@joefromchicago,
Quote:but I wouldn't expect that you'd need to endorse key aspects of his epistemology
Well that's not exactly correct. Insofar that Berkeley can be said to have endorsed the necessity of the consideration of "an observer" in establishing ontological status, I agree with him.
The postmodernist perspective that you seem not to understand is that the Berkeley-Johnson clash cannot be
meaningfully revisited because such clashes (what Derrida called
aporia) are deemed to be inevitable. In short there are no assertions of "what
is the case" which are not predicated on "what
is not the case." ( Don't be tempted into a logical infinite regress about this statement as just another "assertion". Its import does not rest on formal logic, but on its
contextual juxtaposition to alternatives such as naive realism) . The jargon phrase for this is "the denial of the metaphysics of presence". It undermines our (lay)assumptions about the word "is" and suggests adoption of the pragmaticists' alternative of "what works" - and what works is always relative to a shifting historical backcloth of social significance for contemporary observers which we cannot recreate.