Deducing Politics from Natural Theology: Facebook

Ok. So, I'm writing a series of facebook notes in order to impress a girl, and the idea is that I am trying to prove a political system from natural theology, from a conception of God as The Good, The Necessary, The Triune, the Unique, the Eternal, and the Creator of All Things.

I am going to put the various notes in this thread, and I'd like you all to critique it. A few notes, however: I don't want you to critique the proofs of God. I am aware of the counterarguments, I think they are all bogus, and to be honest, the proofs for God's existence are not what I'm interested in having critiqued. I want the later deductions critiqued on whether or not they follow from the definitions I give for God, and also previous propositions. So...have fun!

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Preliminary Remarks:

In the very proximate future, I am going to be writing a number of facebook "notes" on a variety of topics ranging from politics to religion to a number of other things. Therefore, because of the nature of the things I'll be writing about, I issue a very strong cautionary note to them reading:

Kierkegaard writes in the "Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments" that where reason enters, subjectivity departs. In the notes which are to come, you will find only reasoned arguments, given from a certain conceptual framework. You will find nothing "special" for me and for my interests. I say this because many people don't approach these topics in this fashion. They form their opinions from their experience and from their own interests. I issue this cautionary note because such people may get very, very angry when they read what I am going to write, insofar as they will read things that very strongly will run against their interests, their desires, and their "experience."

Consider these ignorant (I mean that in the strictest sense of "being unawares," insofar as their opinions are truly that: opinions; these (opinions) are formed not from reason but from their own interests and desires, and therefore aren't worthy of consideration by anyone but themselves, so far as I am concerned) masses, when one says something they don't like: the tone of their voice becomes higher...they speak faster...they become very eager to interrupt...and last but not least, they block up their ears (metaphorically) and make every effort to bring silence to their "opponent." They are like dogs.

The note, therefore, that I issue in caution to such people is this: DON'T TAKE IT PERSONALLY. I don't have anything against you personally. I don't even live out many of these things in my own life. I am treating of the matter in entirely a theoretical way, by reason alone (mostly, anyways), and reason is common to every man. If, therefore, you are a friend of mine or a possible romantic interest (you know who you are), you ought not feel any compulsion to reconsider your friendship or the romantic relationship which might yet be had. So far as I can see, it won't affect things; my opinion of you personally -as a person- is no different. I just think that your opinions are wrong, but so what?

Furthermore, I am sure that many of you are very curious to know why it is that I have decided to write on these topics in this fashion at this particular point. It's a funny effing story (not in the "ha-ha" sense so much as the "mother *CENSORED FROM THE FACEBOOK VERSION*" sense).

So I have this romantic interest in mind (things probably won't work out, though certainly not by any lack of volition on my part), and I decide both at once to probe into her views on politics, life, and so forth and so on, and I largely keep my own a secret. I accurately guessed that she held the opinions that the aforementioned dogs do, and therefore, because she is pretty and um...Bonaventurian (changed from facebook original; I had my actual first name on the original) likes shiny objects...I didn't want to produce in her the same result which I had noted above. So apparently, I may have guessed -wrongly- that such an effect would be produced, since she apparently found my unwillingness to talk about these things at length and with respect to my own views...well...unattractive. I'm sure she'll contest the wording that I've used, but ultimately, that's what it comes down to.

Ha. *CENSORED FROM THE FACEBOOK VERSION*. Ha.

In any case, I figured that, for future reference, the safest way (for me, that is, with respect to potential relationships, friendly or otherwise) would be exhaustively to have my views and my reasoning very clearly written out.

Have fun reading...dogs, friends, and...girl. Bleh!

All this said, feel free to proceed to "On Method and Reason."

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On Reason and Method:

Before I actually write anything about any subject, the first thing that strikes me is that, without a method, it is impossible (or very nearly so, at least) to gain ground on any matter. Therefore, first I will lay out what it is upon which I will be treating. Then, I will try to find the right way to treat on them all.

