Daniel Dennett and Gretchen Weirob

First, you need to provide sources so that those in here not familiar with the scenarios can contribute any kind of judgement. Here are a couple of links: Gretchen Weirob ... Where Am I?

Gretchen's conclusion after bothering to explore that soul nonsense is that personal identity is the identity of the body (it's probably irrelevent to your question as to whether she's correct or not). Yorick is still a surviving organ of Dennett's original body. But Hubert is only an electronic simulation of Dennett's brain (Yorick), sharing remote control of Fortinbras, the new biological body. Thus, Gretchen chooses Yorick as an actual continuation of the original Dennett, if she is going to choose either of them at all.

Yorick (Dennett's original brain) and Hubert (the computer version of the former) are obviously not going to be thinking or doing the same things with the Fortinbras body once Hubert is activated. Is that the kind of out-of-sync you refer to? This also seems irrelvant to the situation, because since Hubert is only a functional computer copy of Dennett's brain rather than the original biochemical-gunk brain, Gretchen will not accept him as naturally belonging to a new biological body. But if you can provide evidence that she believes in multiple-realizability or variable instantiation, it perhaps tosses her final judgement up in the air more. I could have missed something in the story account in regard to her beliefs there.

My apologies for not including any references. Here is another source that may be helpful in analyzing Gretchen's perspective: http://www.unc.edu/~theis/phil20/thirdnight.html

This link explains Gretchen's stance on personal identity with regards to a situation similar to that of Dennett's situation.

Towards the end of Dennett's Where am I?, he reveals to the reader that Hubert and Yorick go out of sync. Here is a link with the revelation. http://www.newbanner.com/SecHumSCM/WhereAmI.html

It is according to that going out of sunc, that I have to analyze Dennett's dilemma through Gretchen's eyes.

Well, once again we have Gretchen's very definite opinion: Personal identity is body identity. "So, no matter how many duplicate brains Dr. Matthews creates, the only person who will be identical with the original patient is the one who has the patient’s original body. [...] Gretchen asks, why should she care any more about her brain’s survival than her body’s?"

If the "unfamiliarity" is any indication, the excerpt at the bottom from Who Am I? suggests that the new Fortinbras body is not a clone of Dennett's original body Hamlet, the latter now long since deteriorated (he even considers it wise not to pry about its "history", which suggests all the more it is somebody else's former body). Even if it was a clone, the bit of new information supplied above was that Gretchen is fixated on the belief that the original body has to be involved.

The original body isn't the one that Yorick and Hubert are sharing in turns, so it's likely that she would not accept the situation as being the original Dennett, regardless of whether the original brain or the computer version was controlling it. That is, if the tale could be submitted to Gretchen, this confusion over which one is controlling Fortinbras during a given period would seem to be irrelevant to her (she sounds very obstinate). Your project is odd from the standpoint that it's slightly more about literature (exploring a fictional character's motives or "What would Gretchen do?") than the philosophical issue of identity.

"He [...] assured me that steps were being taken to re-embody me. [...] when I awoke, it was to find myself fully restored to my senses. When I looked into the mirror, though, I was a bit startled to see an unfamiliar face. Bearded and a bit heavier, bearing no doubt a family resemblance to my former face, and with the same look of spritely intelligence and resolute character, but definitely a new face. Further self-explorations of an intimate nature left me no doubt that this was a new body, and the project director confirmed my conclusions. He did not volunteer any information on the past history of my new body and I decided (wisely, I think in retrospect) not to pry."

Thanks alot! I guess the question is meant for us to analyze Daniel's situation from the standpoint of someone who belives in same person-same body.