Guys, you should really stop arguing with guigus as he lacks rationallity and out of compulsive behaviour are fixated on his views, no arguments in all the world can sway him.
It's like talking to a pre-programmed robot which can't divert from it's programming.
I pass.
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joefromchicago
1
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Sun 5 Sep, 2010 11:29 am
@guigus,
guigus wrote:
Anyway, the opportunity remains there, you just have to re-read my post without thinking it is about you.
Fair enough. I just wanted to make it clear that I never made those idiotic statements.
guigus wrote:
By saying that a falsehood must be false (that its falsity must be false) you are denying that it can be a falsehood.
Here we see a good reason why "falsehood" and "false" are not interchangeable. Instead of stating "falsehoods are falsehoods," you instead say "falsehoods are false," thus confusing the tautological "A is A" with the simple statement "As are Bs." "Falsehoods are falsehoods" is a true statement, whereas "falsehoods are false" may be either true or false.
But then that's not such a big problem, since a false statement genuinely states a falsehood. "I rode a unicorn today" is a false statement, and there's nothing about the statement that is inherently contradictory or that asserts a truth while simultaneously asserting a falsity. In other words, saying that the statement "I rode a unicorn today" is false does not "deny that it can be a falsity." On the contrary, it affirms that it's a falsity.
Your problem is that you're confusing your statement "falsehoods are false" (i.e. "false statements have the attribute of falsity") with the statement "it is false that this statement is false." The latter is a version of the Liar's Paradox. The former is merely a statement in the form of "A is B." There's nothing inherently paradoxical or contradictory about that.
Anyway, the opportunity remains there, you just have to re-read my post without thinking it is about you.
Fair enough. I just wanted to make it clear that I never made those idiotic statements.
How kind of yours.
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
By saying that a falsehood must be false (that its falsity must be false) you are denying that it can be a falsehood.
Here we see a good reason why "falsehood" and "false" are not interchangeable. Instead of stating "falsehoods are falsehoods," you instead say "falsehoods are false," thus confusing the tautological "A is A" with the simple statement "As are Bs." "Falsehoods are falsehoods" is a true statement, whereas "falsehoods are false" may be either true or false.
Sorry, but "falsehoods are falsehoods" has exactly the same problem as "falsehoods are false," as being a falsehood and being false are exactly the same thing. So "falsehoods are falsehoods" can mean falsehoods are not actually false just as well as "falsehoods are false." However, since you reduce truth (the truth of something) to its object (that something), you must do the same with falsehoods, by which "falsehoods are falsehoods" to you becomes "whatever is false is whatever is false," in which the circumstance of something being either true or false becomes irrelevant, just as in the old "A is A."
joefromchicago wrote:
But then that's not such a big problem, since a false statement genuinely states a falsehood.
Provided it is a true falsehood, right?
joefromchicago wrote:
"I rode a unicorn today" is a false statement, and there's nothing about the statement that is inherently contradictory or that asserts a truth while simultaneously asserting a falsity. In other words, saying that the statement "I rode a unicorn today" is false does not "deny that it can be a falsity." On the contrary, it affirms that it's a falsity.
No falsehood becomes the truth it falsifies by means of the assertion that it is false: you are confusing the argument for Variability with the argument for the corrected version of "A is A." This last argument rests in a falsehood being true as a falsehood, which is precisely what you have just asserted.
joefromchicago wrote:
Your problem is that you're confusing your statement "falsehoods are false" (i.e. "false statements have the attribute of falsity") with the statement "it is false that this statement is false." The latter is a version of the Liar's Paradox. The former is merely a statement in the form of "A is B." There's nothing inherently paradoxical or contradictory about that.
Sorry, but "it is false that this statement is false" is not a version of the liar paradox: it is rather equivalent to "this statement is true." And the statement "false statements have the attribute of falsity" also means that false statements are not actually false, since the attribute of falsity can perfectly apply to their falsehood.
The statement "every truth must be true" has two interpretations:
1) "Anything true must be true," which is wrong, since it reduces the truth of something to that something.
2) "The truth of anything true must be true," which is right, since it preserves truth as the truth of something, rather than reducing it to that something.
