if a lion could speak, we couldn't understand it

Im Confused wrote:

thanks to all for the fascinating input

I've never got to grips with Wittgenstein, but he does know how to get a debate going

it is fascinating that despite being surrounded by humans for hundreds of years now that apes,
be they in zoos or safari parks or wherever, have shown no progress in picking up our language AFAIK

although i believe under 'laboratory conditions', some types of communication have emerged
with some chimpanzees

it seems to defy common sense that we could never understand a talking lion, but 'common sense' is far from perfect in its understanding of the world.

I don 't see a problem:
if the lion coud speak, then he 'd express his desires,
e.g. for food n water, reasonable temperature, etc.

We know that he is interested in these from observation
of his behavior in Nature.





David

thanks to all for the fascinating input

I've never got to grips with Wittgenstein, but he does know how to get a debate going

it is fascinating that despite being surrounded by humans for hundreds of years now that apes,
be they in zoos or safari parks or wherever, have shown no progress in picking up our language AFAIK

although i believe under 'laboratory conditions', some types of communication have emerged
with some chimpanzees

it seems to defy common sense that we could never understand a talking lion, but 'common sense' is far from perfect in its understanding of the world.

I don 't see a problem:
if the lion coud speak, then he 'd express his desires,
e.g. for food n water, reasonable temperature, etc.

We know that he is interested in these from observation
of his behavior in Nature.





David

And I don't see how what you say is relevant to Wittgenstein's question. Wittgenstein does not deny that a lion can speak, and he does not say anything about what what a lion would speak about. Whst he says is that we could not understand what a lion was saying. And nothing you say is relevant to that.

I do not think that Wittgenstein is saying that if a lion could talk, we could not come to learn and speak his language. I dare say that the possibility of a language being learnable is a necessary condition of actually being a language. At present, lions other animals, and babies make noises, but there is no regularity in use that gives their noises a meaning, thus we do not say that their noises are words, or part of a language, they are merely noises.

In order to discern what Wittgenstein is saying with his lion aphorism, we need to set the context. The comment comes in Part 2, section xi of the Investigations, where Wittgenstein talks about seeing an aspect and experiencing the meaning of a word. Seeing an aspect, is like seeing an apparently unfamiliar face and then, all of a sudden, recognising it as the face of an old friend; it the thing that happens when we see the figure below as a duck or seeing it as a rabbit:

Wittgenstein then discusses the possibility that somebody might be "aspect-blind", that he lacks the ability to see something as something. Now clearly, this is not the same thing as being actually blind, he would still be able to see the figure above, he would simply not see it as a duck or a rabbit.

Wittgenstein then moves on to talk about "experiencing the meaning of a word". This is the sort of thing most of us do when we read poetry, or when we look through synonyms in a thesaurus for "the right word". The analogous phenomenon to aspect blindness, here, is meaning-blindness. A meaning-blind person would not understand the difference in what "I will show you fear in a handful of dust" and "I will scare you with a fistful of dust" mean to us, the sort of meaning that poets manage to conjure up with words. He would not understand if we ask him to say "party" as a verb, and then the next moment as a noun? He simply says party, he is incapable of saying it as anything. Yet, as in the case of the aspect-blind person still being able to literally see, the meaning-blind person will still be able to know what words mean the sense that he will be able to use the language. This is because, for Wittgenstein, meaning is use, and one doesn't need to have a particular experience, or indeed any experience, to grasp a sentence.

In the case of the lion, it is preceded by this passage: "We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them. " Wittgenstein is using "understand" not in the sense of being unable to understand his language, but being unable to understand lions and their practices. If lions could talk we would be able to understand their words, but that does not mean they would be anything like the characters in The Lion King; imagine having a conversation with a lion in its natural habitat, it would not be wise or proud, it would just be weird.

I do not think that Wittgenstein is saying that if a lion could talk, we could not come to learn and speak his language. I dare say that the possibility of a language being learnable is a necessary condition of actually being a language. At present, lions other animals, and babies make noises, but there is no regularity in use that gives their noises a meaning, thus we do not say that their noises are words, or part of a language, they are merely noises.

In order to discern what Wittgenstein is saying with his lion aphorism, we need to set the context. The comment comes in Part 2, section xi of the Investigations, where Wittgenstein talks about seeing an aspect and experiencing the meaning of a word. Seeing an aspect, is like seeing an apparently unfamiliar face and then, all of a sudden, recognising it as the face of an old friend; it the thing that happens when we see the figure below as a duck or seeing it as a rabbit:

Wittgenstein then discusses the possibility that somebody might be "aspect-blind", that he lacks the ability to see something as something. Now clearly, this is not the same thing as being actually blind, he would still be able to see the figure above, he would simply not see it as a duck or a rabbit.

