Rethinking the Principle of Identity

I think guigus is equating "imaginary" and "false".

A unicorn is not a false creature. It is an imaginary creature. It seems he has a very materialistic approach to most things.

No, you´re right, there´s nothing useful from what you said that can be possibly commented at all...

What are you referring to precisely? Without specifying what you refer to, it is your comment that is useless...

A unicorn is false as an actually existent animal, not as an image. As an image, a unicorn is true, as you already noticed. So I am not equating "imaginary" and "false" -- on the contrary, I am distinguishing them: from the beginning, I stress the dual nature of any falsehood, which is true as the circumstance of the falsity of something (the unicorn as an image) and false as that something (the unicorn itself). Neither is my approach materialistic, since I do not reduce a unicorn to a material nonexistent -- instead, I stress its dual nature as a truth -- a true falsehood -- and a falsehood. Materialists are forced either to deny a unicorn completely or to affirm it as an image, by which they have no longer a means of distinguishing false images from true ones.

Well, the only people I have ever heard refer to a unicorn as an "actually existent animal" are those who want to say it doesn't exist.
Most people understand what a unicorn is and what it isn't. "Actually existent animal" isn't a part of the definition of unicorn, is it?
You are just pretending that it is so you will have something to rant about.

Most people understand that a unicorn is an actually nonexistent animal -- although this is not the definition of a unicorn, which is a horse with a single horn in the middle of its forehead -- how could I "pretend" that? The only alternative is to say that a unicorn actually exists, which I don't think is what you are holding, is it?

By your way of thinking, imagination doesn't exist. I can't agree with that.

Can you please tell me how did you arrive at such an absurdity?

You said:


If it is nonexistent because it only exists in imagination, then it follows from that argument that anything that only exists in imagination is nonexistent, which is practically the same as saying imagination doesn't exist.

I do not believe you think that. But the words you chose to make your distinctions allow for that misconception to be made. Not only do they allow for it, they make it a logical consequence of the argument you need to construct to communicate what a unicorn is.

That's only because you are confusing imagination with its object: just like an image of a chair is not a chair, the image of a unicorn is not a unicorn, so the nonexistence of a unicorn does not necessarily result in the nonexistence of its image.



The only misconception here is confusing an image with its object, for which you must certainly not blame me, my argument, or my words.

An image is an image; it doesn't matter what it is an image of, it is an entirely different thing. You are just trying to confuse things further.



But that is what it means that a unicorn is an imaginary creature. There is no actual object corresponding to the image. The concept of unicorn makes no claim to being an actual animal. I do not know where you got that notion.

I could not "confuse things further," not even if I tried, which I am not doing: an image is an image of something, by which it must be different from that something. What you are doing is to transform an image into an object among objects, by which it simply ceases to be an image. And the bad news for you is that this is called materialism, which is precisely what you were accusing me of a few posts ago.



You keep confusing an image with its object. The only way for you to see your confusion is going all the way down the path you already took: as you said, a unicorn is an imaginary creature. So, since it does not exist, and since it is nothing but an image, than that image does not exist either (assuming it is the same as its object, which it is not). The only way to escape such an absurd conclusion is by admitting that a unicorn is also different from its image -- just like any other imagined object -- despite not actually existing. In other words, even a nonexistent object must be different from its image.

You could also take the opposite path: a unicorn combines a horse and a single horn in a particular way. The horse and the horn are actually existent, only their combination as a unicorn is not. So the object that is different from the image of a unicorn is that combination as much as its combined elements are actually existent, which is what allows a nonexistent unicorn to be an imagined object to begin with -- or, in your words, what makes a unicorn "claim" to be actually existent.

Original post rewritten:

The principle of identity as originally formulated by Aristotle states that everything exists in its own way, which is its identity. However, if we take the word "existence" to mean precisely the way by which anything exists, which is the same as its "being," then we have that anything must be the same as the way of its being, hence that anything must be identical to itself. Meaning, say, a falsehood must be identical to itself. But what is the necessary identity between a falsehood and itself? What means the statement "a falsehood must be precisely that falsehood"? First of all, we have an ambiguity here, since a falsehood can be taken as meaning:

1. Something false.

2. The circumstance of something being false.

If a falsehood is taken as meaning something false, then that something becomes the same as its own falsity, so:

1. If we take that falsehood -- hence both what is false and its own falsity -- as a being, then being false is anything, so everything is false, by which either there is no truth or truths are the same as falsehoods.

