How do you determine something exists?

@kennethamy,

No, you are still entrenched in naive realism.
No thingers=no things.
Suppose it turns out that at some future date the whole solar system is conceived of as a "single body" linked through as yet unexplored dimensions, would those future thingers say the moon "never really existed in former times". For do not today's naive realists say "the humours of the body never really existed"?

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@fresco,

fresco wrote:

No, your are still entrenched in naive realism.
No thingers=no things.
Suppose it turns out that at some future date the whole solar system is conceived of as a "single body" linked through as yet unexplored dimensions, would those future thingers say the moon "never really existed in former times". For do not today's naive realists say "the humours of the body never really existed"?

We would then have been wrong. But why would you think that because we might be wrong, that we are wrong? If my grandmother had wheels then she would be a bicycle, may be true, but that is no reason to think that my grandmother is a bicycle. If saying that make me a naive realist, then I am all for naive realism. And, hooray for nativite'. "My innocence is my strength" Motto of some knightly order (I forget which).

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@fresco,

fresco wrote:

Thanks for reference. I've skimmed it for now and see where you are coming from. At first reading, Stove does not seem to have read Maturana who repudiates the concepts of "information", "sensory inputs" and "ontic reality" from a biological point of view. If Stove has these as axiomatic his analysis fails.

Try this for a taste:
http://www.oikos.org/vonobserv.htm

Where I am coming from is that your argument that if you can think of (or "observe in your mind's eye") something that exists independently of thought or observation, then you are "really" thinking about that thing, or observing it, so that there is nothing that is independent of thought or observation, is simply a fallacious argument. That is, the conclusion fails to follow from the premises. That is where I am coming from. The place is called "logic". It is an argument that has been characterized at the argument that, since I have eyes, I cannot see. What I find strange is that it actually can convince anyone of normal intelligence. What is ever more peculiar is that the argument comes straight out of Berkeley, which, since he was a very intelligent fellow, shows that he was not above sophistry in the service of theology, himself. That people keep wielding this tired old fallacy seems to me to be one of the great scandals of philosophy.

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@kennethamy,

Two points
1. As Piaget argued, "traditional logic" which is an aspect of general semantics was one product of cognitive "maturation" not always attained by all in a population. The fact that it is basically static set theory in which the nominal level is axiomatic seems hardly adequate for the general dynamics of cognition and the functional nature of a shifting set membership process according to changing contextual requirements.

2. As I understand it, Berkeley utilized the requirement of "the observer" for the particular purpose of establishing "God as the ultimate observer" in order for an "external world" to continue to "exist" when lesser observers turned their backs. So ontologically speaking this was still "realism" albeit "divine realism".
On the other hand, the non-duality of which I speak, takes "relationship" as a priori rather than the poles of relationship such as "observer" and "observed".

Referring once more to Piaget, he gives the picture of observer in state 1 interrelating with world 1. (e.g. a hungry observer actively perceives/classifies the world into "food/non food") the two then interact producing observer state 2 who re-classifies the world as state 2 (the sated observer no longer "sees" food/non food i.e. the existential relationship"hunger" - "food"" no longer operates in state 2).

As an aside, it is significant that the von Glasersfeld reference I gave you cites Piaget's assimilation-accommodation model alongside that of Maturana's autpoiesis in delving into the philosophy of observation.

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What has any of this to do with the argument? Is the argument a good one or a terrible one (as it is)? Never mind why anyone proposed it, or who proposed it. Again, it is an awful argument, and if not the very worst argument in the world, is is well in the running. It is a blight on philosophy, and it makes one despair of the logical acumen of those who accept it. As I pointed out, the argument, I have eyes, therefore I cannot see, is nearly an exact analogy.

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I think it is fairly obvious that either numbers do not exist, or they only exist as a conceptual thought in our perception.

Let's take a number: 62

For us, if we think about this number, where do we arrive? 62 apples, 62 dollars, 62 minutes, more than 61, less than 63, etc. We associate a number with the multiplicity of something measurable that we understand. We see 62 as greater than 30 and less than 90, but the actual number itself is indifferent to the universe.

This is because numbers are symbols in language, no different then letters and words. Take the word "Apple". We have learned to associate this word with the fruit. When we think of this word, we turn to this association and ask this does exist? Yes it exists because I have seen it or tasted it or whatever. The object of reference, an apple, exists, but the word 'apple' is only a symbol.

The same is applied to numbers. '62' does not exist, whereas 62 apples do because '62' is only a symbol we use to reference a group of multiple existing objects.

