Mind to Mind: Mr. Dennett & Mr. Gautama Exchange Ideas

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;74111 wrote:

Yes but the issue is that 'experience' was always understood by the empirical philosophers to be limited to the collection of data that could be experienced by any observer - meaning it must be 'objective', by definition. William James, and some of the other pioneers of psychology, tried to broaden the scope of empiricism to include 'data available to introspection', as did the phenomenologists. The problem is that, in the absence of the normative framework provided by Buddhism (or by 'dharma' more generally) there was nothing to prevent this 'introspective data' from being completely personal or idiosyncratic. And besides, your western empiricists always were, and remain, hostile towards anything resembling spirituality (none more so than Dennett).

[SIZE="3"]I might put it slightly differently and say that "experience" is considered sense experience by empiricists, and while sense experience is focused on things external to the observer, the experience itself is still purely subjective (because it takes place uniquely inside each individual). In other words, there is no possible way for experience, no matter what sort, to be anything other than subjective; it's just that there are two major categories of focus, the focus on externals (and consequently sense-dependent), and by a relative few, the interior focus on one's own consciousness before it is intwined in the senses. The requirement for confirmation by any observer is a practical measure for ensuring competency and honesty while studying the external world.

Now humanity has developed quite the expertise with externalized study, and consequently we have a horde of experts in that field. The experts may train from an early age to develop their external study skills, get scholarships because they are good at it, and then go on to make a living using it. Some write books and receive Nobel prizes. With all that success and reward, there is now a sizable number of people who believe science is next to godliness, that because it has worked so well on externals it works on everything, and even conclude that if science can't discover it, then it can't be true. This is the basis of physicalism.

Someone like Dennett comes along (getting back to the theme of this thread) who fully relies on externalization, and claims he can explain consciousness; of course, he insists any discussion fit his externalized model, not because he knows all consciousness features can be externalized, but because he believes a priori in physicalism (and epistemologies that reveal physicalness).

Further, that point I made above about all experience being subjective is a problem to Dennett's model because no one can explain (without dualism) how some single internal observer can arise from the zillions of mental activities the observer experiences. So Dennett has to get rid of that pesky subject, which he does by simply refusing to allow it into the discussion!

If you watched that video interview with Wright, when Wright implied an observer, Dennett merely answered it should not be included in a consciousness model. If he is asked why so many people report a sense of subjectivity, he just says we merely "think" it exists, but it doesn't really.

But that is no explanation at all because he never explains why we think it exists. So it seems to me that Dennett's solution to physicalism's inability to account for sentience is to simply ignore it.

The Buddha, in contrast, attributes it to a feature that can only be discovered by tracking backward in consciousness, back before entanglement in the senses, before the brain, before the body . . . back to the originating place for all phenomena. That is the part of consciousness that remains constant while all the other stuff moves about. Dennett says we are only that which moves about, the Buddha says we only identify with all that moves, but we are something even more basic and constant.

Does the Buddha's model defeat dualism? Yes. If what moves arises from an overall constant plane, then you simply have two conditions of one underlying reality (true, what causes things to arise and return isn't explained). Rather than dismiss or ignore what the vast majority of humans report about themselves, the Buddha's model accounts for the reports.[/SIZE]

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@LWSleeth,

Quote:

the experience itself is still purely subjective (because it takes place uniquely inside each individual)

Actually I beg to differ. Even though this may be true in a sense, in practise 'objective data' is what any number of people can exactly agree on, and especially quantifiable data, specifically the 'primary qualities' of mass, velocity, and so on. In this sense, it does not take place uniquely inside each individual; each individual can be reasonably certain that the other is seeing exactly the same thing. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and between objective and subjective characteristics, was especially associated with Galileo.

Anyway, not important. As for Dennett, it seems to me there is an obvious defeater for his argument which is so trivial that it makes you fall about laughing. Physical pain is apodictic - cannot plausibly be denied - and entirely subjective - cannot be experienced objectively. Surely somone else must have made this observation somewhere. Al these materialists are simply ideologues. I think they all suffer from a condition of some kind.

As for me, it is winter in the Southern Hemisphere, and I'm off skiing for a week. Been great being part of this and other discussions, I will be back later.

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;74384 wrote:

Actually I beg to differ. Even though this may be true in a sense, in practise 'objective data' is what any number of people can exactly agree on, and especially quantifiable data, specifically the 'primary qualities' of mass, velocity, and so on. In this sense, it does not take place uniquely inside each individual; each individual can be reasonably certain that the other is seeing exactly the same thing. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and between objective and subjective characteristics, was especially associated with Galileo.

As conscious experience, it must take place subjectively, whether it is experience through the senses or experiences that are strictly of our internal life. My only point is that no matter what triggers experience, experience is always subjective.

