, Enver Bey may well have lost his nerve and abandoned Constantinople. Had the landings been made initially under the cover of naval guns as the opening move in the operation, it might have succeeded. As it was, by the time the Allies finally landed troops, the Turks were ready--as were the Germans--that sub only arrived after the initial, abortive attempt to run the forts in the Sea of Marmara.
