The greater danger Iraq or North Korea?

First, you assume that all Muslims support Iraq. Not true. Second, you seem to be asserting some linkage between taking out Saddam and the Israeli/Palestinian problem. How so?

tres, You're reading more into my posts than is necessary. Where in my posts have I said anything about "all Muslims support Iraq?" c.i.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't that what's called "ad hominem?" c.i.

I've already explained the linkage. Please go back and reread. c.i.

ci - I must assume that, or at least that you think most do, otherwise you would logically concede that some Muslims will be happy if we take Saddam out and others will not. You wrote as if the only measurable response would be negative, as if you knew what all (or most) Muslims think.

Here; I'll make it simple for you. Posted earlier. c.i.

All I'm trying to say is that "more" Muslims will join terrorist groups. How many is a queston I cannot answer. I only see logic in this argument, but also because many others believes in the same outcome - both Arabs and non-Arabs. c.i.

Here's a link that explains the connection between the Palestinians and Iraqis. http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=44&articleId=93 c.i.

c.i., you are very clear with what you say - ad hominem are simply ad hominem's.

I understand that North Korea fired a missile yesterday that fell into the Sea of Japan. That raises several questions.

What missile was it? The three most probable are: a Na-Dong, a Taepo-Dong-1, or a Taepo-Dong-2. If it was a TD-2, that would be the first test firing of the missile. The TD-1 was only tested once (1998), and flew beyond the Japanese Islands. If it was a Na-Dong, we can probably assume that Kim is sending a threatening message that he is capable of nuking one of our naval battlegroups in the Sea of Japan.

What does the telemetry tell us about the missile? Did the missile appear to have behaved as programed, or not? If it was a TD-1 or TD-2, this firing may give some indication as to reliability and accuracy of the type.

Very interested in hearing how the military observers on the site feel about this latest DPRK gambit.

Then is it your position that the US should never take any action if it is believed that some people will choose to respond with terrorism?

Not engaging N. Korea is like handing it a loaded weapon

By Rose Gottemoeller

WASHINGTON – Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Asia this week follows the latest round in North Korea's spiraling misbehavior - its threat to withdraw from the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War. Once again, the Bush administration is faced with North Korea upping the ante. First it trumpeted its uranium enrichment program, then withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then restarted its facility to produce weapons-grade plutonium. By June, the North Koreans might have enough additional plutonium to build four nuclear weapons beyond the two it is suspected of already having. In these games, the Bush administration has treated Kim Jong Il as some kind of preternatural dictator with a genius for blackmail. More and more, however, Mr. Kim looks to me like a child who is out of control. He's a little kid who has gotten a key to the gun closet and is brandishing a loaded gun at the window. From the sidewalk, family and neighbors argue what to do about it, but can't come to grips with the answer.

http://csmonitor.com/2003/0227/p09s01-coop.html

I suspect your analogy is quite apt. This little kid has never heard the word "no", and has yet to learn that actions have consequences.

tres...that just doesn't follow from what was said. You are going black and white again, and that is entirely unhelpful. The speaker's position, I'll assume, is that each situation is/will be unique. Obviously, this administration considers the situation of Iraq different from that of Korea with different 'solutions'.

Obviously, this administration considers the situation of Iraq different from that of Korea with different 'solutions'.

This administration is so befuddled it does not know what to do regarding Korea. IMO much of the problem stems from the flapping mouths of our Washington brain trust and their superb diplomatic moves.

au, If truth be told, how many reasons has this administration given for our need to go to war with Iraq? Let me count the ways.... c.i.

I hope that all of you who now cite the dangers of North Korea will remember them later this year when the DPRK is given the ultimatum to give up its nuclear weapons program, or face the consequences. When UN Security Council takes up the problem, will you still favor a hard stand against North Korea? How about when the U.S. Military center of gravity shifts from CENTCOM to PACCOM, and Kim's threats increase? If at the penultimate moment, Kim grudgingly agrees to negotiate will you believe him?