If St. Bonaventure in the "Itinerarium Mentis in Deum (Journey of the Mind into God)" ascends from creatures to God, in the following series of notes, I intend to make a descent from God to creatures. Since my understanding of the world is that the world and all therein is a reflection of the Goodness of God, it is necessary for my undertaking that I provide first a clear conception of God, and then treat on the world and all therein only in relation to that God for Whom I have provided a clear conception.

Simply put, it is my desire in the following series of notes to show that there is a Supremely Good and Necessary God Who created the world as a reflection of His Goodness, that truth and morality can only subsist in God, and that law is only lawful when it harmonizes with the moral law fixed eternally in the mind of that God.

It should be at once evident, therefore, that feelings and emotions, interests and desires will have no place in the discussion, since I intend to show that these things are the case actually, and that these truths, being necessary, are true for every man. Therefore, any faculty in which there is present even the slightest bit of myself as an individual will not do for this discussion. Rather, we must make use of that faculty in which is present nothing of myself, but which is common to all men, and that faculty of the reason, which is the faculty whereby we apprehend truth and do away with error.

The following assumptions, therefore, will be in place throughout the discussion:

1. All contradictions are impossible.

2. Whatever proposition leads to a contradiction is false.

3. Then a contradiction is reached solely through a priori reasoning, then the proposition which leads to the contradiction is NECESSARILY false.

4. Definitions have no truth value; only propositions making use of the defined term have a truth value.

Finally, I wish to define the terms "contingent" and "necessary." When I use the word "necessary," I understand "it is a contradiction to deny." When I use the word "contingent," I understand "there is no contradiction in the denial."

Thus, it is a contradiction for me to say that there exists a round square or a greatest number. It is not a contradiction for me to say that the entire universe does not exist (it's plainly false, but it's not a contradiction of terms...the universe does not have to exist, and it could have been otherwise than that it exists).

All this said, please proceed to my note "On God."

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On God:

P1. I shall prove that God (defined as "The Eternally Necessary Being") exists.

P1a. This proof is very much in the spirit of Parmenides. I have a concept in my mind, a definition, and that definition is "The Necessary Being, that is, That Being Who Necessarily is and Cannot Fail to Be." With respect to this definition, I am able either to affirm or to deny that the definition has a corresponding object actually, that is to say, I can either affirm or deny that God (so defined) exists. I think to deny that God (so defined) exists, and I find myself uttering a contradiction: "That Being Who Necessarily is and Cannot Fail to Be is not." Since I have contradicted myself in saying that God (so defined) does not exist, it is necessarily the case that God (so defined) exists. Thus, whenever by "God" I understand "The Necessary Being," and I say "God exists," I speak a necessary truth, and when I deny that truth, I utter a contradiction and a necessary falsehood.

P1b. Furthermore (as St. Augustine points out in the 11th chapter of Confessions), time is sequential. Assume that God exists temporally. God possesses a property at T1, namely being present at T1. T1 becomes T2. God has lost the property that He hitherto had. God, therefore, has in some way ceased to be and has been admixed with not-being. Yet, from P1a, this is clearly a contradiction of terms. God, therefore, does not exist temporally, but eternally.

P2. I shall prove that God (defined as "The Supreme Good") exists.

P2a. This proof is St. Anselm's ("Proslogium"). I have a concept in my mind, a definition, and that definition is "That Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Conceived." I deny that such a being exists, and instantly I am able to think of a greater being, namely the same kind of being I have just conceived, except one that exists actually. Thus, I speak a contradiction: "I have conceived of a being that is greater than That Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Conceived." Since I have contradicted myself in saying that "That Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Conceived" does not exist, it is therefore necessarily the case that God (so defined) exists. Thus, whenever by "God" I understand "That Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Conceived," and I say "God exists," I speak a necessary truth, and when I deny that truth, I utter a contradiction and a necessary falsehood.