And since true falsehoods are also truths, the same applies to them: the falsity of something can be reduced to that something, by which the statement "every true falsehood must be true as a falsehood" becomes "anything false must be false," which erroneously turns the necessary truth of a falsehood into its necessity, that is, into the necessary falsity of whatever is false -- destroying the necessary truth of its falsity.
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joefromchicago
1
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Tue 7 Sep, 2010 08:37 am
@guigus,
I find myself getting a strange sense of deja vu in this interaction with guigus. Nevertheless, despite my better judgment, I'll proceed...
guigus wrote:
Sorry, but "falsehoods are falsehoods" has exactly the same problem as "falsehoods are false," as being a falsehood and being false are exactly the same thing.
"Falsehoods are falsehoods" doesn't have any problem at all. It's a tautology. It's supposed to say the same thing.
But I've grown weary of this. You want "false" and "falsehood" to mean the same thing. They don't, but I can't justify expending any more effort in trying to educate you. So, for the sake of moving forward, I'll simply concede your point.
guigus wrote:
So "falsehoods are falsehoods" can mean falsehoods are not actually false just as well as "falsehoods are false." However, since you reduce truth (the truth of something) to its object (that something), you must do the same with falsehoods, by which "falsehoods are falsehoods" to you becomes "whatever is false is whatever is false," in which the circumstance of something being either true or false becomes irrelevant, just as in the old "A is A."
I'd respond, but first I'd need to know what the hell you're talking about. I don't "reduce truth to its object" (whatever that means). Indeed, I've never offered any opinion on what constitutes "truth." On the other hand, I agree that, in order to test the truth of a statement in the form of "A is A," it is not necessary to determine if "A" is, in fact, true. "Unicorns are unicorns" is a true statement, even though there are no such things as unicorns. Thus, "falsehoods are falsehoods" is indubitably true, and the "circumstances of something being either true or false" are indeed irrelevant.
guigus wrote:
joefromchicago wrote:
But then that's not such a big problem, since a false statement genuinely states a falsehood.
Provided it is a true falsehood, right?
Perhaps. What do you mean by "true falsehood?"
guigus wrote:
No falsehood becomes the truth it falsifies by means of the assertion that it is false: you are confusing the argument for Variability with the argument for the corrected version of "A is A." This last argument rests in a falsehood being true as a falsehood, which is precisely what you have just asserted.
I'll withhold my response until you explain what you mean by "true falsehood."
guigus wrote:
And the statement "false statements have the attribute of falsity" also means that false statements are not actually false, since the attribute of falsity can perfectly apply to their falsehood.
The solution is to say that every true falsehood must be a truth, by which any falsehood, if true, is also a truth. But its truth must be different from that of a truth, since it is a falsehood. And what could such a difference be?
the word is being used in different meanings
"true" falsehood is being used as "real"
"truth" is being used as well, what is true, fact.
a real falsehood is not truth.
if you state a factual falsehood stating, i.e. 1+1 is 4, that is a real falsehood, the statement of "1+1 = 4 is false" is a true statement.
I find myself getting a strange sense of deja vu in this interaction with guigus. Nevertheless, despite my better judgment, I'll proceed...
To me that is not just a strange sense of deja vu: it is plain and simple repetition.
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
Sorry, but "falsehoods are falsehoods" has exactly the same problem as "falsehoods are false," as being a falsehood and being false are exactly the same thing.
"Falsehoods are falsehoods" doesn't have any problem at all. It's a tautology. It's supposed to say the same thing.
But I've grown weary of this. You want "false" and "falsehood" to mean the same thing. They don't, but I can't justify expending any more effort in trying to educate you. So, for the sake of moving forward, I'll simply concede your point.
Never do that. Just moving forward without knowing what you are doing is a receipt for disaster. Before going forward, you must understand that "falsehoods are falsehoods" does not necessarily mean the tautology you refer to: it also means that falsehoods are not true as falsehoods, hence being rather the truth they falsify. In fact, this last interpretation is the correct one, since it takes the first "falsehoods" as meaning the circumstance of the falsity of something, rather than as that something (repetition). This should not be that difficult.