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@LWSleeth,

It is indubitable that there must always be a subject of experience, but I don't think this is necessarily what 'subjective' means. The word 'subjective' is used to distinguish aspects of experience, or judgement, from those elements of experience that are 'objective'.

Furthermore some experiences are entirely subjective, and some are not. For example, my thoughts and sensations are subjective in that they are directly perceptible only to me. However if you and I both witness an event, then we might have subjective views or opinions about the event, but there is also an element or part of the experience which is common to both of us and to any observer who also witnessed it.

If 'everything is subjective' then the word does not add anything or describe anything insofar as it applies to everything equally. It does not qualify anything.

(However I do agree that modern thought has made an enormous error by believing that 'objectivity is the sole criterion of truth', an error which is repeated every day on this forum.)

1 Reply

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;74492 wrote:

It is indubitable that there must always be a subject of experience, but I don't think this is necessarily what 'subjective' means. The word 'subjective' is used to distinguish aspects of experience, or judgement, from those elements of experience that are 'objective'.

Well, I suppose we better decide on definitions we are each using before we debate any further. There is of course a way we use the terms "objective" and "subjective" to signify types of interpretations where we say an interpretation is an unbiased reporting of facts, or we say it is colored by subjective influences; some also talk about objective reality in the sense reality exists independent of conscious interpretation.

But in this discussion we've been talking about sentience, and if the functionalist model accounts for it. Really what we need to know is what exactly defines experience; that is, not "types" of experience, but the very phenomenon itself.

I use a simple definition in my work, and that is: experience is sensitivity that knows it senses. Dennett doesn't add the second part of my definition ("knows it senses"), but only admits consciousness is sensitive. Being aware that we feel things is the problem for a physicalist model because it creates a singularity, a uniquely knowing "subject,"that should not be there if consciousness has derived from billions of neurons and lots of brain functions.

So by "subjective" I mean that part of consciousness that knows it feels. Just to make it a little more clear what I'm talking about, there are lots of things able to feel/sense -- a motion detector or Geiger counter for examples, are able to sense vibrational information -- but unlike consciousness, those things don't know they feel vibration (i.e., they don't subjectively experience). That second layer of awareness is what Dennett is trying to get rid of with his model (because, I opine, it seems so unlike anything physicalness can achieve, and he is a committed physicalist).

This "knower" aspect of us has been modeled (and ridiculed) as a homunculus, a little man sitting at the controls running the show from the middle the so-called Cartesian theater of our brain. Dennett's solution is interesting because he basically says consciousness is a collection of information, memory, and "stances" that come about as parts of the brain vie for prominence. It's the culmination of that activity which produces a decision or act, not some central, observing knower.

I say it's interesting because his model seems to be a perfect match for the Buddha's concept of acquired self. Just as Dennett has us not really in control, but merely following the operations of the brain, the Buddha too taught we are pushed around by our conditioning and desires rather than from being fully conscious. So the only difference between Dennett's ideas of consciousness and the Buddha's (as far as I can see), is that Dennett thinks conditioning and brain is all we are, while the Buddha says there's another element behind the conditioning we can join with.

I explain the difference in their models as what they know. Dennett only knows his incessantly going mind and his conditioning, so his model reflects that. The Buddha knew of a foundational plane behind all the movement, and his model reflects that.

jeeprs;74492 wrote:

Furthermore some experiences are entirely subjective, and some are not. For example, my thoughts and sensations are subjective in that they are directly perceptible only to me. However if you and I both witness an event, then we might have subjective views or opinions about the event, but there is also an element or part of the experience which is common to both of us and to any observer who also witnessed it.

As you can see, mixing up the two definitions of "subjective" creates confusion. The way you are using subjective (in your second description) is an informal way we've come to talk about personal bias. But the term subjective experience in discussions about the nature of consciousness almost always refers to the knower aspect of consciousness. If we are talking about subjectivity as sentience, then that is only directly available to you, and thus all experience is subjective.

jeeprs;74492 wrote:

If 'everything is subjective' then the word does not add anything or describe anything insofar as it applies to everything equally. It does not qualify anything.

True, but I didn't say everything is subjective, I said all experience is subjective; I hope you can see what I meant by that now.

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@LWSleeth,

Yes, thanks Les. I think a question of semantics. As you say at the end, I think what we are really discussing is 'sentience' although it also contains the implication of 'self-aware sentience'. Perhaps this is the meaning of the word 'buddhi' which is 'that which knows' and is the underlying word behind the term 'Buddha'.

Dennett and Theravada Buddhism (and also Hume) describe the 'personality' as being a constantly-changing aggregate of impressions, feelings and ideas with no 'abiding self'. However, as you say, the objectivist account concludes that human being is really nothing other than an information processing system which can be descibed objectively. The Buddha, as you say, has realised the state beyond all sorrow and impermanence. There is nothing like that understanding in the materialist account or in modern Western philosophy generally.