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@Huxley,

when you understand that the " something " has all to do with your existence in the first place and is not an abstraction of thought

such as water

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@kennethamy,

Your "eyes" metaphor is couched in naive realism.

My argument is should more properly be stated: I see that I have "eyes" therefore "seeing" must involve something more than "eyes" per se.

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@Mindlapse,

Quote:

This is because numbers are symbols in language, no different then letters and words.

There are many difficulties with this view. First of all consider that while the symbol may be different in each culture, in the case of number, what is signified is the same regardless of the signifier. So the symbol is not actually the number; it signifies the number.

The second difficulty is that math has real predictive power. In other words, it can be used to elicit hitherto undiscovered or previously undiscovered facts. Certainly one might devise stories in ordinary language that also describe imaginative landscapes and so on. But mathematical predictions or the consequences of particular mathematical operations have often led to completely new discoveries about reality. In subatomic physics, mathematical formalism has been instrumental in making many discoveries about properties of matter. So I think it is an oversimplification to say that number is a symbol.

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs wrote:

consider that while the symbol may be different in each culture, in the case of number, what is signified is the same regardless of the signifier. So the symbol is not actually the number; it signifies the number.

The same is true of words.

jeeprs wrote:

math has real predictive power. In other words, it can be used to elicit hitherto undiscovered or previously undiscovered facts.

The same is true of words. I dont think you've presented a difficulty, in either case.

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@ughaibu,

Quote:

The same is true of words. I dont think you've presented a difficulty, in either case.

It would seem to me that all of the major scientific advances since Newton's have relied on insights that are only available by way of mathematics. Obviously relativity and QM are cases in point. Please explain to me how these could have been obtained without mathematics, or, alternatively, any scientific breakthroughs of similar magnitude which were articulated in ordinary language (your choice as to which one, of course).

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs wrote:

Quote:
The same is true of words.
It would seem to me that all of the major scientific advances since Newton's have relied on insights that are only available by way of mathematics. Obviously relativity and QM are cases in point.

It is either the case that the numbers employed in these theories map to quantities in the observable world or it is not. If it is the case that they do, then numbers are functioning as words, if it is the case that they dont, then the results are purely mathematical. How is it that you infer the independent existence of numbers, from the ability of human beings to describe the world? As far as I can see, there is no such implication, your realism appears to be a non sequitur.

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@Mindlapse,

Mindlapse:
"The same is applied to numbers. '62' does not exist, whereas 62 apples do because '62' is only a symbol we use to reference a group of multiple existing objects."

If we define 'x exists' as: (some F)(x has the property F) then....

That which does not exist, does not have properies.

You have affirmed that (62 > 30). That is, you have granted that 62 has the property of being 'greater than 30'.

If (62 > 30) then there is a property that (62) has.
That is: (some F)(62 has the property F), is true.
Therefore, 62 exists.

Why do you believe that it makes sense to say:
(62) does not exist and (62 apples) does exist.
It is a contradiction, imo.

How can we apply the number 62, if it does not exist.
If 62 does not exist then it is false to say: 62 apples exist.
eg. do red apples exist if there are no red things?

Empirical truths, factual propositions, establish the existence of empirical objects.
Logical truths, tautological propositions, establish the existence of abstract (non-empirical) objects.
Because (62 > 30) is a tautology, we can assert that: 62 exists and 30 exists.

(root(-1))^2=-1) implies that root(-1) exists, even if there is no application to the empirical world.

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@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

If we define 'x exists' as: (some F)(x has the property F) then....
That which does not exist, does not have properies.

Again, are you supporting the position that existence claims are logical, not ontological?
If so, then I assert that you dont exist, therefore you dont have properties.

1 Reply

@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

Owen phil wrote:
If we define 'x exists' as: (some F)(x has the property F) then....
That which does not exist, does not have properies.
Again, are you supporting the position that existence claims are logical, not ontological?
If so, then I assert that you dont exist, therefore you dont have properties.

Ontological comittments are made prior to the developement of logic.
There are, concrete things and abstract things.
I admit (ontologically): physical objects, abstract objects, physical properties and relations, abstract properties and relations, etc..

Your argument 'I assert that you dont exist, therefore you dont have properties.'
is clearly not sound.

How do you assert that I do not exist?

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@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

How do you assert that I do not exist?