2. If we take that falsehood -- hence both what is false and its own falsity -- as a nonbeing, then being false is nothing, so nothing is false, by which either there is no falsehood or falsehoods are the same as truths.

To escape such unsolvable contradictions, we must rather choose the meaning according to which a falsehood is the circumstance of something being false, hence its falsification.[1] A circumstance that must itself be true since, if it were false, then it would be the circumstance of whatever is false being true rather than false: the circumstance of something being false is true as the falsity of that something, despite being its falsification -- it is itself a truth rather than a falsehood. Hence, the only way for us to maintain the principle of identity regarding falsehoods -- without running into unsolvable contradictions -- is by taking any falsehood as meaning rather a truth -- the true falsity of the truth it falsifies -- by which that principle becomes "every truth must be identical to itself." However, to be faithful to the original meaning of such an identity, which is that anything exists in its own way, we should rather say that "every truth must be true," since the way of a truth to exist is to be true.

[1] Which combines the two previous options in a third one, by identifying what is false and its own falsity to each other as respectively a nonbeing and a being.

I have a better answer to your objection above: although we may render such an identity meaningless by taking falsehoods as nonexistent, we still cannot say "there is no falsehood" without making all that is false be rather true -- if what is false is to be false, then falsehoods must be something.

(Please note that we are still allowed to consider falsehoods as nothing, so there is no guarantee that being something is not also being nothing. However, if we are willing to still be able to consider, say, "2 + 2 = 5" as false, then we must concede falsehoods some kind of existence, whatever it is -- otherwise, we will be utterly unable to distinguish between falsehoods and truths.)

By addressing the objection that the nothingness of a falsehood would prevent its identification to itself, and by further developing the contradiction between a falsehood being both a being and nothing, we get:

The principle of identity as originally formulated by Aristotle states that everything exists in its own way, which is its identity. However, if we take the word "existence" to mean precisely the way by which anything exists, which is its ultimate, concrete "being," then we have that anything must be the same as (the way of) its being, hence that anything must be identical to itself. Meaning, say, a falsehood must be identical to itself: although we may render such an identity meaningless by taking falsehoods as nonexistent, we still cannot say "there is no falsehood" without making all that is false be rather true -- if what is false is to be false, then falsehoods must be something. But what is the necessary identity between a falsehood and itself? What means the statement "a falsehood must be precisely that falsehood"? First of all, we have an ambiguity here, since a falsehood can be taken as meaning:

1. Something false.

2. The falsity of something.

If a falsehood is taken as meaning something false, then that something becomes the same as its own falsity, so:

1. If we take that falsehood as a being -- hence both what is false and its falsity as having that same being -- then being false is just a being, so everything is false, by which either there is no truth or truths are the same as falsehoods.

2. If we take that falsehood as a nonbeing -- hence both what is false and its falsity as having that same nonbeing -- then being false is just a nonbeing, so nothing is false, by which either there is no falsehood or falsehoods are the same as truths.

To escape such unsolvable contradictions, we must rather choose the meaning according to which a falsehood is the falsity of something, despite being that something as false. Which combines the two previous options in a third one, by identifying what is false and its own falsity to each other as respectively a nonbeing and a being:

1. If what is false were different from its own falsity, then it would be possibly true -- or possibly false -- rather than actually false -- or impossibly true.

2. If what is false were a being, then it would be a true being, rather than a false one.

3. If the falsity of something were nothing, then that something would be true rather than false.

Thus, the being of a falsehood is the falsity of something, by which alone it is the nothingness of that something rather than absolute nothingness -- which is the falsity of nothing. A falsehood is a being that, as any other being, must itself be true since, if it were false, then it would be the circumstance of whatever is false being true rather than false: the falsity of something must be true as the circumstance of that something being false to be false as whatever that circumstance falsifies -- it is itself a truth by being a true falsehood, or it is no longer the falsity of something. Hence, the only way for us to maintain the principle of identity regarding falsehoods -- without running into unsolvable contradictions -- is by taking any falsehood as meaning its own truth -- the true falsity of something -- so self-identity regards only truths -- of either true falsehoods or simple truths -- to become "every truth must be identical to itself." However, being faithful to the original meaning of such an identity, which is that anything exists in its own way, we must rather say that "every truth must be true," since the proper way of a truth to exist -- by which alone it is identical to itself -- is to be true.