I feel I have to oppose the materialist understanding depicted by Dennett on the grounds that it is dehumanising.

Anyway I really am off skiing now - thanks for the explanation.

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@LWSleeth,

LWSleeth wrote:

Well, I suppose we better decide on definitions we are each using before we debate any further. . .

Interesting. . . as usual we find little concern about working within the bounds of set definitions without due cause to alter such definitions. Good grief . . . is a relaxed way to express the emotion raised by such discovery.

LWSleeth has said that 'in this discussion we have been talking about sentience,' and in the very next sentence suggests a connection by saying that 'we need to know what exactly defines experience.' In other words, sentience is something that is a matter of experience, or at least has some connection to it. To be honest, I'm not quite so sure that we'd find any informed people ever trying to deny that connection, so what gives? Which direction are we to think of ourselves as being led in?

A possible clue will be found in the next paragraph, where we find, "experience is sensitivity that knows it senses." By this we could take it that the argument is being put forth that sentience is the experience derived knowledge of sensing, but what advantage of explanation would that circle of statement offer us? To say that sentience is an experience derived from working brain is exactly the same thing, and is clearer a statement--so why avoid it?

If, barring any valid further reason to do otherwise, we were to hold the term sentience to its common definition of ' a sentient① state or quality; capacity for feeling or percieving; consciousness,' we would see that we really need not say anything other than that 'consciousness involves the state of knowing that experience has occurred'. Again, this is just as good as saying that living, working brain projects consciousness. If, on the other hand (and barring any valid further reason to do otherwise) we were to hold the term sentience to its other common definition of 'mere awareness or sensation that does not involve thought or perception,' we would see that a self contradiction would be found--in that the absence of thought or perception would surely entail a lack of knowledge and cognitively acknowledging sensory input.

Therefore assuming that self-contradiction is to be avoided, and to have been unintended, we will accept the former common definition (barring any cause to alter that). In that way, a further statement made by LWSleeth will have a robust relation. That statement is, "So by 'subjective' I mean that part of consciousness that knows it feels." While attempts to tag the word 'subjective' to the fact of consciousness at large is a strange thing, we can rest assured that so far, LWSleeth has given a correct, and supported by the evidences at large, understanding; namely that consciousness is defined as that level of conscious brain tissue which projects acknowledged attention to any number of sensory input data, both external and internal (as in the operation of the otolith, or emotional memory recall attached to episodic memory recall, etc.), and works with long-term potentation.

It must not be left behind, we will have to come to face sooner or later, that we ARE (an attempt to add a bit of humour along with the importance of the point . . . hee, hee, hee....) talking about brain here; and for that very reason, to the extent that brain is understood and knowledge on it is secure (notwithstanding the lack that some in certain philosophical circles have in keeping up with it), we must strive to rein in obsolete imaginations.

① Of, having, or capable of feeling (especially sympathy/empathy emotions) or perception (sensory input processing to consciousness); conscious

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@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;74671 wrote:

Interesting. . . as usual we find little concern about working within the bounds of set definitions without due cause to alter such definitions. Good grief . . . is a relaxed way to express the emotion raised by such discovery.

LWSleeth has said that 'in this discussion we have been talking about sentience,' and in the very next sentence suggests a connection by saying that 'we need to know what exactly defines experience.' In other words, sentience is something that is a matter of experience, or at least has some connection to it. To be honest, I'm not quite so sure that we'd find any informed people ever trying to deny that connection, so what gives? Which direction are we to think of ourselves as being led in?

A possible clue will be found in the next paragraph, where we find, "experience is sensitivity that knows it senses." By this we could take it that the argument is being put forth that sentience is the experience derived knowledge of sensing, but what advantage of explanation would that circle of statement offer us? To say that sentience is an experience derived from working brain is exactly the same thing, and is clearer a statement--so why avoid it?

If, barring any valid further reason to do otherwise, we were to hold the term sentience to its common definition of ' a sentient① state or quality; capacity for feeling or percieving; consciousness,' we would see that we really need not say anything other than that 'consciousness involves the state of knowing that experience has occurred'. Again, this is just as good as saying that living, working brain projects consciousness. If, on the other hand (and barring any valid further reason to do otherwise) we were to hold the term sentience to its other common definition of 'mere awareness or sensation that does not involve thought or perception,' we would see that a self contradiction would be found--in that the absence of thought or perception would surely entail a lack of knowledge and cognitively acknowledging sensory input.

Therefore assuming that self-contradiction is to be avoided, and to have been unintended, we will accept the former common definition (barring any cause to alter that). In that way, a further statement made by LWSleeth will have a robust relation. That statement is, "So by 'subjective' I mean that part of consciousness that knows it feels." While attempts to tag the word 'subjective' to the fact of consciousness at large is a strange thing, we can rest assured that so far, LWSleeth has given a correct, and supported by the evidences at large, understanding; namely that consciousness is defined as that level of conscious brain tissue which projects acknowledged attention to any number of sensory input data, both external and internal (as in the operation of the otolith, or emotional memory recall attached to episodic memory recall, etc.), and works with long-term potentation.