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
So "falsehoods are falsehoods" can mean falsehoods are not actually false just as well as "falsehoods are false." However, since you reduce truth (the truth of something) to its object (that something), you must do the same with falsehoods, by which "falsehoods are falsehoods" to you becomes "whatever is false is whatever is false," in which the circumstance of something being either true or false becomes irrelevant, just as in the old "A is A."
I'd respond, but first I'd need to know what the hell you're talking about. I don't "reduce truth to its object" (whatever that means). Indeed, I've never offered any opinion on what constitutes "truth." On the other hand, I agree that, in order to test the truth of a statement in the form of "A is A," it is not necessary to determine if "A" is, in fact, true. "Unicorns are unicorns" is a true statement, even though there are no such things as unicorns. Thus, "falsehoods are falsehoods" is indubitably true, and the "circumstances of something being either true or false" are indeed irrelevant.
Fine, we have a genuine agreement. Now let me explain what the hell is to "reduce truth to its object." It is just what happens in your interpretation of "falsehoods are falsehoods." This is as important as it is subtle, so please read it with care: when you take "falsehoods are falsehoods" to mean just "A is A," the first "falsehoods" does not mean the circumstance of something being false (its falsity), which would make the second "falsehoods" mean the falsity of that circumstance, so the "falsehoods" you are talking about would be rather the truth they falsify. To mean an irrelevantly false "A" the first "falsehoods" must mean whatever is false (the object to which falsity applies) rather than the circumstance of its being false (its falsity). That is, you must reduce the first "falsehoods" to the object to which falsity applies in order to get a irrelevantly false "A": if you take the first "falsehoods" to mean falsity itself (the circumstance of something being false), then the second "falsehoods" will apply to that falsity, making it rather the truth it falsifies.
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
joefromchicago wrote:
But then that's not such a big problem, since a false statement genuinely states a falsehood.
Provided it is a true falsehood, right?
Perhaps. What do you mean by "true falsehood?"
For example, "it is raining" can be false, right? But is it a true falsehood? That is, is it indeed not raining?
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
No falsehood becomes the truth it falsifies by means of the assertion that it is false: you are confusing the argument for Variability with the argument for the corrected version of "A is A." This last argument rests in a falsehood being true as a falsehood, which is precisely what you have just asserted.
I'll withhold my response until you explain what you mean by "true falsehood."
So let me reinforce: a true falsehood is a falsehood grounded in the falsity of whatever it asserts. For example, "it is raining" when it is not raining. In other words: a true falsehood is just a falsehood, like a true truth is just a truth.
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
And the statement "false statements have the attribute of falsity" also means that false statements are not actually false, since the attribute of falsity can perfectly apply to their falsehood.
Hunh?
This is the same thing I said before: the falsity of a false statement can apply to the circumstance of its being false, in which case it becomes the truth it falsifies.
The solution is to say that every true falsehood must be a truth, by which any falsehood, if true, is also a truth. But its truth must be different from that of a truth, since it is a falsehood. And what could such a difference be?
the word is being used in different meanings
"true" falsehood is being used as "real"
"truth" is being used as well, what is true, fact.
You are confusing the meaning with its implication: a true falsehood is just a falsehood, even though, since it is true as a falsehood, it must correspond to a nonexistent in reality.
55hikky wrote:
a real falsehood is not truth.
As the truth of its falsity yes, it is a truth: every statement implicitly asserts its own truth, including the statement of the falsity of something, so that falsity must be the truth of itself -- just notice that "it is false that it is raining" has exactly the same meaning as "it is true that it is false that it is raining."
55hikky wrote:
if you state a factual falsehood stating, i.e. 1+1 is 4, that is a real falsehood, the statement of "1+1 = 4 is false" is a true statement.
And the falsity of "1+1=4" is true as a falsehood: nothing is a "real" falsehood without being also a true one.
55hikky wrote:
toodles
toodles too (or two?)
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joefromchicago
1
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Wed 8 Sep, 2010 06:04 am
@guigus,
guigus wrote:
Before going forward, you must understand that "falsehoods are falsehoods" does not necessarily mean the tautology you refer to: it also means that falsehoods are not true as falsehoods, hence being rather the truth they falsify.
