@ElAleph,
ElAleph wrote:
The second interest in the traditional philosophical problem about other minds lies in the question, whether, given what would seem a natural way we have of thinking of the meaning of mental terms, we can even make sense of the sentences we use to attribute mental states to others. Such a problem arises because there is a natural tendency to assume that our mental terms (i.e 'pain', 'belief', etc.) get their meaning from our relating them to our own experiences. Thus, if we only understand what it is to have a pain or a belief from our own case, a question arises as to whether such a perspective on them will even allow our talk of others having pains or beliefs to make sense. This is known as the conceptual problem of other minds.
I would discart the question from a language point of view. There is no private world where we feel pain or fear, that's not a private experiencie, we are speaking of a type of behavior when we speak of experiences of pain, seeing colour, thing like that. What we call consciousness is a social construct, all beings like us are conscious beings just like us or not even we are conscious in that sense.
It's a Wittgensteinian aproach that I think to be correct, we can't not speak of private experiences, so consciousness must be social, not private.
I define consciousness as "explaining some behaviour using conceptual language".
@HexHammer:
I thing Pangloss is talking about our subjective experience of being conscious (if there is such a thing). I already discart private experience.
Sorry for my english.