It must not be left behind, we will have to come to face sooner or later, that we ARE (an attempt to add a bit of humour along with the importance of the point . . . hee, hee, hee....) talking about brain here; and for that very reason, to the extent that brain is understood and knowledge on it is secure (notwithstanding the lack that some in certain philosophical circles have in keeping up with it), we must strive to rein in obsolete imaginations.

① Of, having, or capable of feeling (especially sympathy/empathy emotions) or perception (sensory input processing to consciousness); conscious

That sir is one amazing pile of blather.

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@LWSleeth,

I'm not quite sure how you can support that claim, LWsleeth. It is you who has stated that 'experience is sensitivity that knows its senses' and who has then further described 'experience' as being 'consciousness.' Think about that for a second, please. Think about the connection between the terms 'sensitivity' and 'senses.' Think about what might be gained from saying that 'consciousness knows that consciousness senses'--which is what you are saying, logically.

I tell you, LWSleeth, if a brain can not form the synaptic connections needed to project sensory input, there is no sensation to consciousness, no sensory experience--thus brain does not know. If a case of anterograde amnesia occurs at a fairly young age, almost no trace of long-term memory will be formed (and the only traces that can be found will not be projected to consciousness). No permanent experiences will be in the content of consciousness--thus brain would not know--and of course experience would not know..

Have you not been trying to assert that in such cases the consciousness content and state is an external (to brain) reality which is simply unknown to the otherwise possessor of such private consciousness?

The destruction of specific functioning cortical areas leaves no consciousness loss--the brain does not concern itself with what it does not know. If sensory input is not coming to a living module, there is feed-foward information that something is wrong, and there is disturbance in homoestasis.If, however, the module itself is distroyed, and sensory input intact and incoming, even, there is no problem at all--it is simply ignored (because the left-hemisphere does not miss what it does not recieve...and there is nothing coming from that module).

Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not true? Can you refute by demonstration the truthfulness of the understanding that what is otherwise a normal, and perfectly working consciousness for that individual patient, does not admit of the bodily possession of that limb simply because it no longer recieves any data from that limb module; and at the same time demonstrate how we could consider it a true external reality that that individual possesses a state of consciousness that acknowledges the bodily possession of that limb that the patient cannot 'tune into' because of the damaged brain tissue?

Also enough study has been done to know that in most cases, putting out the 'interpreter' function of the left hemisphere, especially tied up in the structures responsible for linguistics to frontal cortical (layers 2 & 3), puts out the singularity projection of consciousness to a very high degree. For this reason, the silent right-hemisphere, while still very much maintaining a level of conscious, does not appear to have consciousness (in the normal sense, because it doesn't work to unify all separate data recieved). Split-brain patients have been known to have hemisphere disputes (played out by their hands).

Can you demonstrate that it is a true external reality that each hemisphere is in possession of a level of hemispheric consciousness that can only be realized by corpus callosum severage; or do you think this is because we are essentially talking about the 'interpreter' and brain, here?

In cases where the vestibular system has major or total irrevocable damage, the patient will have the constant feeling of falling, the room spinning, and an inability to track moving objects visually. This not only alters, but puts a major strain on the state of consciousness--however, there is no brain damage here. The strength of incoming erroneous signals can be tuned out a bit, but the array becomes so strong that the brain cannot shut it out. Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not a matter of brain function alone? And, in the event that you wish to deny that this sensitivity is simply because brain tissue senses, can you demonstrate that there is some true external reality of a consciousness which behaves in such a way?

Dr. Gazzaniga (who had also done much work with Dr. LeDoux) put it humorously in the following way:

[indent]We don't usually feel like dispatchers with reports coming in from hundreds or thousands of different sources, deciding what is important or useful or not, or like triage nurses lining up incoming information in order of its importance, but somehow this is happening in our brains. (italics his) Human-The Science Behind What Makes Us Human, p 285; HarpersCollins, (2008)[/indent]

What Dennett is saying, overall, is basically the case. The premise upon which you have based the question is faulty because of lack of information, that's all. If you were to adjust for that, there'd be no problem--but you might have to update your explanations of 'experience, 'consciousness', and 'mind.'

(And of course, pain is no big deal at all, we all feel it, you see, as do animals too !! . . . just another one of those brain things, you know.)

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;74770 wrote:

I'm not quite sure how you can support that claim, LWsleeth. It is you who has stated that 'experience is sensitivity that knows its senses' and who has then further described 'experience' as being 'consciousness.' Think about that for a second, please. Think about the connection between the terms 'sensitivity' and 'senses.' Think about what might be gained from saying that 'consciousness knows that consciousness senses'--which is what you are saying, logically.