P2b. This proof is Descartes' ("Meditations," in the 5th meditation). I have a concept in my mind, a definition, and that definition is "The Supremely Perfect Being." I deny that such a being exists, and instantly I am able to think of a more perfect being, namely a being that possesses all perfections and exists actually. Thus, I speak a contradiction: "This being is more perfect than the Supremely Perfect Being." Since I have contradicted myself in saying "The Supremely Perfect Being" does not exist, it is therefore necessarily the case that God (so defined) exists. Thus, whenever by "God" I understand "The Supremely Perfect Being," and I say "God exists," I speak a necessary truth, and when I deny that truth, I utter a contradiction and a necessary falsehood.

P3. I shall prove that God (defined as "Creator of All Contingent Things") exists.

P3a. This proof is St. Thomas Aquinas' (Summa Theologica, Part 1, Question 2, Article 2, "the third way"). Everything which exists does exist either necessarily (existence is part of its essence) or contingently (its existence is not part of its essence, but is received). Every contingent being receives its existence either from a contingent being or a necessary being. Assume that there is no necessarily existing being (which is a contradiction, as per P1, but never mind that). Thus, everything which exists depends on some other being from which to receive their existence, and this being does not exist. Nothing therefore exists. Wait, stuff clearly exists! Therefore, there exists a Necessary Being, and all contingent things depend on this Necessary Being in order for them to receive their existence.

Corollary to P3a: Assume for a moment that even one contingent thing exists independently of God's will. A greater will can be conceived, then, namely one upon which every contingent thing depends. A Greater God has been conceived, then, namely One upon Whose will all things depend, rather than most things only, some things only, or none. Yet, as per P2, the previous statement is a contradiction. Therefore, all contingent things exist only according to the will of God.

Therefore, when I speak the phrase "God (defined as "The Creator of All Contingent Things") exists," I speak a hypothetically necessary truth. If there are contingent things, then truly, God is necessarily the Creator of all of them.

P4. I shall prove that in the Divine Substance there are three consubstantial persons.

This proof is St. Bonaventure's (Itinerarium Mentis in Deum 6:3 and De Reductione ad Theologiam 23). The Good necessarily is self-diffusive. Assume for a moment that He diffuses Himself in an imperfect way only (such as through the creation of the world). A greater God can be conceived, namely One who diffuses Himself in the highest conceivable way. Yet, as per P2, the previous sentence is a contradiction. God therefore must diffuse Himself in the highest conceivable way, and this can only be the case if the diffusion is consubstantial, personal, and intrinsic to the Divine Substance. Furthermore, it is necessarily the case that in God there is the highest rectitude (since if there were not, a greater God can be conceived, namely One in Whom there is), and from this it follows that in God there be one Person producing only, one Person both produced and producing, and one Person produced only, and these are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Thus St. Bonaventure writes: "If then God is perfect rectitude by virtue of the divine nature itself, and since God is the Beginning and the End of all things, it is necessary to posit within God an intermediate person fo the divine nature, so that there may be one person who only produces, another who is only produced, but an intermediary who both produces and is produced" ("De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam" 23).

P5. I will prove that God is the only Necessary Being.

P5a. Suppose that there were some other Necessary Being. A greater God could be conceived, namely One Who is entirely unique in His necessity. Yet, this is clearly absurd, given P2. It follows therefore that God is unique in His necessity.

P5b. Suppose that there were some other Necessary Being. A Necessary Being by definition exists independently of everything, given that, were it dependent on anything, it would be contingent and not necessary. Yet, here is a being which is not dependent on God. A greater God, however, could be conceived, namely One upon Whom even this thing were dependent. This is clearly absurd given P2. It follows therefore that God is unique in His necessity.

Please proceed to "On Creation."

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On Creation:

P6. I will prove that God Himself is the sole object of His own will.

P6a. It is not to be contested that a will is good insofar as its object is good, and a good will has as its object that which is good. Even Kant does not contest this point, but rather orients the goodness of a will towards the moral law. Assume therefore that God does not not will Himself alone, but Himself and other things or other things only or nothing at all.

