Moral Relativism. It may be right but it must be wrong.

You are not listening. Your example is bogus because the word "good" is too vague to have any meaning. Let me say it again, the reason the word "good" doesn't have any meaning (and can be assigned to different ideas) is because it is too vague.

That is why changing the vague idea of "goodness" to something specific, like "beauty" or "morality" completely turns your argument on its head.

No no - this is really my big point.

It's one thing to say: Purple is Beautiful.
It's another thing to say: Beautiful is Purple.

Purple is beautiful means Purple belongs to the category beautiful.
Beautiful is purple means Beautiful belongs to the category purple.

In my hypothetical, Person 1 defined good as purple. Person 2 defined good as furry animals. In other words, the Good is literally purple things. And for person 2, the Good is literally furry animals. This is entirely different from furry animals are good and purple is good.

And what you're saying now: "I argue that the word 'beautiful' refers to the same thing" ----> This is precisely my view! Which I have stressed from the start. This is my whole point!

You were the one who originally said that each person gets to define beautiful for themselves. But on the contrary - everyone uses the same definition. And you now concede my point.

Fil - I totally agree with you. The "in" and "relation to" distinction isn't that big a deal for me. But what you are saying after - I totally agree... The herbivore feels good in one thing. The carnivore feels good in another. But what they both experience is one thing - the good. Precisely - totally agree.

It is obvious that two people can agree on the meaning of the word "beauty" without agreeing on the items that are beautiful.

Some people believe that Sitar music is beautiful. I don't believe that Sitar music is beautiful. This doesn't mean that we have different meanings for the word "beautiful". It simply means that we have different ideas about what fits in the beautiful category based on our own values.

You originally said:



But after we discussed it, you said:



So you do concede that:



which is what I originally said.

--------------------------

Now, you're switching gears. Instead of talking about what the word "beauty" means, you are talking about what things belong to the category "beauty". But you've switched topics. Let's just confirm. You do agree that



Yes?

Note that that doesn't make "beauty" be relative or "good" be relative...the relation (whatever relation) probably needs the same form to make "good" or "beauty" show...the objects and subjects may vary but the form of the relation, the pattern, needs be the same. What it means is that both object and subject when together in the relation conform to such a category that qualifies X, to be "good" or to be "beautiful"...

We say X is beautiful when we should say my relation with X makes it beautiful...that brings about the idea that property's are relational, are functions...yet another step to assume an information reality...

PS - special careful is needed because I don't intend to mean subjects are particularly necessary...as objects can interact with other objects relational functions can be established...I suppose at best we can say that when we have conscious agents such relations are far more complex...and even that is a guess...wishful thinking...it just might be the case that it is so.

Your style of argument is really tiresome, especially the part where you keep on insisting that I concede. I am more interested in a discussion than a nuggie contest. Instead of picking little snippets out of context in some attempt at syntactic victory, it would be nice if you could respond to the point I am making.

My point is that the experience of beauty is something we all share. Everyone feels the happiness of seeing, or hearing something beautiful. In this way the concept of beauty is the same for all of us.

However the things that I consider beautiful is different then the things you consider beautiful. What we consider beautiful is dependent highly on our personal values, our upbringing and our culture.

There is no absolute standard of beauty. It is relative.

This doesn't mean that you and I don't agree on what the idea of beauty is, or our desire to experience beauty. It just means that we have different ideas of what is beautiful.

There is no contradiction here.

Doesn't that mean that when my friend remarks on the beauty of Sitar music, I should inform him that he is wrong (since actually Sitar music is not beautiful in a factual sense)?

What is wrong with beauty (and morality) being in the eye of the beholder?

haha - alright man. So you're not going to concede to the fact that beauty is a single idea?

You're complaining that I'm not responding to your points, but I introduced the topic. And you've been consistently trying to sidestep the topic. In other words, you're not really responding to my points.

My original point was that (1) each person does not define what the good is and (2) each person does not define what belongs to the good.

So first, you've shifted the conversation to beauty. OK. But I think you and I agree that (1) each person does not define what the beauty is. (which you won't concede, but apparently agree with).

Ok - so be it. So now you are moving on to point (2). Each person does not define what belongs to the beauty.