I tell you, LWSleeth, if a brain can not form the synaptic connections needed to project sensory input, there is no sensation to consciousness, no sensory experience--thus brain does not know. If a case of anterograde amnesia occurs at a fairly young age, almost no trace of long-term memory will be formed (and the only traces that can be found will not be projected to consciousness). No permanent experiences will be in the content of consciousness--thus brain would not know--and of course experience would not know..

Have you not been trying to assert that in such cases the consciousness content and state is an external (to brain) reality which is simply unknown to the otherwise possessor of such private consciousness?

The destruction of specific functioning cortical areas leaves no consciousness loss--the brain does not concern itself with what it does not know. If sensory input is not coming to a living module, there is feed-foward information that something is wrong, and there is disturbance in homoestasis.If, however, the module itself is distroyed, and sensory input intact and incoming, even, there is no problem at all--it is simply ignored (because the left-hemisphere does not miss what it does not recieve...and there is nothing coming from that module).

Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not true? Can you refute by demonstration the truthfulness of the understanding that what is otherwise a normal, and perfectly working consciousness for that individual patient, does not admit of the bodily possession of that limb simply because it no longer recieves any data from that limb module; and at the same time demonstrate how we could consider it a true external reality that that individual possesses a state of consciousness that acknowledges the bodily possession of that limb that the patient cannot 'tune into' because of the damaged brain tissue?

Also enough study has been done to know that in most cases, putting out the 'interpreter' function of the left hemisphere, especially tied up in the structures responsible for linguistics to frontal cortical (layers 2 & 3), puts out the singularity projection of consciousness to a very high degree. For this reason, the silent right-hemisphere, while still very much maintaining a level of conscious, does not appear to have consciousness (in the normal sense, because it doesn't work to unify all separate data recieved). Split-brain patients have been known to have hemisphere disputes (played out by their hands).

Can you demonstrate that it is a true external reality that each hemisphere is in possession of a level of hemispheric consciousness that can only be realized by corpus callosum severage; or do you think this is because we are essentially talking about the 'interpreter' and brain, here?

In cases where the vestibular system has major or total irrevocable damage, the patient will have the constant feeling of falling, the room spinning, and an inability to track moving objects visually. This not only alters, but puts a major strain on the state of consciousness--however, there is no brain damage here. The strength of incoming erroneous signals can be tuned out a bit, but the array becomes so strong that the brain cannot shut it out. Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not a matter of brain function alone? And, in the event that you wish to deny that this sensitivity is simply because brain tissue senses, can you demonstrate that there is some true external reality of a consciousness which behaves in such a way?

Dr. Gazzaniga (who had also done much work with Dr. LeDoux) put it humorously in the following way:

[indent]We don't usually feel like dispatchers with reports coming in from hundreds or thousands of different sources, deciding what is important or useful or not, or like triage nurses lining up incoming information in order of its importance, but somehow this is happening in our brains. (italics his) Human-The Science Behind What Makes Us Human, p 285; HarpersCollins, (2008)[/indent]

What Dennett is saying, overall, is basically the case. The premise upon which you have based the question is faulty because of lack of information, that's all. If you were to adjust for that, there'd be no problem--but you might have to update your explanations of 'experience, 'consciousness', and 'mind.'

(And of course, pain is no big deal at all, we all feel it, you see, as do animals too !! . . . just another one of those brain things, you know.)

You seem to believe regurgitating facts and other people's concepts, theories, and arguments somehow equates to sound reasoning. Add to that how your self-referencing lectures only rely on your beliefs, and never properly give weight to other's points, and we are left with proclamations supported by a narrow collection of self-serving facts. I find that kind of condescending, overbearing attitude so irritating I wish you'd stop talking to me if it is all you can manage.

1 Reply

@LWSleeth,

KJ and LW-
actually you guys are both making me giggle...but i must admit i dont think there is going to be any productive exchange of ideas between you. i dont fault either of you, but i see you are speaking in different languages.
peace,
salima

1 Reply

@salima,

salima;74777 wrote:

KJ and LW-
actually you guys are both making me giggle...but i must admit i dont think there is going to be any productive exchange of ideas between you. i dont fault either of you, but i see you are speaking in different languages.
peace,
salima

Well, I can talk science competently when that's the subject matter, and when someone I'm debating acknowledges my points, answers them fairly, and then responds according to how a conversation should naturally proceed between two people treating each other respectfully.

But there are some people who just can't believe that you understand science (and what science has discovered), yet don't buy the science believer's theory that all existence is physical. If you disagree with them, you can expect one science lecture after another. What's particularly distressing is that they do not make one iota of effort to study or understand the other side of things. They merely dismiss it out of hand merely because it isn't "scientific," and then keep cramming their beliefs down other's throats.