It has already been established in P2 that God is the Supreme Good. Assume therefore either that God wills other things only or nothing at all. A better will can be imagined, namely a will which has as its teleological object the Supreme Good, namely God. Yet, it is a contradiction to say that God does not have this better will, as has been shown in P2. It follows therefore that it is not the case that God wills other things alone or nothing at all.

Assume then that God wills both Himself and other things. Either it is the case that God wills the other things seeing some deficiency in Himself which the other things supplement or it is the case that these other things add some additional goodness to Himself.

Suppose the former. It was already established in P2 that God is the Supreme Good. If there is in God some deficiency, then there can be conceived a greater Good, namely one in which there is no deficiency, but this is clearly absurd, given P2. It follows therefore that God does not see in Himself some deficiency which other things supplement.

Suppose the latter. It was already established in P2 that God is the supreme Good. If the other objects of God's will can add some greater goodness to God, then a greater Good can be conceived, namely one so good that nothing can be added to it, but this is clearly absurd, given P2. It follows therefore that nothing can be added to God's goodness.

From the above, it clearly follows that it is not the case that God wills both Himself and other things.

From the above, it clearly follows that God alone is the object of His will.

P6b. Assume that God wills something other than Himself. God therefore wills some contingent created thing, some contingent uncreated thing, or something necessary which is not Himself.

Suppose that God wills some contingent uncreated thing. If the thing is contingent and has not been created, then it does not exist, and therefore God will lacks an object. Yet, a greater will can be conceived, namely a will which does not lack an object, but it is absurd to say that God does not have this will, given P2. It follows therefore that God does not will some contingent uncreated thing.

Suppose that God wills some contingent created thing. It has been established in P3 that God is the Creator of all contingent things, and it has been established in P1b that God is Eternal, and that in God there is no sequence. From the above, it follows that God's will logically precedes the creation of things. If it is the case that God wills some contingent created thing, therefore, it follows that God wills it after He has created it, but this is clearly absurd, given P1b. It follows therefore that God does not will some contingent created thing.

Suppose that God wills some necessary thing which is not Himself. Yet, it has already been demonstrated in P5 that God alone is the Necessary Being. Therefore, God wills some thing which is not, and thus His will lacks an object. A greater will can be conceived, namely one which does not lack an object, but it is absurd to say that God does not have this will, given P2. It follows therefore that God does not will some other necessary thing.

From the above, it follows that God is the sole object of His own will.

P7. I will prove that God Himself is the sole object of His own intellect.

It is not to be doubted that God knows Himself. Should we suppose that God does not know Himself, then immediately a more perfect intellect could be conceived, namely one which has God as its object. It is absurd, however, to say that God does not have this intellect, given P2.

Assume that God knows something other than Himself. God therefore knows some contingent created thing, some contingent uncreated thing, or something necessary which is not Himself.

Suppose that God knows some contingent uncreated thing. If the thing is contingent and has not been created, then it does not exist, and therefore God intellect lacks an object. Yet, a greater intellect can be conceived, namely an intellect which does not lack an object, but it is absurd to say that God does not have this will, given P2. It follows therefore that God does not know some contingent uncreated thing.

Suppose that God knows some contingent created thing. It has been established in P3 that God is the Creator of all contingent things, and it has been established in P1b that God is Eternal, and that in God there is no sequence. From the above, it follows that God's will logically precedes the creation of things. Furthermore, in any act of creation, the intellect precedes the will. If it is the case that God wills some contingent created thing, therefore, it follows that God knows it after He has created it, but this is clearly absurd, given P1b. It follows therefore that God does not know some contingent created thing.

Suppose that God knows some necessary thing which is not Himself. Yet, it has already been demonstrated in P5 that God alone is the Necessary Being. Therefore, God knows some thing which is not, and thus His intellect lacks an object. A greater intellect can be conceived, namely one which has an object, but it is absurd to say that God does not have this intellect, given P2. It follows therefore that God does not know some other necessary thing.