And I assert again, each person does not define what belongs to the beauty. Now, Person A may find the taste of dog feces not beautiful. In other words, the taste of dog feces is not beautiful for him. However, this isn't a choice. He cannot choose to define the taste of dog feces as beautiful for him. Objectively, the taste of dog feces is not beautiful for him. So if he defined the taste of dog feces as beautiful for him then he would be objectively incorrect.

Now Person B may in fact find the taste of dog feces beautiful. He cannot then define the taste of dog feces as not beautiful for him. So once again it's an objective truth that the taste of dog feces is beautiful for him.

This is similar to physical pain. Consider someone who is not able to feel physical pain. This person cannot then decide to define a sharp knife as painful for him. He would be objectively wrong. The sharp knife is not painful for him because he does not experience pain.

So indeed pain and beauty may vary from person to person. But that's not because they defined it as such. Rather it is the particular situation or state of their psyche and body.

So...... that's the application of beauty.... But - this conversation is about morality, not beauty. And once we get past this beauty discussion and back to morality, the application of the principles will be very, very different. But for now - on beauty - My original claim stands: (1) People do not define what beauty is for themselves and (2) People do not define what belongs to beauty for themselves.

I think we disagree on what the term "subjective" means. If taste isn't subjective, then nothing is subjective (or is that the point you are trying to argue).

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, just as morality is in the eye of the beholder. The reason one person has a different set of beliefs about what is beautiful than another isn't relevant to my point. The point is that there isn't a universal, absolute standard of beauty. Each person has their own ideas (influenced greatly by upbringing and culture) about what is beautiful.

OK - that may be your definition of subjective. But recall my original statement. I stated that no one defines what belongs to the beautiful. And you challenged that sentence.

Now, let's turn to morality. Morality is not like beauty. (and actually, the definition of beauty we've been using can be argued as well. But I went along with your definition, because I didn't want to go down another rabbit hole.) Anyway - your definition of beauty involves personal preference. Beauty was defined as - roughly - what brings pleasure or enjoyment to a particular person. So the definition we were using involved personal preference.

But morality, or the Right, is not something that involves personal preference. Perhaps, "perception" is the better word here. For example, a color blind person will perceive an orange ball as - let's say - blue. While another person will perceive it as orange. Well - the perception of color varies because each person has a different brain and eyes. And the brain is where perception takes place. The same with beauty (the kind that we were discussing). Beauty is something that is perceived - and each brain perceives differently.

Now - Right is not about perception. What is right has nothing to do with a person's perception apparatus. It may vary in different situations - but it will not vary based on a person's perception.

Moreover, with discussions on morality, relativists look at people's belief systems. Now belief systems are also different from perception. Belief systems entail rules of logic. They also entail assumptions. And when we analyze people's belief systems, here, we will find contradiction.

Relativists say that each person may have their own opinion about right and wrong. This is entirely different from each person having their own perceptions. Opinions and perceptions are two totally different things. So if you want to call differing perceptions of beauty relative - alright, fine. But calling differing opinions or belief systems relative - that's another story. And when I think of "relative" or "subjective" - this is what I understand the word "relative" to refer to... opinions. Before going any further, I'll let you respond.

I looked over your post again and noticed you talking about "beliefs" of beauty. Again - a person can have an incorrect belief about their perception.

If someone does not like the taste of feces, that person is wrong if he believes he does like the taste of feces. He is objectively wrong.

I think you agree with me about beauty more than you are willing to let on, and my entire point is that morality is like beauty in the sense that there is no absolute objectively testable measure of either.

Color is an interesting counter example. In fact, it is more interesting than you know.

Color is purely a human invention and wouldn't make sense in any other species. Even other sentient species would experience color (if they experienced color at all) in a completely different way.

In science, certain colors correspond to certain frequencies of light that can be objectively measured. But that only get's you certain colors. The color brown has zero meaning scientifically. It is purely an feature of how the human mind and eyes evolved.

If there was a race of humans that saw different colors (because of different eye physiology) there would be no objective way to say that one was right, and another was wrong. They would just be different.

It so happens that because our physiology is much the same in this regard, there is pretty wide agreement.

The obviously isn't the case with either beauty or morality (where different groups of humans have widely differing views in either case).

I am sorry, but this seems silly to me.

I believe I love the taste of coffee (which is why I drink it every day). Is it possible that I am mistaken?

If tastes are objective (as you seem to be arguing), give me an example of something that is subjective.

Objective testability is not the measure of relativism.