No, "falsehoods are falsehoods" means exactly what it says. I see no reason whatsoever to interpret one of those "falsehoods" any differently from the other. Any other interpretation is simply Humpty-Dumptyism.
guigus wrote:
Fine, we have a genuine agreement. Now let me explain what the hell is to "reduce truth to its object." It is just what happens in your interpretation of "falsehoods are falsehoods." This is as important as it is subtle, so please read it with care: when you take "falsehoods are falsehoods" to mean just "A is A," the first "falsehoods" does not mean the circumstance of something being false (its falsity), which would make the second "falsehoods" mean the falsity of that circumstance, so the "falsehoods" you are talking about would be rather the truth they falsify. To mean an irrelevantly false "A" the first "falsehoods" must mean whatever is false (the object to which falsity applies) rather than the circumstance of its being false (its falsity). That is, you must reduce the first "falsehoods" to the object to which falsity applies in order to get a irrelevantly false "A": if you take the first "falsehoods" to mean falsity itself (the circumstance of something being false), then the second "falsehoods" will apply to that falsity, making it rather the truth it falsifies.
Making something "the truth it falsifies" isn't a profound insight, it's just incomprehensible gobbledigook. You're saying nothing.
guigus wrote:
For example, "it is raining" can be false, right? But is it a true falsehood? That is, is it indeed not raining?
If all falsehoods are "true falsehoods," then there's no reason to add "true." Using Ockham's Razor, you should eliminate it.
guigus wrote:
This is the same thing I said before: the falsity of a false statement can apply to the circumstance of its being false, in which case it becomes the truth it falsifies.
Before going forward, you must understand that "falsehoods are falsehoods" does not necessarily mean the tautology you refer to: it also means that falsehoods are not true as falsehoods, hence being rather the truth they falsify.
No, "falsehoods are falsehoods" means exactly what it says. I see no reason whatsoever to interpret one of those "falsehoods" any differently from the other. Any other interpretation is simply Humpty-Dumptyism.
Are you serious you didn't understand that "falsehoods are falsehoods" can read as "falsehoods are not true as falsehoods"? Humpty-Dumptyisms appart, it is pretty obvious that the first "falsehoods" can refer to the circumstance of something being false, in which case the second one would make that circumstance false, hence those falsehoods become the truths they falsify, don't you agree?
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
Fine, we have a genuine agreement. Now let me explain what the hell is to "reduce truth to its object." It is just what happens in your interpretation of "falsehoods are falsehoods." This is as important as it is subtle, so please read it with care: when you take "falsehoods are falsehoods" to mean just "A is A," the first "falsehoods" does not mean the circumstance of something being false (its falsity), which would make the second "falsehoods" mean the falsity of that circumstance, so the "falsehoods" you are talking about would be rather the truth they falsify. To mean an irrelevantly false "A" the first "falsehoods" must mean whatever is false (the object to which falsity applies) rather than the circumstance of its being false (its falsity). That is, you must reduce the first "falsehoods" to the object to which falsity applies in order to get a irrelevantly false "A": if you take the first "falsehoods" to mean falsity itself (the circumstance of something being false), then the second "falsehoods" will apply to that falsity, making it rather the truth it falsifies.
Making something "the truth it falsifies" isn't a profound insight, it's just incomprehensible gobbledigook. You're saying nothing.
You are correct, this isn't a profound insight: it is an obviety, so you should easily understand it. And why incomprehensible? If a falsehood is taken as the circumstance of something being false, then that circumstance being itself a falsehood makes the truth it falsifies rather true. What is incomprehensible about that?
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
For example, "it is raining" can be false, right? But is it a true falsehood? That is, is it indeed not raining?
If all falsehoods are "true falsehoods," then there's no reason to add "true." Using Ockham's Razor, you should eliminate it.
In mathematics, you often duplicate things in order to get identical terms, so you can cancel them out. Do you think mathematicians are also wrong in doing that?
joefromchicago wrote:
guigus wrote:
This is the same thing I said before: the falsity of a false statement can apply to the circumstance of its being false, in which case it becomes the truth it falsifies.