From the above, it follows that God is the sole object of His own intellect.

P8. I will prove that God knows and wills created things only in His self knowledge and self will.

I have shown in P3 that God is the Creator of all things, and that all things are dependent on His will. In P6 and P7, however, I have shown that God is the sole object of His own will and intellect. It follows, therefore, that God wills (and therefore knows) creatures and created things, but neither as objects separate from Himself nor in a different act of willing and knowing. He therefore knows and wills created things in the same act whereby He knows and wills Himself. That is, God knows and wills created things only in His self knowledge and self will.

Note on P8: By saying that God knows and wills created things only in His self knowledge and self will, I do not mean to advance any kind of pantheism. I understand that all things exist "in God" in the sense that God is the cause both of the origin and of the sustaining of the being of created things. What is meant precisely by God understanding and willing creatures in the same act of willing and knowing Himself will be made more plain in P9, P10, and P11.

P9. I will prove that the essences of things (henceforth called Ideas) both are eternal and precede the particulars.

It has been shown in P3 that God is the Creator of all contingent things. It is a self apparent truth that in the act of intentionally creating (and let it not be supposed that God, in creating, does not create intentionally, for then we could conceive of a greater God (One Who creates intentionally), which is absurd, given P2), will precedes action, and intellect precedes will. It follows, therefore, that in the act of creation, God must have in willing creation some corresponding object of His intellect. Therefore, if God creates something, He must have a corresponding intellectual object for the thing He creates. Yet, it cannot be the case that He knows this particular object, first since God's act of knowledge precedes the particular, and then since this particular object first was not, then was, and at every moment is at flux. It has been shown in P3, however, that in God there is no sequence. Rather, the corresponding object to God's intellect must likewise be eternal and unchanging, since God's intellect likewise must be eternal and unchanging. It follows, therefore, that the essences of things (henceforth called Ideas) both are eternal and therefore precede the particulars (since they are not eternal).

P10. I will prove that the Ideas exist in the mind of God and are one with God's nature.

Suppose that Ideas exist apart from God. Either the Ideas exist contingently or necessarily.

Suppose that the Ideas exist contingently. If it is the case that Ideas exist contingently, it follows from P3 that God has created them, and from P9 it follows that there must be corresponding Ideas for them (which consequently must be either contingent or necessary), but this leads to a vicious regress and so is absurd. Therefore, the Ideas do not exist contingently.

The Ideas therefore exist necessarily. Yet, it has already been shown in P5 that God alone exists necessarily. It follows, therefore, that Ideas do not exist apart from God, but rather exist in the mind of God and are one with God's nature.

P11. I will prove that God created the world in reflection of His own Goodness.

Assume that God created the world in order that something might be added either to His glory, His goodness, &c. Clearly, then, a greater God can be conceived, namely one to Whose glory, goodness, &c. nothing can be added, but this is absurd, given P2. It follows therefore God did not create the world in order that something might be added to Him which before was deficient.

Assume that God created the world for some reason other than that His Goodness might be reflected, for some reason external to Himself. This is absurd, however, since I have already demonstrated in P6 that God is the sole object of His own will, and I have demonstrated in P8 that God wills created things only in His act of self willing.

It follows therefore that God created the world in reflection of His own Goodness.

P12. I will prove that this is the best possible world (or at least the best compossible world).

Assume that God did not create the best possible world. A greater God can be conceived, namely one Who wills only the best possible (or best compossible) world, if He creates, but this is absurd, given P2. It follows therefore that God created the best possible world (or best compossible).

Please proceed to "On Morality."

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On Morality:

P13. I will prove that morality subsists in loving God.