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@LWSleeth,

the thing that is so funny to me is that i see you both saying the same thing in different words. i can incorporate all of what both of you say into what i perceive as real. it is the miserable limitations of language that is getting in the way of understanding all across the world. there is a way of listening behind the words.

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@LWSleeth,

Tis good that some humor can be found in the exchange; also good to be entertaining ! :bigsmile: In a way, I think I can see how some points of exchange between LWSleeth and myself may be the same, however others, I'm not sure about; at the moment. Good to see that you are following along, salima, and being entertained to boot.

While I cannot deny the flow of apologetic emotion that through my veins runs, LWSleeth, neither can I deny a degree of confusion. (and could this have any bearing on it?) What, exactly are you wishing for in your plea for 'acknowledgment?'

I mean, we have the OP, we can go back and look at the whole thread, we can see how the flow of discussion has developed, and we can put that on the table and double check it. Yet, we can put other things that relate to, or have direct bearing on, what is written within this thread, out on the table as well--in that it all is representative of the argument you are putting forth. Wouldn't this be most pragmatically correct?

While it is most obvious, and you had clearly stated so, that the didactic story of the OP was your creation, and that while some things could be challenged in it, it is true, is it not, that I didn't come into the thread until post #5, questioning a statement you had made in your #4. Is what I am saying here true? (please see post #4 and post #5)

In your #6, is it not true that you have stated the following:

[indent] I can and have argued extensively, for example, how mind can be both brain dependent in some ways, and brain independent in others (just as a radio signal is dependent on the mechanics of the radio to manifest somewhere, but still exists independently even if no radio is present to pick it up).

As a meditator, and student of past great meditators, I can state with utter conviction that is very possible to still the mind (and you can do it in a sensory deprivation chamber too). In that experience, not only is a knower present, the experience of knowing (knowing one exists) is heightened.[/indent]

And, when factored in with another statement in your #4 :

[indent]Well, let me make it clear what I mean by "quieting the mind" before we get into a debate about it. It is specifically to quiet that activity Dennett claims is key to the rise of our sense of being individually conscious. As I quoted him, “Your stream of consciousness is replete with an apparently unending supply of associations. As each fleeting occupant of the position of greatest influence gives way to its successors, any attempt to halt this helter-skelter parade and monitor the details of the associations only generates a further flood of evanescent states, and so on.”

So to be clear, I am not talking about the brain, since if it were wholly quiet we'd be dead. (bold mine) [/indent]

And your #8 :

[indent]As I said, I wanted to avoid a debate about the neuronal model, especially since I don’t believe the brain “creates” consciousness.[/indent]

Along with the anlogy story you had used to answer a question presented by salima (#37), I think it is clear enough that you are presenting the proposition that 'mind' has an certain volume (for lack of a better term) that is not physical, that is not part of the brain, and that is (based on other points from other threads and such) eternal and prior.

Therefore, when you complain that I do not acknowledge (you might want to check out that word carefully in good dictionary too) your points, are you talking about this point? I hope not, but, if you are, since this point is very important for the point you are trying to raise in your question, I would think that you'd be more willing to defend it with something other than its just being your interpretation of your experience.①

Also, I have answered the question you had wanted an answer to, and you had said earlier that you were ready to defend your belief that the answer which is most clear, is incorrect, right? And so, to do that you'd surely have to talk science in order to refute the findings, right? I mean, if you wish to refute the conclusion and results of a study in neuroscience, you'll first have to do it in that discipline, will you not? If you simply wish to argue that experience alone is what will teach one, and that all meditators who have experienced samadhi experience basically the same thing, then I will say, "of course, the basic mid-line cortical structures and basic brain workings are all very, very much the same, down there, so we'd all get the same thing."

I'd like to work with you, but you earlier said you were not interested. Now, I do want to rein in misinformation when I see it, however. So what, exactly can you present besides your experience, to refute the hard-data findings of actual studies done?

① From post #37, please note the force of the following, bold and underline mine:

[indent] I don't rely on my experiences with samadhi as a proof of anything except what I actually experience; I resist such "believers" because nothing about consciousness is proven, and because it doesn't fit with my experience; That is why one of my highest ideals for acquiring knowledge is to not believe anything once and for all, but instead to let my experience of reality shape my views as it will; I don't want you to think I believe I "know" anything much except what I have experienced; There is another model (besides the neuronal model) that fits the facts. I am going to touch on it as I answer you, but keep in mind I am not claiming it is the “truth,” [my insertion; fact, but not claimed as truth?] or even that I “believe” it myself. It just better jives with my experiences; The experience of this foundation reveals just how vast it is; Of course, I can say that because I’ve experienced it . . . without that personal experience, I don’t see how anyone can believe it is true; But most smart people are trying to understand consciousness without directly experiencing its nature, and that results in opinions about it that sells consciousness short; Instead they turned their attention 180 degrees around to experience consciousness directly, before consciousness is tangled in the senses and nervous system, to see that consciousness is indeed composed of something not included in physicalistic models [my insertion: seems to be extremely close to saying that something is known as a true fact, doesn't it?]; The most dedicated practitioners stuck with the interior path, penetrating more deeply inward still, until finally experiencing where consciousness remains “one” with its source. They experienced how their CNS had been remarkably successful at giving them a sense of separation from that consciousness origin and foundation, yet individuating them as well within the general consciousness realm they’d rediscovered. All the dots connected, give a very clear frame of intent to communicate, and all in only one post ![/indent]

1 Reply

@KaseiJin,

Deleting my post.

1 Reply

@LWSleeth,

LWSleeth;75457 wrote:

You may not use that one, but here's a couple of tactics you attempt that so irritate me I would rather not interact with you if you are going to continue them.

1. "Dismissing" or failing to give proper weight to my report of experiences. An example:

I simply added my report as a witness to centuries of similar reports by meditators. That I took the time--years of practice (and study)--to learn the experience so I could speak knowledgeably about it makes it more than just an uninformed opinion. And what "exactly" do you know about the experience? You dismiss it's significance like an expert when you don't know much at all.

The effect of that dismissive attitude is that you whiz by what I consider significant enough to make you stop and deal with it intellectually. But you treat it as so unimportant, it's like I made no point at all; and of course the next step is to return the discussion to the framework YOU think is correct, and to then just go on and on and on and on . . . with your own views.

Let's kind of go one at a time, then, and before I rush on off to the office, here . . . I'd like to touch on this one.

Yes, I understand your emotion; trust me, I do. At the same time, however, I would like to again present the understanding that what you and all meditators over so many hundreds of years even, experience when you focus your concentration like that, just like the experiences Alan had with his NDE, are internal brain events. I know I have presented that to you before (no time to double check and link now) either here on this thread, or on the Gospel of Thomas thread.

Now how can a person who has never done that much of a concentrative degree of meditation (please recall, again, that I did meditate, you see, just not that 'deeply') make such a claim? Because, simply (as I have presented on this thread), since we are talking about brain, and the brain, and since almost every H. sapien has a very similar basic brain build (structure and operation), and because that organ is being, and has been, studied fairly well enough to elucidate a number of solid, verifiable understandings, we can make sure claims about what is happening in stages of sleep, and states of meditation. That's how I can say what I am saying, you see.

Now another thing, will be the need to adhere to common definitions, unless there is a good reason to alter them--such as I have done with the word 'conscious' (which I use as a quasi-noun, rather than an adjective for the noun consciousness [because the evidences of understanding make that word choice more precise, and since the old English terms were set way before the neurosciences got started, and are obsolete]).

But, this much for now. Thus in summary, I understand your emotion, and the understanding that the basic underlying condition of the working brain in such a state is known (even if one does not wish to accept it [and of course to refute it will take hard evidence from studies done with a proper methodology, peer-reviewed, and so on]) So I have presented the later in explanation of why the meditator can feel the emotion, can have the sense of non-self, yet have the memory traces being made along with the consciousness required to task in those, and while having shut out the continuously incoming sensory signals, synchronized language modules and self-talk areas, memory play-back areas, and so on, still has the mind up and running.

(will have to edit later...apologies...must run now. KJ)

0 Replies

@LWSleeth,

"nothing in the model I gave you contradicts what we empirically observe about the brain. The only difference is that you and other physicalist believers interpret it to mean the brain is creating consciousness, and I and other meditators interpret it as the brain affecting the consciousness being projected through it. There is no disagreement about the observed influences of the brain..." LW

this is the same model that i have come to accept, though i might say, rather than the brain having influences, that it has in place certain limitations of perception which constrict the consciousness from an accurate view of its condition. those limitations however can be overcome. the brain cant really affect consciousness-but consciousness can in fact affect the brain. and in this instance i am using the word consciousness to refer to that unified field of consciousness that les describes. in fact, i do not believe there is any other definition possible. what is commonly considered to be consciousness in the individual unit or brain is actually that awareness arrived at through its individual perspective and perception, which includes but is not limited to the five senses. even its self-awareness comes from these senses, which is why when they are temporarily by-passed a new sense of self emerges.

but les, i have to ask if you become annoyed with a person's speaking and communicating habits, what is the practical use of this experience? i have been struggling for decades to overcome 'taking it personally' since i discovered that there isnt really any 'person'. yes, in the real world of course we cant ignore everything and say so what, he is only me and i am him and it's ok. but this is only a discussion on an anonymous messageboard.

this may be part of the reason why 'physicalists' are unable to accept a view of reality such as we describe. they cannot see how it can become a foundation for a way of navigating through this physical world, how to apply it to daily life. it isnt easy, but i believe it can be done. i try.