More gobbledigook.
I ask myself if you did not understand me or if you didn't like what you did understand.
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guigus
1
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Wed 8 Sep, 2010 06:57 pm
@joefromchicago,
Let me try to explain it even better.
The word "falsehood" in the sentence "every falsehood must be false" can be taken as meaning:
1) Something false.
2) The circumstance of something being false.
If it is taken as meaning something false, then the circumstance of something being false is reduced to that something, which becomes necessarily false, not only because this is what the sentence asserts, but mainly because the property of being false is identified with whatever it applies to -- hence reduced to it. And since this is manifestly wrong, the second interpretation must be the correct one, so the sentence becomes "the circumstance of something being false must be false," by which whatever "something" to which that circumstance applies must be rather true.
Now if we replace "the circumstance of something being false" by a general reference to "falsehoods," then we get the statement "falsehoods must be false," which conserves the same meaning as "the circumstance of something being false must be false," provided we do not forget what "falsehoods" mean (the circumstance of the falsity of something rather than that something). Finally, we can replace "must be false" by "must be falsehoods," because the circumstance of being false is the only one of its objects we are allowed to reduce it to -- the circumstance of the circumstance of something being false is just the circumstance of that something being false.
So the correct interpretation of the sentence "every falsehood must be false" is the necessary falsity of the circumstance of anything being false, which is why I opted for "every true falsehood must be a truth," which benefits from the fact that any falsehood implicitly asserts its own truth, hence being a truth as a falsehood.
The word "falsehood" in the sentence "every falsehood must be false" can be taken as meaning:
1) Something false.
2) The circumstance of something being false.
If it is taken as meaning something false, then the circumstance of something being false is reduced to that something, which becomes necessarily false, not only because this is what the sentence asserts, but mainly because the property of being false is identified with whatever it applies to -- hence reduced to it. And since this is manifestly wrong, the second interpretation must be the correct one, so the sentence becomes "the circumstance of something being false must be false," by which whatever "something" to which that circumstance applies must be rather true.
Now if we replace "the circumstance of something being false" by a general reference to "falsehoods," then we get the statement "falsehoods must be false," which conserves the same meaning as "the circumstance of something being false must be false," provided we do not forget what "falsehoods" mean (the circumstance of the falsity of something rather than that something). Finally, we can replace "must be false" by "must be falsehoods," because the circumstance of being false is the only one of its objects we are allowed to reduce it to -- the circumstance of the circumstance of something being false is just the circumstance of that something being false.
So the correct interpretation of the sentence "every falsehood must be false" is the necessary falsity of the circumstance of anything being false, which is why I opted for "every true falsehood must be a truth," which benefits from the fact that any falsehood implicitly asserts its own truth, hence being a truth as a falsehood.
There is a correction to make in my last post above: in the statement "falsehoods are falsehoods," if we take the first "falsehoods" to mean the circumstance of something being false, then we simply cannot make the second "falsehoods" mean that same circumstance: the second "falsehoods" must rather mean the circumstance of the first "falsehoods" being false. This is because the circumstance of something being false cannot be identical to itself (we have the same problem with "nothing is nothing"), being the reason why the first "falsehoods" may be taken in the second one as its own object.
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guigus
1
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Sun 12 Sep, 2010 06:31 pm
Going further with my nine philosophical categories, I will re-present now the first one, Variability, and present the second one, Constancy:
Variability
If any truth were untrue, then it would not be a truth: every truth must be true. And yet, since the truth of a being is a true being, for any truth to be true it must have itself as a truth, which must be different from it. So its truth must be different from itself, hence untrue. But if the truth of a truth is untrue, then the truth it makes true is also untrue: any truth becomes its falsity, which makes every truth variable. Conversely, any falsehood must have itself as a true falsehood, by which it is also a truth. Yet still, since any truth must be false, the truth of no falsehood has any truth: any falsehood becomes the truth it falsifies, which makes every falsehood also variable. Finally, since any truth must be false and its falsity must be this truth it falsifies, if any being is true, then it must be false, and if it is false, then it must be true. Even though any being is either true or false, hence either a being, once true, or nothing, once false: as it varies between true and false, its variability between a being and nothing becomes all being.