By "morality" it is commonly understood "living rightly" and "doing what is good." It seems strange (perhaps even contradictory) to speak of a moral man who lives wrongly and does the evil, and even more strange to speak of an immoral man who lives rightly and does the good. As Kant and Abelard rightly point out, however, moral worth is not to be found either in inclinations nor in outcomes (since neither finds its origin in the moral agent), but in the will (or "consent," as Abelard calls it). To be a moral person, then, is to will what is good. It is obvious, however, that God is the supreme and complete Good (were He not, then a greater God could be conceived, namely One Who is, but this is absurd, given P2). It follows, therefore, that to be moral is nothing else but to have God as the sole and primary object of the will (see P6a).

P14. I will prove that there is a Moral Law common to all men.

P14a. I have proven in P9 and P10 that Ideas are both eternal and precede particulars, and further I have proven that they exist in the mind of God and are one with God's nature. I have proven further in P13 that to be moral is nothing except to have God as the sole and primary object of one's will. It follows, therefore, that to be moral is, in willing God, to will the Ideas also. Further, it is obvious that all men, though each is different from the others and unique, have in common their humanity, and this humanity has in God's mind a corresponding Idea. It follows, therefore, that all men, in willing God, must will in God and for themselves manhood in the Ideal.

Note on P14a. From the above, it clearly follows that to will in oneself what falls away from the Idea is clearly immoral, since to fail to will the Idea is to fail to will God in some way. If, for example, it is the nature of man that he be a social creature, then one must, in willing the Idea, abstain from gossip, since gossip tends to harm social bonds and wound the reputations of others.

P14b. Assume that it were not the case that there is a single Moral Law for all men that subsists chiefly in loving God. A greater God can be conceived, namely One Who is rightfully the sole and primary object of the will for all men (and all rational creatures, generally speaking), but this is absurd, given P2. It follows therefore that there is a single Moral Law for all men, and that Law subsists chiefly in loving God.

P15. I will prove that it is not a right use of the free will to do what is immoral.

St. Augustine defines the free will as the intermediate good whereby one is empowered to choose the higher good. Since I have proven in P13 that morality subsists in loving God, it follows trivially that it is not a right use of the free will to do what is immoral, since God by definition (see P2) is the Supreme Good.

P16. I will prove that man is in need of a Savior and that it is fitting that God become man.

I have proven in P13 that to be moral is nothing but to love God, and in P14 that all men are bound by a common Moral Law to do precisely that. It is further evident (save for One and maybe two or a few others) that all men have broken this Moral Law, that is to say, that all men have at some point broken the Law either by failing to love God (in the sense of of holding God as the primary and sole of the will) or by failing to will manhood in the Ideal. It follows, therefore, that in breaking the Law there is an infinite fault on the part of the moral agent (since the One offended is infinitely Majestic (let it not be thought that God is not infinitely Majestic, for were He not, then a greater God can be conceived, namely One Who is, but this is absurd, given P2)). Man, since he is finite, cannot atone for this fault. It follows, therefore, that men, since they have incurred an infinite moral debt which they cannot repay.

Justice demands that this debt be paid (and paid by the guilty (mankind generally speaking)), the guilty parties are entirely unable to repay it, and the mercy of God is such that He pities us who have wronged Him. It follows, then, that mankind is need of a Savior Who is able to repay this infinite debt, and this Savior can be God alone. Since the debt must be paid by man, however, it is entirely fitting that God become man in order to repay our infinite moral debt (henceforth called "sin").

Proceed to "On Politics."

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On Politics:

Preferatory Remarks:

I have thus far provided a very clear conception of God, of God's relationship to the world, and of God's relationship to moral agents, and this conception is "clear" in the sense that what I have written should be obvious to the reason. The reason that everything thus far has been very clear is because of God's nature as the Good, the Necessary, the Eternal, the Unique, and the Creator of all things.

When discussing politics, however, one runs the risk of running into fairly "murky waters," so to speak, insofar as politics is a science whereby men relate to each other, rather than to God, and there are a number of different ways in which men might relate to each other which are entirely acceptable, presupposing certain conditions are present.