1 Reply

@salima,

salima;75486 wrote:

but les, i have to ask if you become annoyed with a person's speaking and communicating habits, what is the practical use of this experience? i have been struggling for decades to overcome 'taking it personally' since i discovered that there isnt really any 'person'. yes, in the real world of course we cant ignore everything and say so what, he is only me and i am him and it's ok. but this is only a discussion on an anonymous messageboard.

I think I've been debating too long. I am going to drop out and focus on my work. :surrender: I should have realized by now that there is little hope for an objective discussion if people lack the experience to properly judge the claims I make, or if I don't have the room to present the whole model for their consideration. It will take at least an entire book for me to make my case. My apologies for the miscalculation, and thanks for participating.

1 Reply

@LWSleeth,

LWSleeth;75487 wrote:

I think I've been debating too long. I am going to drop out and focus on my work. :surrender: I should have realized by now that there is little hope for an objective discussion if people lack the experience to properly judge the claims I make, or if I don't have the room to present the whole model for their consideration. It will take at least an entire book for me to make my case. My apologies for the miscalculation, and thanks for participating.

i know what you are facing and it isnt easy. if i can be of any help to you in writing that book, let me know. you know where to find me!

and KJ, i have some thoughts for you in closing. there would seem to be nobody left on this thread now but you and me-i think everyone else must have unsubscribed!

i think there are a number of points that go beyond what neurons would be suited to do and logicically they would not be programmed to do for the purpose of survival or preservation of species, which is the purpose of brain activity ias you stated it, or something to that effect.

1-why would the attribute of sympathy develop? if killing the weak makes a species more fit and strong, why develop a characteristic that would protect the weak and downtrodden? humanity has a fair degree of that.
2-why would one species defend another as humans do in the case of animal rights' activists? we are not defending them so that they can continue to be our benefactors-often our defense causes us to lose out on capitalising from that which killing them would allow.
3-why would a herd of zebras or a sunset be beautiful and fill us (some of us) with awe and wonder, or any other vista of nature, to the extent we would want to preserve it for future generations? just so that it will be a part of their experience, not for any survival necessities i mean.
4-if a brain reacts to stimuli inherently wanting to survive and reproduce, then it is primarily looking for food and water, shelter and sex in a sort of automatic reflex action. even if you want to say the human brain is more complicated, has memories and associations and emotions that other beings do not, it could only react. with what you know of neuroscience, could the brain, assuming it to be in a wholly normal and healthy state of ordinary consciousness initiate an action that served no purpose, or even some purpose that deviated from those already mentioned?

i think the will and intent is the key to what we are talking about here. there is a will, which would be a power and decision-making sense which is able to differentiate between things that run the entire spectrum of value and/or harm. it can handle the small stuff, like 'get your hand out of the fire' but it is responsible for that which nothing else can do. without it there would have been no cathedrals built or symphonies composed or going to the moon or wars fought. it is responsible for the best and the worst that humanity is capable of-and i dont see how you can put that in the brain as a well organized, mechanically oriented group of neurons firing across synapses filled with hormonal secretions.

it is really very funny to me, while there were three of us left here i drew an analogy in my mind that it was as if we were the right half, the left half, and the interpreter parts of the brain. we are all living the same reality and all talking about the same thing, but i guess the interpreter isnt doing a good enough job...

0 Replies

@KaseiJin,

KaseiJin;67247 wrote:

It is true that you had kind of spelled out--regardless of its possibly being somewhat general--what you had meant by 'quieting the mind' in the first paragraph of your #4 post, above. As I have read that (along with other points that evidently have bearing on that), you are talking about working around neuronal clusters (loops, maps, pathways) by creating firing patterns similar to slow wave sleep for the most part. In other words, the effect is to shut out sensory input information, a degree of memory recall, self-talk, and much cortical to basal feedback systems from cognition of them.

From my experiences, strictly dealing with the physical relaxation of muscles through not moving, and making them unclench bit by bit, suddenly you become aware that you can't feel where your limbs are, though you do feel some kind of movements withn the body. However, if someone was to touch your arm, you would feel it.
So it seems that upon lack of stimulation.

At the same time, in a state somewhat like sleep, but the most relaxed part, healing seems to occur at a vastly increased rate.

I never felt that memory was affected, nor computational ability. What was affected was emotion about what was being calculated or recalled. Merely thinking about something that was a subject of much anxiety did not prompt anxiety. And a subject could be examined - or everything just "let go". It is, surprisingly, really only an attractive proposition to really "let go"( and not be content to merely ponder stuff, whilst very comfortable), once you start to feel freedom of choice.

If any of this is informative, in any way..good.

1 Reply

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