Constancy
Since any truth must be false and its falsity must be this truth it falsifies, neither any truth nor its falsity remains its own being: they are always each other, so as to remain themselves. Thus none of them is ever itself: each one must be nothing unless it is the other. Even though the other has never become itself yet, so they are both nothing. Indeed, since for each one to become the other is the same as to remain itself, which hence is an impossible constancy, they are both nothing. And yet, all different beings can only be nothing by being the same nonbeing: nothing, as a nonbeing, must have always the same being. Hence, not only are every truth and its falsity both nothing, but they are also the same nonbeing as each other: their being themselves remains that single nonbeing, although it still varies between them. But a single nonbeing is unable to vary, so any truth and its falsity are also unable to vary: since their beings have no being, they must remain steady. Finally, as it is impossible for them to remain steady while still varying into each other, all truth and its falsity are impossible: there is neither the truth of any being nor its falsity. Only their nothingness is possible, so it includes all that is either true or false, as thus its constancy becomes all being.
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guigus
1
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Sat 18 Sep, 2010 01:22 pm
Determinacy
All truth and its falsity are impossible. Hence, any truth and its falsity are both false. But if all truth is false, then so is the truth of its falsity: all truth is true or impossibly false. And if all truth is true, then so is the truth of its falsity: all truth is false or impossibly true. Inevitably, any truth and its falsity determine each other to have a being. But since both any truth and its falsity are impossible, each one of them is nothing, which determines nothing. Coincidentally, the whole determinacy of nothing must be nothing. Indeed, since all truth and its falsity are nothing, they are the whole determinacy of each other, so each one determines nothing. Even though any being is either true or false, by which either its falsity or its truth determines it, respectively, since these also determine each other to have any being. So there must be always a truth and its falsity, as a means for the whole determinacy of all being to be nothing.
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guigus
1
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Sat 18 Sep, 2010 01:26 pm
Possibility
There must be always a truth and its falsity. And yet, since there is either a truth or its falsity, for each one to have a being is to be the other. This way, all truth is impossible if not as its falsity, which is impossible if not as the same truth it falsifies. However, any truth becomes impossible while being its falsity, which becomes impossible while being this truth it falsifies: their being possible only as each other makes them also impossible. So their mutual dependency must be as impossible as they are, although it still varies between them. Indeed, since any truth and its falsity still depend on each other, their impossibility must become either one of them. Even though they have it as a common impossibility, by means of their mutual dependency. Hence, all truth and its falsity must be that same impossibility: they are only possible as a single nonbeing. Finally, since all that is possible must either be true or false, its nothingness becomes the whole possibility of all being.
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guigus
1
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Sat 18 Sep, 2010 09:19 pm
Identity
Since all truth and its falsity are the whole possibility of each other, they must become each other so as to ever be themselves. And since their being each other depends on each one as rather itself, which in turn still depends on its rather being the other, they are impossible. Initially, their beings as themselves make them possible: each one is the whole possibility of the other, thus remaining itself, which makes the other possible. But later on, their being possible makes them rather impossible: each one must be the other so as to remain itself, hence no longer being itself, which makes the other impossible. Indeed, since any truth and its falsity forever depend on each other, their not remaining themselves for being each other makes them impossible. Even though, as they also forever exclude each other, each one being only the other is their whole possibility. So they can only be themselves by being each other, then are neither themselves nor hence each other. Therefore, it is the same for any truth and its falsity to be possible and impossible: all that is either true or false becomes this identity.
Unity
Although it is the same for any truth and its falsity to be possible and impossible, each one of them is either possible or impossible. Indeed, any being is either possible or impossible. Besides, any true being must remain possible. And any false being must remain impossible. Finally, still any being is either true or false. Even though, if it is true, then it is possible. And if it is false, then it is impossible. Hence, being either possible or impossible is the same as being either true or false: these two alternatives form a unity, which becomes all being.