For example, Kant tells us in the Groundwork that we ought to treat others as ends, never as means. Christ tells us to love other people as we love ourselves. Yet, it is very clear that there are a number of ways in which we can interact with each other and nonetheless avoid conflict with these precepts, and the same holds true of government.

Prima facie, there doesn't seem to be any intrinsic reason why democracy should be any better than monarchy, supposing that the monarch affords the same liberties, protects the same rights, and legislates more or less in the same manner that a democratic government would.

For the above reasons, in this particular section, I do not intend to demonstrate the rectitude of any particular political system, even though I indeed do have a particular preference (I have a particular affinity for fascism (not so much the appendix). Rather, I intend only to show what governments cannot rightly do, and consequently rule out certain systems.

General Remarks About the Aims of the Law:

In this particular section, I do not intend to make any claims about what governments are able (in the sense that they have the power actually to carry out and enforce) to legislate. Clearly, a despotic government is able to oppress its citizenry, put innocent people to death, make Christianity illegal, and so forth and so on.

No. I don't mean to make any claims about government in that sense. Rather, there is a certain (very strong, I think) sense in which people understand the law as having a certain amount of moral authority. Even if the government were not coercive, even if the government were unable to enforce its laws, there is, I think, still a sense in which we understand that we ought to follow the law nonetheless. Therefore, when I make a claim about what the government "can" do, I understand "can" in the sense of this moral authority which we understand the law as possessing.

Furthermore, it's obvious that there are occassions in which the government legislates when there is absolutely no moral authority in the legislation (for example, the Holocaust), and no man ought to honor that legislation.

When we consider the law, then, I think it should be evident that law is a means whereby we relate to each other and to the government in a civil society. Therefore, in any political system, it should be self-evident that the law should have these properties:

1. Legislation should aim towards the common good.
2. Legislation has behind it only the power of them that issue it.
3. Legislation should aim to protect the rights of the individual.

These 3 principles hold true for every good political system, and political systems are good only insofar as they instantiate the first and third principles.

P17. I will prove that there can be no binding legislation empowering the government either to commit or to perpetuate what is immoral.

P17a. I have proven in P14 that there is a Moral Law common to all men. It follows trivially, therefore, that there can be no binding legislation empowering the government to break that law, since the Moral Law applies equally both to each particular man and to groups of men.

P17b. I have proven in P13 that morality subsists in loving God, and in P2 that God is the Supreme Good. It is uncontested that law aims towards the common good. It follows trivially, therefore, that there can be no binding legislation for the government to commit or to perpetuate immorality, since immorality (by definition) falls away from goodness.

P18. I will prove that there can be no right to do what is immoral.

By "right" I understand legislation whereby the government forbids legislation making the thing (which is a right) unlawful. As I have already shown in P14, however, the Moral Law is common and binding to all men. Assume therefore that this particular action which is immoral is legislated to be a right. One finds oneself uttering a contradiction: "No law can be made against that which is unlawful." Clearly, then, it follows (almost trivially) from P14 that there can be no right to do what is immoral.

P19. I will prove that it does not infringe liberty legally to prohibit immorality.

Since I have demonstrated in P15 that it is not a right use of the free will to do what is immoral, it follows trivially that it does not infringe liberty when legislation is passed prohibiting that which is immoral.

Closing Remarks on Political Systems:

I have written in the opening remarks to this "note" that I did not intend to advance any particular political system as being better than others. However, given the above, it should be readily apparent that certain political systems are necessarily excluded as being good systems.

For example, if it is to be understood that men have a right to property (in the sense that property may not be taken away from them against their will), and it is further understood that it breaks the moral law to transgress this right (thievery), it follows that socialism and communism are intrinsically unlawful.

Furthermore, if it is to be understood that all men have an intrinsic dignity and moral worth, it follows that any political system (for example, Naziism) which has as its aim the transgression of that intrinsic dignity and moral worth is intrinsically unlawful.