There is no way to objectively test whether we are in the Matrix. Does that mean that if someone believes he is in the Matrix then it is true for that person that he is in the Matrix? Whether something is objectively testable simply does not determine relativism.

On the belief about perception. I have never tasted feces. Though I believe that I dislike feces, I could discover that feces are actually very delicious to me. Although highly unlikely, and though it may sound very strange, it is conceivable that a person could actually taste something that he perceives as disgusting and yet because of some pathology forms the opinion that he likes it. Perhaps he says, "Oh I love feces!" and actually believes it. But when you give him feces, he spits it out immediately. Silly as it may sound, the distinction is important. Opinion is not the same as perception.

So let's get back to my original point: (1) Each person does not define morality for herself and (2) Each person does not define what belongs to morality for herself.

First, when we talk about Right, we are all talking about the same idea. One person doesn't think - "Oh yes, the Right - Those furry animals!" And another doesn't think - "Oh yes, the Right - You mean those cucumbers?" No, all agree on what the idea of the Right is. Now, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to define. But anyone who thinks the Right is furry animals or cucumbers is simply talking about a different idea than the rest of us.

So (1) Each person does not define morality for herself.

Turning next to (2) Each person does not define what belongs to morality for herself. The definition of the Right, unlike that of Beauty, is not something involving preference or perception. The Right doesn't enter our eyes and bring us pleasure. Some of us dislike the Right. Some of us like the Right. Some gladly admit that they dislike the Right. Some gladly admit that they like the Right. So individual preference is not what defines the Right. This is an entirely different animal than Beauty.

The relativist says - well the right is defined by each person according to their beliefs. So - take the following example:

Franky believes the following:
Hitting a person is wrong.
Joey is a person.
therefore
Hitting Joey is right.

You see that Franky's moral belief system contradicts itself yes? But yet a relativist would say that whatever he defines as Right is Right for him. But what is Right for Franky is contradictory.

Perceptions don't contradict themselves. Opinions and beliefs, conversely, most definitely can contradict themselves.

Additionally, people apply the Right, not only to themselves individually, but also, to everyone else. But this is unlike Beauty. When we're talking about Right and Wrong, we're talking about something that we apply to everyone, not just ourselves individually. So then, Franky might say, "It's wrong for Suzie to hit Joey". But then Harold might say, "It's not wrong for Suzie to hit Joey." This is a contradiction. You can't say that well it's right for Franky and wrong for Harold.

Consider if Franky and Harold applied Beauty to others. Franky says, "Suzie finds the Mona Lisa beautiful." Harold says, "Suzie does not find the Mona Lisa beautiful." This would be a contradiction. This reveals the true nature of relativism. In actuality Beauty is objective. It's not a matter of opinion whether Suzie finds the Mona Lisa beautiful. If it were a matter of opinion, then there would be a contradiction. Harold and Franky cannot both be right.

Therefore (2) Each person does not define what belongs to Morality for herself. This would lead to contradiction.

Yes I am not sure we are the origin or the cause of the relation...we are not wanting anything upon the object but rather our state of affairs and the state of affairs of the object raises an experience of beauty !
While we may claim the property of experiencing X we may not claim the property of the experience of X.
The experience of X is the experience of X.

1. An absolute truth should be objectively testable. If there is no way to test objectively test a statement of truth, then there is no way to decide (objectively) who is correct when two people disagree.

2. I am a relativist.



Your putting words into my mouth (words that, by the way, I would never say) is the definition of an straw man.

You are inventing a fictional dialog by a fictional "relativist" and then feeling smug when you disprove what your own invention says.

I am not sure that I understand, Fil.

When I say-- "that woman is very beautiful" I am assigning a property ("beauty") to an individual woman.

Beautiful is a property, and this woman's beauty will likely not just change my experience, it will likely change my actions towards her.

Yes you are experiencing beauty !... exactly what I said...you just aren't the author of beauty existing itself...if beauty is a function between a complex thing like an agent and any other thing, but you can't prove the agent invented the function of beauty, then you cannot assign beauty to you if not as an experience that you have, the experiencing itself...it happens to you but you are not in control...its like you can't avoid it but have that experience...your state of affairs and whatever object state of affairs inevitably produces that experience when confronted together in a given context where such algorithmic function like "beauty" arises...sorry for my English (I'm Portuguese) hope the idea is a bit more clear if not, ask away !