Kim still has some time to behave in a reasonable manner, but given his history I'd bet he will continue down the path to war.

I can't speak for anyone else, asherman, but i see the danger of North Korea, and can't understand what everyone is waiting for to do something.

Beth,

I think there are several reasons that North Korea is not being aggressively confronted just now. There are more reasons, and those below are not in priority order.

* The ROK government is brand new, and elected on the most anti-American platform seen in South Korea probably since the 1950's. The new ROK government reflects the disenchantment of younger Koreans who have no painful memories of when the North invaded the South. The Korean economic boom has made the young very confident, and Korean pride (which is towering) demands American recognition. The new ROK government can be expected to soften it's anti-American rhetoric as the reality of a nuclear armed and aggressive North becomes more "real" to them. I suspect that we will see the ROK government swing back toward support of American military presence over the next few months. The students will continue to demonstrate against America, but that's to be expected. It is worth waiting for awhile in hopes that our relationships with the ROK will return to what they've been for most of the last 50 years.

* Time works against Kim much more than it has against Saddam. The population of the DPRK is on the brink of famine. American food aid is diverted to the military and elites, while the civilian population is left to starve. The result over time will be an erosion of military capability, especially if food aid is further reduced. As soldiers leave service, they will become harder and harder to replace. The logistics required to support and maintain the military presence concentrated along the DMZ are a major burden on the government, and the burden will only increase over time.

* The U.S. military is currently concentrated in CENTCOM, and if we are going to actively engage the DPRK, it is wise to first shift our center of gravity to PACCOM. Though we have sufficient forces to defeat the North in theater, it is prudent to wait until we can assemble overwhelming land, sea and air forces before increasing the ante. This is one of the reasons that Iraq needs to be dealt with without delay.

* Kim Jong-Il's highest priority is self-preservation. He knows that in actual open warfare that he will be defeated in relatively short order. He doesn't really want a war, but he is very willing to threaten and walk a very fine line as a means of obtaining Western concessions. So long as the situation is held to the status quo, nothing much is lost, and Kim probably will not start a shooting war. We can not make any concessions, because that will only encourage further threats and behavior that would push us toward war. Kim may increase his provocations probing just how far he can go. By careful diplomacy, we probably can forestall the crisis from coming to a head for some months yet.

* The DPRK has only a limited nuclear arsenal and delivery platforms at this time. The Tae'po Dong 1 and 2 missile systems are small, and only minimally tested, but are probably capable of delivering a small warhead as far away as American or Australian soil. Further testing of those systems would be a matter of grave importance. North Korea has not tested it's nuclear warheads, but they probably will work though they would be very dirty and with a low yield. With only two, or three, bombs available the damage possible from a North Korean nuclear attack is limited. If there is evidence that the North Koreans are greatly increasing their arsenal, some action will have to be taken without much delay. So far, neither of these two conditions demanding immediate attention have occurred.

* It is possible, even probable, that the coming showdown in Iraq will tip the balance further against the DPRK, and reduce the probability that open hostilities will be necessary on the Korean Peninsula. Kim must be convinced that the U.S. is willing to actually use it's military to back up its demands. So long as Kim believes that we will back down and concede to his demands if the threat is big enough, the more likely he will pursue that course. Iraq will demonstrate to Kim, and others, that threats alone will not cause the Free World to knuckle under. Secondly, the demonstration of our military capability can be expected to "shock an awe" Pyong-Yang as much as it will Baghdad. That will give Kim pause before he pushes the Korean Peninsula into a confrontation that might result in his demise. It is also possible, though less likely, that the demand for North Korean missiles and munitions may decrease, thus reducing Kim's cash flow.

* By pushing off open confrontation, the probability that the DPRK will collapse without resort to war is increased. Elimination of Kim Jong-Il and his military threat is the goal, and if that can be accomplished without firing a shot no one will be happier than the Pentagon.

I assumed the intent of his statement was to imply that we should take some action or not take some action based on whether or not some people might be moved to join terrorist groups should we do so. Can you tell me how you interpret it differently?