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guigus
1
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Sat 18 Sep, 2010 09:36 pm
Autonomy
Although being either possible or impossible is the same as being either true or false, it is not: being possible also includes being false, while being impossible does not include being true. Conversely, no false being must have been impossible. Even though any false being must remain impossible. Indeed, its impossibility must itself have been possible, so the state of being possible includes all impossibility. Likewise, that same possibleness includes all truth and all falsehood, which must have also been possible. Then, being possible includes all being by becoming all that is true, false, and even impossible. So the whole being of any being becomes its possibility, hence its autonomy. And all possibility becomes the autonomy of all being.
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guigus
1
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Sat 18 Sep, 2010 09:46 pm
Totality
Although the whole being of any being is its possibility, any possibility must either be true or false. Yet still, being either true or false is the same as being both possibly true and possibly false, which is again the whole possibility of any being. Indeed, any possible truth and its possible falsity are the actual truth of each other as possibilities. Hence, the whole being of any being substitutes for itself as the actual truth of its possibility, by being either its possible truth or its possible falsity. However, the actual truth of no being is both possibly true and possibly false by being either its possible truth or its possible falsity. So any being is not only all possible substitutions between its actual truth, its possible truth, and its possible falsity but also the same substitutions as impossible. By which actually true beings are not only possibly true and possibly false but also actually false. Coincidentally, a possible falsehood, a possible truth, an actual truth, and an actual falsehood are the totality of what any being ever can be: they are both all being and its possibility.
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guigus
1
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Sat 18 Sep, 2010 09:53 pm
Omnistitution
Although the actual truth of any being is not only possibly true and possibly false but also actually false, the actual truth of no actually true being is actually false. Hence, the actual truth of any being is nothing, since it is not itself. So the possible truth, possible falsity, and actual falsity of that being are also nothing, since they are the same as its actual truth. Even though the actual truth of any possible being still substitutes for itself by the substitution of its possible truth and its possible falsity for each other. However, the possible falsity of a being never substitutes for the actual truth of that same being as for the same as itself. So any possible falsehood is nothing for which the actual truth being possibly false in it, which is rather a possible truth, substitutes. Hence, it is nothing for which the possible truth being possibly false in it, as thus nothing, substitutes: possible falsehoods are nothing for which nothing substitutes. While any possible truth is nothing that substitutes for its possible falsity, as thus for nothing: possible truths are nothing that substitutes for nothing. And any actual truth is nothing that substitutes for its possible truth: nothing that substitutes both for the substitution of nothing for nothing and for nothing. So the substitution of nothing for nothing can be nothing. Finally, any actual falsehood is not only nothing, hence the substitution of nothing for nothing, but is also any possible falsehood, any possible truth, and any actual truth. So whatever there is that stands or makes anything stand, regardless of whether being possibly false, possibly true, actually true, or actually false, is nothing, by being a substitution. And since nothing is both what substitutes for nothing and what nothing substitutes for, it is more than the substitution of nothing for nothing, it is Omnistitution: all and every act of standing or making stand.
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guigus
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Sun 17 Oct, 2010 05:51 am
What becomes the principle of identity by referring to the identity between a falsehood and itself? So "anything must be identical to itself" means "a falsehood must be that falsehood"? First of all, we have an ambiguity here, since a falsehood can be taken as meaning:
1. Something false.
2. The circumstance of something being false.
If a falsehood is taken as meaning something false, then that something becomes the same as its own falsity, while being false becomes the same as just being, so everything becomes false, including the falsity of everything. To escape such a result, we must choose the second meaning, according to which a falsehood is the circumstance of something being false. Then, that circumstance must be true since, if it were false, then it would be the circumstance of something being true rather than false: the circumstance of something being false is the truth of the falsity of that something, being independent of the truth or falsity to which it refers -- it is a truth rather than a falsehood. Hence, the only way for us to formulate the principle of identity regarding falsehoods without running into unsolvable contradictions is by taking any falsehood as meaning rather a truth -- the truth of the falsity of the truth it falsifies -- by which the principle of identity becomes "every truth must be identical to itself" -- or "every truth must be true," since for a truth to be identical to itself is the same as its being true.