Wittgenstein then moves on to talk about "experiencing the meaning of a word". This is the sort of thing most of us do when we read poetry, or when we look through synonyms in a thesaurus for "the right word". The analogous phenomenon to aspect blindness, here, is meaning-blindness. A meaning-blind person would not understand the difference in what "I will show you fear in a handful of dust" and "I will scare you with a fistful of dust" mean to us, the sort of meaning that poets manage to conjure up with words. He would not understand if we ask him to say "party" as a verb, and then the next moment as a noun? He simply says party, he is incapable of saying it as anything. Yet, as in the case of the aspect-blind person still being able to literally see, the meaning-blind person will still be able to know what words mean the sense that he will be able to use the language. This is because, for Wittgenstein, meaning is use, and one doesn't need to have a particular experience, or indeed any experience, to grasp a sentence.

In the case of the lion, it is preceded by this passage: "We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them. " Wittgenstein is using "understand" not in the sense of being unable to understand his language, but being unable to understand lions and their practices. If lions could talk we would be able to understand their words, but that does not mean they would be anything like the characters in The Lion King; imagine having a conversation with a lion in its natural habitat, it would not be wise or proud, it would just be weird.

But you write just as if you understand what is would be like for a lion to talk, and go on to draw implications from that. I am stuck at the start. I can certainly imagine a human voice emanating from a lion, may like what is depicted in the Wizard of Oz. I can even imagine Gregor in Kafka's famous story of the man transformed into a giant cockroach talking, but like Gregor (the man) of course. But what would it even be like to hear a lion (or cockroach) talking, and not a human voice coming our of a lion or cockroach? What do you think it would sound like? It is not just that lions don't talk. It is that it makes no sense think of lions talking. And I think that Wittgenstein, in his elfin way, is trying to make that thought occur to you.

mickalos wrote:

I do not think that Wittgenstein is saying that if a lion could talk, we could not come to learn and speak his language. I dare say that the possibility of a language being learnable is a necessary condition of actually being a language. At present, lions other animals, and babies make noises, but there is no regularity in use that gives their noises a meaning, thus we do not say that their noises are words, or part of a language, they are merely noises.

In order to discern what Wittgenstein is saying with his lion aphorism, we need to set the context. The comment comes in Part 2, section xi of the Investigations, where Wittgenstein talks about seeing an aspect and experiencing the meaning of a word. Seeing an aspect, is like seeing an apparently unfamiliar face and then, all of a sudden, recognising it as the face of an old friend; it the thing that happens when we see the figure below as a duck or seeing it as a rabbit:

Wittgenstein then discusses the possibility that somebody might be "aspect-blind", that he lacks the ability to see something as something. Now clearly, this is not the same thing as being actually blind, he would still be able to see the figure above, he would simply not see it as a duck or a rabbit.

Wittgenstein then moves on to talk about "experiencing the meaning of a word". This is the sort of thing most of us do when we read poetry, or when we look through synonyms in a thesaurus for "the right word". The analogous phenomenon to aspect blindness, here, is meaning-blindness. A meaning-blind person would not understand the difference in what "I will show you fear in a handful of dust" and "I will scare you with a fistful of dust" mean to us, the sort of meaning that poets manage to conjure up with words. He would not understand if we ask him to say "party" as a verb, and then the next moment as a noun? He simply says party, he is incapable of saying it as anything. Yet, as in the case of the aspect-blind person still being able to literally see, the meaning-blind person will still be able to know what words mean the sense that he will be able to use the language. This is because, for Wittgenstein, meaning is use, and one doesn't need to have a particular experience, or indeed any experience, to grasp a sentence.

In the case of the lion, it is preceded by this passage: "We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them. " Wittgenstein is using "understand" not in the sense of being unable to understand his language, but being unable to understand lions and their practices. If lions could talk we would be able to understand their words, but that does not mean they would be anything like the characters in The Lion King; imagine having a conversation with a lion in its natural habitat, it would not be wise or proud, it would just be weird.

kennethamy wrote:

But you write just as if you understand what is would be like for a lion to talk, and go on to draw implications from that. I am stuck at the start. I can certainly imagine a human voice emanating from a lion, may like what is depicted in the Wizard of Oz. I can even imagine Gregor in Kafka's famous story of the man transformed into a giant cockroach talking, but like Gregor (the man) of course. But what would it even be like to hear a lion (or cockroach) talking, and not a human voice coming our of a lion or cockroach? What do you think it would sound like? It is not just that lions don't talk. It is that it makes no sense think of lions talking. And I think that Wittgenstein, in his elfin way, is trying to make that thought occur to you.

U r satisfied to ASSUME that lions r not talking,
from the fact that u do not understand their words.

But you write just as if you understand what is would be like for a lion to talk, and go on to draw implications from that. I am stuck at the start. I can certainly imagine a human voice emanating from a lion, may like what is depicted in the Wizard of Oz. I can even imagine Gregor in Kafka's famous story of the man transformed into a giant cockroach talking, but like Gregor (the man) of course. But what would it even be like to hear a lion (or cockroach) talking, and not a human voice coming our of a lion or cockroach? What do you think it would sound like? It is not just that lions don't talk. It is that it makes no sense think of lions talking. And I think that Wittgenstein, in his elfin way, is trying to make that thought occur to you.

I'm pretty sure Wittgenstein never saw The Lion King