What is the atheistic basis of absolute morality?

Yes, of course--it's subjective and cannot possibly be absolute, given that the subjective judgments included in moralistic systems can and do vary from one group to another.

...if one changes G for God for a looping closed system all of the sudden the question makes sense...is there a finite or infinite set of different functions by which a system can be organized ?...( I am not sure you understand the question...hell if you do you will answer in the face of those who do get it...)

Say G stands for all possible geometric arrangements of functions and say that such number is finite...

...better yet, is there a final looping function for all functions ?

Since what we usually equate with energy are bottom line functions, operating algorithms, one could equally ask if is there an infinite amount of energy instead of an infinite looping cycle of finite energy ?

...curiously I believe G stands for a finite looping cycle of algorithms...thus from there a necessary concept of Truth can be derived...

Instead of approaching the question of morals in terms of "absolutes" I prefer to approach them in terms of "generalities." Morals are generalities in that they are habits of conduct in regard to standards of right and wrong to which humans generally conform with a lot of exceptions and qualifiers.

From what I've read, there is no consensus for secular moral absolutism. The reason being is that context matters. Though the questions raised by the debate between Harris and Craig are important regarding objective moral values, their justifications for moral realism I think is wrong.

Craig thinks objective moral values require the existence of God. He seems to think objective moral values must be quote: "wholly independent of man". Obviously then, he thinks the obvious answer is God, if he exists, can ground them. Since we should think objective moral values exist, we should also accept the previous premise.

Craig then says that secular ethics as summed up by Harris has quote: a "value problem". We have problems explaining the grounding of the well being of animals, humans etc since the values which justify theories of well being should be "wholly independent of man".

Harris thinks we don't need to insert an Abrahamic God to justify objective moral values. Instead, if we redefine "goodness" as meaning the same thing as the "evolutionary adaptation of conscious animals", we can explain the "ought" or value implied in moral thinking as being the same thing as an "is".

While I definitely disagree with Craig and am sympathetic to Harris, both are mistaken in my mind. We don't need God, and we don't need just science to explain objective moral values. Pain, for example, is a good candidate as having objective moral value. We know what pain is, meaning we can experience it, we understand what it feels like in others (thus it is a part of the world), and that it matters, that is, it is bad for me, bad for us. I think because pain explains our moral reasoning gives us good reason to accept that pain isn't merely a preference or psychological disposition. The fact that it matters in the sense that it has value no matter who experiences means it constitutes a reason, in and of itself. This certainly isn't a proof, but rather a good reason combined with evidence for it.

Returning to absolutism, pain has intrinsic moral value, but we don't think it is always wrong to cause pain. Sometimes causing pain is necessary in order to achieve other ends. It depends on context. So that is why I reject the absolutist position.

...I would agree with your reasoning except there is the problem of free will in the way...the problem of hard determinism, finity and infinity...the problem of God is the problem of truth...I mean is there a necessary arrangement on the order of things? If so, moral is just a necessary operating system to maximize efficiency and productivity...in fact Truth places Moral out of God as meaningful....

But F.A., even if Hard Determinism is true, does it necessarily follow that we have no moral agency at all? It could be true that all events follow causally from prior events, but it seems reasonable to accept (as many Hard Determinists do) that to choose or deliberate simply means such "choices" follow natural laws, just like any other physical phenomena. That is, there is a causal mechanism at work, which explains the "choice". Does this take intentionality entirely out of the conversation? No, but free will advocates seem to think so, thus the erroneous claim that ethics requires free will.

Hard Determinism would only be a problem if we were "forced" in a narrow sense so to speak to act in certain ways. Our actions may be causal, but the range of actions available to us seems hardly forced in the narrow sense.

The thing is I don´t believe in middle ground here...either there is full mechanical causality or there is none and mickey mousse might just be minutes away of turning as an emergent phenomena...I cannot conceive of such thing...I dread it !
Some Multiverse hypothesis models allow a hard deterministic explanation of all possible Universes even explaining the wave function collapse...there is n´t enough knowledge to put away a deterministic explanation just yet...and as I said when I think upon the implications freedom as it truly is appears to me as pure chaos, magic !

sentience