As you assert that unnamed numbers have the property of being numbers. On which point, the false has the property of being false, so, if properties imply existence, then the false exists. What does it mean for the false to exist?
Either you can decide that a thing exists by whether or not it has properties, or you can decide that a thing has properties by whether or not it exists. The position that x exists because it has properties but y doesn't exist because it has no properties, is trivial, it is purely logical and as such is independent of reality. It isn't ontologically meaningful.

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@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

x exists because it has properties but y doesn't exist because it has no properties

My mistake:
the position that x exists because it has properties but y doesn't have properties because it doesn't exist

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@ughaibu,

ughaibu wrote:

Owen phil wrote:
How do you assert that I do not exist?
As you assert that unnamed numbers have the property of being numbers. On which point, the false has the property of being false, so, if properties imply existence, then the false exists. What does it mean for the false to exist?

The x such that it is less than 5 and greater than 3, is an existent number .. even if we do not have a name for it. (some x: x<5 & x>3) is tautologous.

Of course, 'the false' exists. Because we can assert that: the negation of the false is the true. |-. ~(~p) <-> p.
Falsity is a property of propositions, therefore, falsity exists.

To say that eg. my car is blue when in fact (what is the case, physically) it is red, is false.
To say that: 1+2 = 4 when 1+2=3 is proven (what is the case, logically), is false.
Falsity includes both non-factual propositions and contradictory propositions.
There are many properties of falsity, imo.

ughaibu wrote:

Either you can decide that a thing exists by whether or not it has properties, or you can decide that a thing has properties by whether or not it exists.

"Either you can decide that a thing exists by whether or not it has properties, or you can decide that a thing has properties by whether or not it exists"

They are equivalent.

x exists =df (some F: x has the property F)

x exists, if and only if, x has some property F.
is equivalent to,
x has some property, if an only if, x exists.

ughaibu wrote:

The position that x exists because it has properties but y doesn't exist because it has no properties, is trivial, it is purely logical and as such is independent of reality. It isn't ontologically meaningful.

Why do you exclude purely logical truths from reality?
Surely, logical truths are shown to be the case, and factual truths are shown to be the case.

Do you deny that 'reality' is all that is the case?
Is logical truth denied in your ontology?

I'm interested in your view here. What is ontologically meaningful for you?

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@Owen phil,

Owen phil wrote:

The x such that it is less than 5 and greater than 3, is an existent number

This doesn't analogise to almost all numbers because there is no greatest number.

Owen phil wrote:

Of course, 'the false' exists.

Okay, but my question was an enquiry as to what this means. Do you hold that the number of entities in the world that are false is equal to the number of those which are true? If so, I reject this. The number of truths is countable, the number of non-truths is uncountable, so, under realism about falsity, almost everything is false, the probability of anything being other than false is zero.

Owen phil wrote:

Why do you exclude purely logical truths from reality?

Logics are human constructions, at best, they facilitate some forms of thought about reality, they dont define reality.

Owen phil wrote:

Surely, logical truths are shown to be the case, and factual truths are shown to be the case.

Quite, but the methods of demonstration aren't the same.

Owen phil wrote:

Do you deny that 'reality' is all that is the case?
Is logical truth denied in your ontology?

I dont deny logical truth, but it doesn't define ontological facts. How could it?

Owen phil wrote:

What is ontologically meaningful for you?

This is a question that, while interesting, doesn't strike me as pertinent to this thread.

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@kennethamy,

Sorry I missed your "right/wrong" analysis above. My point is these two must be defined functionally in terms of "what does or doesn't work" with respect to a particular historical or cultural context, that judgement is reached/negotiated between participants at that time and place.

If you have the time or inclination, read up the celebrated Evans-Pritchard study of the Azande concept of "witchcraft". Westerners who sought to impose their legal trial system on the Azande were faced with dissent, because the guilt or otherwise of the accused was traditionally established by examining the entrails of a ritually poisoned chicken. This established whether the perpetrator of an act had been "bewitched" by another, or whether the act was freely committed. The point is that even when the Western trial had found a person "guilty", the chicken procedure was a cultural requirement to check on the verdict. Only then did both the miscreant and the rest of his society accept the verdict. This ethnocentric point can extrapolated to the paradigmatic subcultures associated with the acceptance or otherwise of "scientific findings".(Kuhn)

In short, it is ridiculous for us to judge whether the concept of "bodily humours" was "right" or "wrong", because it worked at the time. Similarly we have no way of knowing what the ontological status of "atoms", electrons etc will be in the future. The concepts "work for now". And that's as far as you are going to get with the applicability of the word "truth" i.e. social agreement, irrespective of the algebraic convolutions to which the abstract concept gives rise.

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