Cyber Abyss wrote:
If Philosophy is the acceptance of others ideas, values and evaluations on logical principle then why does Philosophy focus on undermining religion when it is an acceptable way of examination? In a study that denies conclusions it seems to deny any ideas that promote conclusions. This is contradictory to all that philosophy preaches. Acceptance is the valuing (and devaluing) of all ideas and not just the ideas that come to conclusions.
To correct, you need to either take "why" out of the conditional statement (because "why" begs the ontology of the "if" conditional and is also syntactically incorrect), or in this instance change "does" to a future tense word, such as "would" (because "does" implies that the "if" clause currently is
when in fact the "if" conditional suggests that you do not know something to be or not). Also, there seem to be a few implicit assumptions which, if I may, would like to tease out by reformulating your 'conditional statement':
- If philosophy is the acceptance of other ideas, values and evaluations on logical principle, and
- If philosophy undermines unacceptable ways of examination, and
- If religion is an acceptable way of examination,
- Then why does philosophy focus on undermining religion?
Please let me know if this reformulation is not acceptable to you, Cyber Abyss
Premise 1 rests it's acceptance "on logical principle," and I believe in itself it is enough to answer the question. Religion is not based on logical principles, therefore premise 3 is false by virtue of premise 1. However, even this being the case, I would still like to make a few additional comments.
Accepting may indeed be the "valuing (and devaluing) of all ideas and not just the ideas that come to conclusions", but valuing does not include that one must accept the truth or falsity of what is being valued. For ideas which you say are 'not just the ones that come to conclusion', I believe one of the major aims of philosophy would be to determine which foundation the value was being derived from and to then place more value in those items which were shown to be closer to what we could consider our best source of indubitable knowledge. A person does not have to know the outcome in the attempt to evaluate the basis of ideas.
For example, mathematical and logical foundations seem to be two of the best explanations for the most amount of data and the most amount consistent results. Thus, if we have a problem lacking a firm conclusion, simply determining which foundation the problem can be reducible too and then holding it's construction up to the standards set by the foundation, we can determine how much the idea is worth valuing.
Religion as a foundation has some of the least capable ability to explain the most amount of data and the most consistent results.
Furthermore, mathematics, logic, the empirical sciences, and phenomenology, for example, seem to have a very easy time in relating to one another. There is mathematical logic, there is empirical and phenomenological inquiry into the nature of mathematics, and the results of one foundation seem to historically have fruitful impacts on each of the others. Some parts of each of these foundations are actually so intertwined with the other foundations that they have created a necessary reliance on the very foundation of the other. Religion does not have this. It does not have
to care about logic. It does not have
to care about mathematical breakthroughs. It does not have
to care about the empirical sciences. Its very attempt to be founded on a god or god(s) severs itself. On the otherhand, these foundations have