@TK421,
TK421 wrote:I'm not so sure that's true. For instance, the medieval ontological proof of God's existence depends on the concept of God as a greater than which nothing can exist. The concept of a God constrained by logic is less than the concept of a God not constrained by logic; therefore, God must be above logic. This illustrates a very basic and traditional way of thinking about God, at least in the philosophy of religion.
I'm not aware of many medieval scholastics who held that position. If logic determines that God should exist in a certain way, then it would be illogical to say that God exists illogically.
TK421 wrote:If God knew prior to creating the world the suffering that would befall humanity and had the power to do things differently, then He is culpable. One wonders why, even if He didn't have the power to avert mass suffering, He would create us in the first place. Certainly the degree of human suffering far outweighs the good, especially if we throw Hell into the equation. An all-knowing and -good God simply would not have created us.
I disagree. I think God proves that He possesses the property of goodness by bringing about permanent goodness in the world. God averts culpability with evil by simply not directly or indirectly causing evil. That is, God is not a sufficient condition for evil.
For example, if we tied a rope on a downhill slope where skiers are passing by, then we are
directly culpable for the evil of the passerby skiers tripping and hurting themselves (i.e., we act as both the
sufficient and necessary condition for their fall). If we simply stood at a difficult spot which was too distracting to the skier such that all the skiers fell and hurt themselves, then we are
indirectly culpable for the evil of them falling and hurting themselves (i.e., we act only as a
sufficient reason for them falling, but some might have fallen anyway, or a pro wouldn't have fallen at all, so we are not a necessary condition for them falling). On the other hand, if we simply took skiers on a ski trip and some fell and hurt themselves really badly--maybe even one died, then we are not culpable for this evil. That is, we are only a necessary condition for them falling, but we do not act as a sufficient condition for them falling.
God is not a sufficient cause of evil, and therefore is not culpable for evil. For God to be a sufficient cause, you'd have to show that evil was inevitable for creation, and that's what Christian theology rejects.
TK421 wrote:By reducing God from "all-powerful" to "not-so-all-powerful" we admit the potential for humanity to outstretch God. I don't think this is a possibility traditional Christianity would entertain.
God is all-powerful in a relational sense versus a crazy, absurd sense.