@Setanta,
Setanta wrote: I don't know why the hell you're talking about "the Presser Court."
Because I had confused
Presser with
Miller. Perhaps you had started your response after I corrected myself.
Setanta wrote:I don't see any basis, other than your quixotic desire to align yourself with what you imagine to be the values of American libertarians, to come to the conclusion that that ruling was a mistake.
The reason is that I consider it a fallacy to construe "preceded" as meaning "predicated".
American legislation is ripe with laws of the structure "Whereas (x1, x2, x3, ...), be it enacted that (operative clause 1, operative clause 2, operative clause 3, ...)". American courts never treat the "whereas" clauses as constraining the reach of the operating clauses. They merely explain why those clauses are there.
Similarly, some bills of rights in state constitutions had operative clauses on other rights preceded by "whereas-like" clauses. See, for example, the free press clause in Rhode Island's constitution: "The liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state, any person may publish sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty" No judge ever interpreted the part before the comma as a constraint on the freedom of speech in Rhode Island. Analogously with "whereas" clauses in statutes, they treated clauses like that as explanations of why the substantive clauses where there, not as constraints on what they meant.
Hence, I consider it a gratuitous over-interpretation of the Second Amendment's grammatical structure to say that the part before the second comma constrains the right granted in the operative clause.