Again, if it is to be understood that one of the chief aims of the law is securing the common good (and not the "good" of special interests groups), and furthermore it is to be understood that there can be no legislation or rights either for the individual or for the government to do what is immoral, then it follows that that no man may further the cause of any party seeking to transgress either principle (for example, the (American) Democratic Party), since such a party's aims are intrinsically unlawful.

Please proceed to "Abortion and Contraceptives."

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On Abortion and Contraceptives:

P20. I will prove that every abortion is murder.

By "murder" I understand the intentional slaying of a human person who is not guilty of a capital crime.

I have proven in P3 that God is the Creator of all things, and therefore it follows that God is the creator of every unborn child, even from the moment of conception. I have proven further in P9 that Ideas precede particulars, and it is according to these Ideas that God creates each particular. A posteriori we understand that the kind of thing God creates in creating the unborn child at conception is a human thing. Let it not be thought, therefore, that at the moment of conception (when the act of creation clearly occurs) there does not exist a creature whose essence is human, but rather there is some thing whose essence is other than human, but rather becomes human later, for were it the case, a greater God can be conceived, namely One Whose power is sufficient immediately to obtain what He wills, but this is absurd, given P2. It follows, therefore, that God in creating a human person at the moment of conception produces a creature whose essence is human. It follows, therefore, that a human person exists even at the moment of conception. Since it is confessed by every man that an unborn child can do no wrong (and therefore can incur no personal guilt), it follows that every abortion is murder, even from the moment of conception.

P21. I will prove that the government has legitimate power neither to command nor to aid in the commission of abortions.

Since I have proven in P20 that every abortion is murder (and every man confesses that murder is immoral (indeed, even criminal)), and I have proven in P17 that there can be no binding legislation for the government either to do or to perpetuate what is immoral, it follows trivially that the government has legitimate power neither to command nor to aid in the commission of abortions.

P22. I will prove that there can be no right to have an abortion.

Since I have proven in P20 that every abortion is murder (and every man confesses that murder is immoral (indeed, even criminal)), and I have proven in P18 that there can be no right to do what is immoral, it follows trivially that there can be no right to have an abortion.

P23. I will prove that no pregnancy is unwanted.

Since I have proven in P3 that God is the Creator of all things, and furthermore that no contingent thing exists except dependently on the will of God, it follows trivially that no pregnancy is unwanted.

P24. I will prove that the use of contraceptives is immoral.

By "contraceptives" I understand those devices, drugs, and other things which are used in order to prevent pregnancy.

I proven furthermore in P13 that morality substs in loving God and willing God as the sole and primary object of the will. It follows, therefore, that to be moral is to put one's will in line with the will of God, and insofar as one's will deviate's from God's will, it strays into the realm of immorality. I have proven, however, in P3 that God is the Creator of all things, and nothing exists except dependently on His will. To use contraceptives, therefore, is to will that one be closed off to the will of God, and this is clearly immoral, given the above propositions.

P25. I will prove that the government has no legitimate authority either to distribute, make mandatory the use of, or to aid in the production, sale, or procuration of contraceptives.

Since I have proven in P24 that the use of contraceptives is immoral, and further in P17 that there can be no binding legislation empowering the government either to commit or to perpetuate what is immoral, it follows trivially that the government has no legitimate authority either to distribute, make mandatory the use of, or to aid in the production, sale, or procuration of contraceptives.

P26. I will prove that there can be no right to use contraceptives.

Since I have proven in P24 that the use of contraceptives is immoral, and further in P18 that there can be no right to do what is immoral, it follows trivially that there can be no right to use contraceptives.

Please procede to "On Marriage and Sexuality."

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On Marriage and Sexuality:

Not. Done. Yet.

Please procede to "On Charity and the Human Person as a Moral End."

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On Charity and the Human Person as a Moral End:

Not. Done. Yet.

Please procede to "On Truth."

---------- Post added at 03:12 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:56 PM ----------

On Truth:

Not. Done. Yet.